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 ABSTRACT 
THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE APPREHENSION OF BEING: 
THE ROLE OF JUDGMENT IN LIGHT OF  
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY  
SEMANTICS 
 
 
Rosa E. Vargas Della Casa, M.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2013 
 
 
Aquinas’ famous comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences (In I Sent., d. 
38, q. 1, a. 3) regarding the intellect’s apprehension of essence and esse have traditionally 
been interpreted as grounding Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse. For Aquinas, it 
appears, what the intellect apprehends in a simple concept is essence. Since esse, for him, 
is not an essence, it cannot, on the received view, be the object of conceptualization. 
Therefore, esse is grasped by the intellect only in judgment. The claim that no genuine 
concept of esse is possible, however, is inconsistent with Aquinas’ theory of 
signification. A term’s signification is constituted, at least in part, in its “signing relation” 
with some “concept” in the mind. If, as on the traditional reading, there is no concept of 
esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without signification. To respond that the term ‘esse’ signs, 
not a concept, but the judgment in which esse is apprehended is in direct conflict with 
Aquinas’ claim elsewhere that no term, including ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, signifies a judgment. I 
propose an alternative interpretation to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that allows for the 
possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse. The alternative reading explains 
Aquinas’ remarks there in light of the theoretical context of the discussion, in particular 
the theory of propositions and their objects. I show how and why Aquinas develops a 
distinctive theory of the object of the proposition, that it is concerned with “the esse of a 
thing” as a complex. Although this complex includes the simple act of being, as for the 
traditional position (contrary to its major critics), it cannot be reduced to anything simple. 
Despite the Sentences’ affirmation of a real distinction between a thing’s esse and 
essence, to which correspond two different operations of the intellect, it does not follow 
that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives essences, in a simple 
conception. 
  
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
Rosa E. Vargas Della Casa, M.A. 
 
 
I would like to thank my advisor, David Twetten, for guiding and supporting me 
throughout the time it took me to complete this research and write the dissertation. Also, I 
would like to thank my committee members, Richard Taylor, Owen Goldin, Mark 
Johnson, and John O’Callaghan, for their very helpful insights, comments and 
suggestions. 
I must acknowledge as well the many people who in various ways assisted, 
advised, and supported my research and writing efforts over the years. Alicia Burga, 
Marcos Campillo, Patricio Carrasco, Matt Wion, Daniel Esposito, Arun Iyer, Cristina 
Bucur, Luke Amentas, Arlie Ferguson, Katja Krause, Daniel Vecchio, Susan Whippel, 
Chris Pivonka, Tom Doyle, I thank you all. 
Especially, I need to express my gratitude and deep appreciation to my siblings, 
Ana Josefa and Guillermo, for their endless support and encouragement, and most 
importantly to my mother, Ana Eugenia, for her unwavering confidence in me and her 
pride in everything I do. 
Last but not least this dissertation is dedicated to my late father, Dr. Teófilo 
Vargas Saavedra, a truly inspirational individual and scholar whom I sorely missed.  
 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...................................................................................................i 
 
INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................vi 
 
CHAPTER I 
A PROBLEM REGARDING THE HUMAN INTELLECT’S  
APPREHENSION OF ESSE...............................................................................................1 
 
1.1 The Problem: A Concept of Esse.......................................................................1 
 
1.2 A Concept of Esse: Aristotelian or Thomistic Logic?.....................................12 
 
1.3 The Problem of a Concept of Esse: Begging the Question..............................15 
 
1.4 An Alternative Approach to the Problem........................................................17 
 
CHAPTER II 
AQUINAS AND THE TRADITION OF TERMINIST LOGIC.......................................20 
  
2.1 Thirteen Century Logic: The Tradition of Terminist Semantics.....................21 
 
2.1.1 Historical Background......................................................................22 
 
2.1.2 Thirteenth-Century Theory of Supposition.......................................30 
 
2.1.3 Thirteenth-Century Theory of Signification.....................................32 
 
A. The Signification of Terms......................................................33 
 
B. Consignifications and Modes of Signification.........................38 
 
a. Consignification...........................................................38 
 
b. Modes of Signification.................................................40 
 
C. Analogy: Signification per prius et posterius..........................43 
 
a. Background of the Discussion of Equivocation  
and Analogy in the Thirteenth Century.......................44 
 
b. The Semantic Structure of Analogous Terms..............47 
   
2.2 Aquinas’ Theory of Signification....................................................................51 
  
iii 
 
2.2.1 Aquinas’ Account of the Nature of the Conceptio and  
Res Signified by Terms.....................................................................52 
 
A. The Res Signified in Aquinas..................................................53 
 
B. Aquinas and the Conceptio Signified......................................62 
 
a. Simple vs. Complex Conceptions................................63 
 
b. Signification and Knowledge.......................................67 
  
2.2.2 Aquinas on Modes of Signification..................................................71 
 
A. Preliminary Remarks...............................................................71 
 
B. Concrete and Abstract Modes of Signification  
in Aquinas................................................................................74 
 
C. Concluding Remarks on Aquinas’ Account of  
Modes of Signification.............................................................81 
 
2.2.3 Aquinas on the Signification of Analogous Terms...........................84 
  
CHAPTER III 
AQUINAS ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF ESSE............................................................91 
 
3.1 Preliminary Remarks on the Signification of the Terms  
‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’ in Aquinas.............................................................................93 
 
3.1.1 The Modes of Signification of the Terms  
‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’................................................................................94 
 
3.1.2 Analogy of ‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’.............................................................95 
 
3.1.3 The ‘Conceptio’ and ‘Res’ Signified by  
‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’................................................................................96 
 
3.2 Aquinas on the Signification of the Concrete Term ‘Ens’  
and its Abstract Counterpart Esse’.................................................................100 
 
3.2.1 The Signification of the Concrete ‘Ens’.........................................100 
 
A. The Term ‘Ens’ Consignifies Composition...........................102 
 
B. The term ‘Ens’ Does not Signify Composition.....................109 
 
iv 
 
3.2.2 The Signification of the Abstract ‘Esse’.........................................122 
 
3.3 Aquinas on the Signification of the Verb ‘Est’..............................................130 
 
Conclusion...........................................................................................................137 
 
CHAPTER IV 
REREADING IN I SENT., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: EXPLAINING DIVINE  
KNOWLEDGE WITH A DISTINCTIVE PROPOSITION THEORY...........................142 
 
4.1 Eliminating Two Solutions............................................................................144 
 
4.1.1 Restating the Problem: Two Conflicting Sets of Texts on  
the Intellect’s Apprehension of Esse...............................................144 
 
4.1.2 Solution I: Judgment Regards Esse, not as Act of Existing,  
but as Mode of Existing...................................................................147 
 
4.1.3 Solution II: Only in the Later Writings Does Aquinas  
Recognize a Simple Conception of Esse........................................152 
 
4.1.4 The Simple Conception of Esse in the Early Writings...................154 
 
A. Aquinas’ Early Account of the Semantic Structure of  
‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’.....................................................................154 
 
B. The Simple Conception of ‘Ens’ in the Commentary  
on the Sentences and in the De veritate.................................158 
 
Text 1: The Commentary on the Sentences.....................158 
 
Text 2: The De veritate....................................................160 
 
4.1.5 Response to an Objection to a Simple Conception of  
‘Ens’ in the Early Writings.............................................................161 
 
4.1.6 Two Corollaries..............................................................................163 
 
4.2 In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: Utrum scientia Dei sit enuntiabilium..................164 
 
4.2.1 Theoretical Context: Enuntiabile Theory.......................................165 
 
A. The Ontological Status of Enuntiabilia.................................168 
 
B. Enuntiabilia as Bearers of Truth Value.................................170 
 
v 
 
C. Enuntiabilia as Objects of Knowledge and Belief.................173 
 
4.2.2 God’s Knowledge of Enuntiabilia: An Exegesis of  
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3................................................................175 
 
4.2.3 Human Knowledge of Enuntiabilia................................................181 
 
4.2.4 The Inherence Theory of Predication in Aquinas...........................185 
 
A. Copulative Propositions.........................................................185 
 
B. Existential Propositions.........................................................193 
 
4.2.5 The Esse of Things as Signified by Enuntiabilia............................196 
 
4.2.6 Returning to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: Esse Rei as the  
Correlate of Human Judgment........................................................200 
 
Concluding Remarks on on the Intellect’s Apprehension of  
Esse Rei at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3.......................................................214 
 
CONCLUSION................................................................................................................216 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................223 
 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The most famous and distinctive doctrine in Aquinas’ metaphysics is his account 
of esse as the act of a thing by which it exists, an act ontologically distinct from a thing’s 
essence. As a result, there is great interest in how Aquinas establishes the doctrine, and 
how esse in this sense is known. In three well-known passages in the commentaries on 
the Sentences and on Boethius’ De trinitate, both early works, Aquinas maintains that the 
second operation of the intellect regards the esse of a thing, whereas the first operation 
regards a thing’s essence. Ever since the work of Étienne Gilson and Joseph Owens such 
remarks have been interpreted as outlining Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse. 
According to this doctrine, esse is grasped originally and solely in ‘judgment’. There is 
no authentic ‘concept’ of esse, for only essence is grasped in ‘simple apprehension’. 
Since esse is not an essence, it cannot be the object of conceptualization. 
Among the earliest criticisms of this interpretation of Aquinas’ words is that of 
Louis-Marie Régis who, in a review of Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers in 1951, 
challenges the assertion that for Aquinas no concept of esse is possible from the point of 
view of Aquinas’ logic. Régis points to various passages from Aquinas’ commentary on 
Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias where Aquinas speaks of a concept of esse signified by the 
verb ‘est’. Régis’ critique was echoed by Jean Isaac who, in a similar review and 
referring also to the commentary on the Peri hermeneias, argues that for Aquinas the 
noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘est’ signify a concept of esse in different ways. Some years later, 
in 1959, Ralph McInerny argues against the claim that the verb ‘est’ is not a predicate 
(for, predicates are concepts, and ‘est’ is not a concept since no concept of esse is 
possible) on the basis of an study of Aquinas’ account of the signification of the verb 
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‘est’, which shows that, for Aquinas, ‘est’ is not only a concept but a predicate as well. 
Régis’ line of criticism for the denial of a concept of esse in Aquinas has otherwise 
generated very little attention among mainstream Aquinas scholars. A contributing factor 
may be the fact that prior to 1970 not much was known about the nature of thirteenth-
century logic and its place in Latin scholasticism. Only since the work of L. M. De Rijk 
in his Logica Modernorum, a two-volume study terminist logic completed in 1967, has it 
been widely recognized how central a role was played within subsequent thirteenth-
century education and thought by a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s logic, which 
originates in the twelfth century. As regards to Aquinas, in the last twenty years, serious 
research on Aquinas’ logic has begun to show the extent to which Aquinas’ doctrine of 
esse is embedded in his theory of signification. 
The present study defends Régis’ approach to the issue of the possibility of a 
concept or simple conception of esse in Aquinas. Régis’ position has failed to be 
compelling because (i) it offers no convincing alternative account of the early texts on 
judgment of esse; (ii) whatever account of these texts is offered seems to focus on a 
proposition as predicating form of a subject, which either ignores non-quidditative esse as 
act or reduces it to esse in the sense of the truth of a proposition, or ‘propositional esse’. 
By contrast, I establish three different claims. First, as part of his semantic theory, 
Aquinas recognizes a simple conception of esse. Second, the traditional reading of 
Aquinas’ remarks in the commentaries on the Sentences and on De trinitate on the 
intellect’s apprehension of  the esse of a thing as ruling out the possibility of a simple 
conception of esse cannot be made consistent with the text. And, third, Aquinas’ 
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association of the intellect’s second operation with a thing’s esse is a consequence of his 
rather novel view on the object of propositions. 
The discussion is divided into four chapters. In chapter I, I discuss in detail 
Gilson’s and Owens’ claim of the impossibility of a ‘concept’ of esse in Aquinas. I also 
review Régis’ and Isaac’s critique of this claim from the point of view of Aquinas’ logic.  
Last, I consider Gilson’s answer to the difficulties introduced by Régis and Isaac. 
Following on McInerny, I argue that Gilson’s response begs the question in ruling out of 
court Aquinas’ remarks in the commentary on the Peri hermeneias concerning a concept 
of esse as signified by the noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘est’. I submit that the question of 
whether or not Aquinas’ remarks in the Peri hermeneias are representative of the sort of 
logic to which Aquinas’ subscribes must be answered on the basis of an independent 
study of Aquinas’ logic, and in particular of his theory of signification. 
In chapters II and III, then, I review Aquinas’ account of the signification of 
terms, including the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’, in order to ascertain the nature of the logical 
theory to which Aquinas subscribes. In the process, I present evidence that as part of his 
semantic theory Aquinas recognizes a simple or non-composed conception of esse (i.e. a 
‘concept’ of esse). I begin chapter II by presenting the main elements of the standard 
semantic theory of terminist logic, according to which the signification of terms, nouns 
and verbs alike, is constituted primarily by their “signing relation” with a simple or non-
composed conception of some res. Aquinas subscribes to a version of this theory that is 
distinctive of mid-thirteenth century Latin Europe, a version sometimes called ‘pre-
modism’, in which is highlighted a correspondence within the semantic triangle between 
the modi significandi of terms, the modi intelligendi of our intellect, and the modi essendi 
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of extra-mental reality. We shall see significant overlap between the major witnesses of 
this logic, Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood, and Lambert of Auxerre, and the 
semantics of Aquinas. At different places throughout his works Aquinas characterizes the 
conception signified by terms as simple (incomplexa), and in more than one occasion he 
specifically links the kind of conception that nouns and verbs signify to the first operation 
of the intellect. Under the ‘pre-modist’ semantic framework, the noun ‘ens’ and the verb 
‘est’, which have esse as their res significata, must signify a simple conception of esse. 
Indeed, in chapter three, I show that in his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias, 
Aquinas argues that, despite appearances to the contrary, the conception the terms ‘ens’ 
and ‘est’ signify is not the sort of conception produced by the second operation of the 
intellect, a complex conception, but rather the sort of conception that belongs to the first 
operation, a simple conception. Aquinas’ remarks in the commentary on the Peri 
hermeneias on the signification of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ are thus very much consistent 
with the semantic theory to which Aquinas subscribes, pace Gilson. If, as on the 
traditional reading of the Sentences and De Trinitate, there is no concept of esse, we are 
faced with two conflicting sets of texts on the subject of the human intellect apprehension 
of esse. Should Aquinas’ early texts on the judgment of esse, then, be dismissed as 
inconsistent with his finished semantics? 
In the last chapter (chapter IV), I dissolve the apparent inconsistency between the 
texts by presenting an alternative reading of Aquinas’ association of the second operation 
of the intellect with a thing’s esse. My reading leaves open the possibility of a simple 
conception of esse. I begin by addressing a question of development, which suggests that 
Aquinas’ doctrine of the impossibility of a simple conception of esse belongs exclusively 
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to his early writings. In response, I show that even while (presumably) still maintaining 
the view that esse is apprehended only in judgment, Aquinas recognizes a simple 
conception esse. Next, I give an exegesis of the key text, In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, where 
Aquinas refers twice to the intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s esse in its second 
operation. Aquinas’ affirmations cannot be understood independently of the medieval 
problem of divine knowledge of enuntiabilia: can God with his simple understanding 
know propositions and their objects, which are complex, and if so, how? After presenting 
the theoretical background of Aquinas’ discussion, I show that, contrary to the traditional 
reading of the passage, Aquinas’s remarks on the second operation of the intellect and 
‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ are not directed at the intellect’s apprehension of esse as 
a simple. What Aquinas has in mind is rather the intellect’s apprehension of the 
composed unit that is ‘the esse of a subject’. Further, evidence for this interpretation 
emerges when one examines Aquinas’ ‘inherence theory’ of the proposition. Standard 
characterizations of Aquinas’ theory fail to see how the very notion of the proposition as 
predicating form of matter or a subject allows it also to be seen as predicating the being 
of a form of the subject. Existential propositions such as ‘Socrates exists’ can be taken as 
predicating a form. But Aquinas moves in the opposite direction: all propositions can be 
related to existential propositions as the primary instance, so that all propositions can be 
seen as predicating the act of being of a thing or esse rei. It appears that it is precisely in 
the context of explaining divine simple knowledge of complexes that Aquinas develops 
this propositional theory. Aquinas’ aim at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 is to contrast a 
propositional and hence complex apprehension of esse as the act of a subject (esse rei) in 
humans with knowledge in God that is not really distinct from his simple apprehension of 
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his esse, which is his essence. Apparently for Thomas the account of how God knows 
essences is by itself inadequate to explaining how God knows propositional complexes. 
The same association of the second operation of the intellect with the apprehension of a 
complex esse rei can be found in Aquinas’ other early texts, and he refers to the same 
solution to the problem of God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia in the mature Summa 
theologiae. 
 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 
A PROBLEM REGARDING THE HUMAN INTELLECT’S  
APPREHENSION OF ESSE  
 
 
1.1 The Problem: A Concept of Esse 
 
 
In his early Scriptum on the Sentences (c. 1251-52)
1
 Aquinas makes the following 
remarks regarding the intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s essence and esse: 
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse 
ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio 
intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis 
formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates 
rerum, quae etiam dicitur indivisibilium 
intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse 
rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam 
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a 
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in 
quadam compositione formae ad materiam, 
vel accidentis ad subjectum.
2
 
 
 
Since there are two [components] in a 
thing, the quiddity of the thing and its esse, 
a twofold operation of the intellect 
corresponds to these two. One is called 
“formation” by philosophers, by which the 
intellect apprehends the quiddities of 
things, which is also called the 
“understanding of indivisibles.” But the 
other comprehends the esse of a thing by 
composing an affirmation, because also the 
esse of a thing composed of matter and 
form, from which the intellect receives 
cognition, consists in a certain composition 
of form with matter or of accident with 
subject. 
 
Later in the same article, contrasting God’s and the human intellect’s apprehension of a 
thing’s esse and non esse, Aquinas adds, in the response to the second objection:  
Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a 
rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, 
non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo 
et dividendo.
3
 
But our intellect, whose cognition arises 
from things that have composite esse, 
apprehends this esse only by composing 
and dividing. 
 
Since the work of Étienne Gilson and Joseph Owens, these remarks have been interpreted 
as ruling out the possibility of a “conceptual” apprehension of esse and thus as grounding 
                                                 
1
 For the dating of Aquinas’ works see Jean-Pierre Torrell, Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin: 
Sa personne et son œuvre, 2nd ed. (Paris: Cerf, 2002). 
2
 In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903. 
3
 In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 904. 
2 
 
Aquinas’ distinctive doctrine on the judgment of esse. According to the mainstream 
reading of this doctrine, esse is originally and solely apprehended by the human intellect 
in judgment. For Aquinas, it appears, what the intellect apprehends in simple abstract 
conceptualization is essence. Since esse, for him, is not an essence, it cannot be the object 
of conceptualization. Therefore, no concept of esse is possible.  
The absence, indeed, the apparent impossibility, of a concept of esse, however, 
makes it difficult to explain the evident fact that esse is often the subject of thought and 
discourse. In response, Aquinas scholars generally concede that what is originally 
apprehended in judgment is in some way later also conceptualized. I say “in some way” 
because the resulting concept of esse is not regarded as a concept in the strict sense. In 
the second edition of Being and Some Philosophers, for example, Étienne Gilson 
recognizes a “logical concept” of esse. This logical concept, he says, mistakenly turns 
esse into an essence and needs to be distinguished from the proper “metaphysical 
conception” of esse in judgment. Gilson reminds his readers of a distinction he made 
earlier in his book between “conception,” which covers both judgment and 
conceptualization, and “concept” which is the simple apprehension of an essence.4 
Similarly, in An Interpretation of Existence, Joseph Owens observes that when we think 
and write about esse, the term ‘esse’ refers to a concept whose borrowed content can do 
no more than to “draw attention to and focus attention upon what is originally known 
through a judgment.”5 If esse cannot be apprehended through conceptualization, there is 
in fact no concept of esse. Owens writes: 
                                                 
4
 Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 221-27. 
5
 Joseph Owens, An Interpretation of Existence (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1968), 65. 
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We have no authentic concept of existence. What we do is use concepts of other 
objects to indicate actual existence and to keep attention concentrated upon it. But 
no concept taken just in itself expresses what is characteristic of the fact that 
something exists.
6
 
 
In a later article Gilson takes a similar position. He accepts a conceptual “representation” 
of esse; we use quidditative concepts to represent what is “implicitly conceived” in 
judgment.
7
 In the end, there really is no concept of esse. There cannot possibly be one if 
conceptualization, properly speaking, is limited to essences. The doctrine of the judgment 
of esse is seen by both Gilson and Owens as a distinctive feature of Aquinas’ 
metaphysics as compared to that of Aristotle. No doubt what is apprehended in judgment 
needs to be somehow conceptualized, but this can never be an authentic 
conceptualization. As Owens notes:  
Aquinas of course does more than judge that things exist. He thinks about and 
writes about existence as a topic. He is thereby conceptualizing what was 
originally known in judgment . . . He speaks of the existence of God, the 
existence of man, the existence of a stone, regarding existence as a single notion 
undiversified in itself . . .  Yet he shows no interest in calling it a concept.
8
 
 
Though largely accepted among scholars, the claim that esse is originally and 
solely apprehended by the human intellect in judgment has seen some criticism as not 
properly representing the doctrine of Aquinas. Cornelio Fabro, for instance, rejects the 
stand entirely. Fabro interprets Aquinas’ remarks at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 as dealing 
with “the characteristic function of the two operations of the mind which divide the two-
fold content of the notion of ens, essence and the actus essendi. Therefore, the notio entis 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 70. 
7
 Étienne Gilson, “Propos sur l’être et sa notion,” in San Tommaso e il pensiero moderno, ed. 
Pontificia Accademia di S. Tommaso (Roma: Città Nuova Editrice, 1974), 16. 
8
 Joseph Owens, “Aquinas on Knowing Existence,” in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of 
God: Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1980), 29. 
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precedes them both.”9 The notion of esse or actus essendi is thus for Fabro consequent 
upon the notion of ens. Jacques Maritain, in contrast, concedes an original intellectual 
apprehension of esse in judgment, but he denies that esse is solely apprehended in 
judgment. He recognizes three concepts of esse. One is a reflexive concept, subsequent 
upon what is originally known in judgment; the other two concepts are attained through 
abstraction and precede the apprehension of esse in judgment.
10
 
As intriguing as these alternative interpretations are they appear to be guided 
more by their respective proponent’s general understanding of Aquinas’ metaphysics than 
by a primarily logical inquiry guided by Aquinas’ texts. Another line of criticism, which 
stems from Louis-Marie Régis in his review of the first edition of Being and Some 
Philosophers, appears promising in this regard.
11
 Régis challenges Gilson’s assertion that 
for Aquinas no concept of esse is possible from the point of view of Aquinas’ logic, 
specifically his theory of signification. 
Before addressing Régis’ account of the problem, let us first briefly review some 
of the main components of Aquinas’ theory of signification.  Aquinas’ semantic theory is 
not different from the standard semantic theory of the mid-thirteenth century Latin west, 
terminist logic, the culmination of a dominant century-old tradition.
12
 The term 
                                                 
9
 Cornelio Fabro, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Grounds of Metaphysics,” 
International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1966): 426. 
10
 Jacques Maritain, “Réflexions sur la nature blessée et sur l’intuition de l’être,” Revue thomiste 
68 (1968): 17-32. 
11
 Louis-Marie Régis, review of Being and Some Philosophers, by Étienne Gilson, Modern 
Schoolman 28 (1951). 
12
 The most comprehensive work on terminist logic is that of L. M. De Rijk, Logica 
Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, 2 vols. (Assen: Van 
Gorcum, 1962-7). Other relevant works include: Elizabeth Ashworth, “Signification and Modes 
of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” Medieval 
Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991); Paul Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” in The Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Umberto Eco, “Denotation,” in On the 
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‘terminist’ results from the theory’s focus on the properties of terms. Among those 
properties, logicians count that of signification or significatio. Generally speaking, a term 
(terminus) can be any word in a given language. Strictly speaking, however, a term is 
defined as any part of speech which may be “subjected to the predicate or predicated of 
the subject in an ordinary categorical proposition.”13 Thus, whole phrases may be terms, 
but only words of a certain type are terms in their own right. According to terminist 
logicians, only ‘categorematic’ words (nouns, adjectives, and verbs) may be placed in the 
subject or the predicate position. What is characteristic of categorematic words is that 
they have signification on their own, that is, they have signification outside a 
propositional content. In other words, categorematic words have signification before they 
enter into a proposition. 
There are two things worth emphasizing in the terminist notion of signification. In 
the first place, signification is associated with “signing” rather than, as we might suppose, 
meaning.
14
 The question about the signification of terms is a question about what it is that 
terms sign. For any term, to signify is ‘to sign’. Signification is the property that a term 
has to sign something, that is, to represent or make something known beyond itself. Thus, 
another common formula for signification is “to establish an understanding” (intellectum 
constituere).
15
 Second, we must note that a term’s signification is twofold. A term 
immediately signifies a ‘conception’ in the mind (conceptio, ratio, or verbum mentale), 
but ultimately it signifies the ‘thing’ (res) that is the object of that conception. Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Medieval Theory of Signs, eds. Umberto Eco and Constantino Marmo (Amsterdan: Benjamins, 
1989). 
13
 Paul Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” 188. 
14
 On signification as signing, see Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 43-45; Eco, 
“Denotation,” 47-55; Spade, “Semantics of Terms,” 188-90.  
15
 Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 44. 
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signification of the res is mediated by the conceptio signified by the term.
16
  At the same 
time, the conceptio signified by the term is the conception of the res signified by the 
term. In the words of Aquinas: “the ratio signified by a name is the intellect’s conceptio 
of the thing signified by the name.”17 Now, there are many other distinctions that 
terminists will add to the signification of a term: consignifications, modi significandi, and 
possible secondary significations. At this point, however, what we need to remember is 
that a term’s signification consists in the signing of a ‘conception’ in the mind and of a 
‘thing’, generally outside the mind, which is the object of the conception signified.  
Signification is generally defined as a property of terms, but propositions too were 
said to have signification. Propositions have signification inasmuch as they make 
something known to the mind. The semantic or logical distinction between terms and 
propositions rests on the nature of the conception they signify. Propositions signify the 
composition or division of the intellect, that is, they signify a “mental proposition” or 
complex conception. Terms, on the other hand, signify a simple or non-composite 
conception.
18
  
                                                 
16
 For this doctrine in Aquinas see ST I, q. 13, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 139: “Respondeo 
dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum 
similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione 
intellectus;” ST I, q. 13, a. 4, ad 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 145: “[N]omen non significat rem, nisi 
mediante conceptione intellectus;” also In I Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 11, lines 
109-12: “[I]deo necesse fuit Aristotili dicere quod uoces significant intellectus conceptiones 
inmediate, et eis mediatibus res.” As we shall see, this mediated “signing” of the res is crucial to 
Aquinas’ account of modes of signification.  
For a discussion of the role of Boethius’ translation of Aristotle as affecting the medieval 
signification theory, see John O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a 
More Perfect Form of Existence (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 41-77.  
17
 ST I, q. 13, a. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 144: “Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio 
intellectus de re significata per nomen.”  
18
 On the signification of propositions see Gabriel Nuchelmans, “The Semantics of Propositions,” 
in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. 
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Let us now return to Régis’s review. Régis begins by pointing out that the 
assertion that no concept of esse is possible is inconsistent with Aquinas’ remarks in his 
commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias (c. 1270-71) regarding the signification of 
verbs. Régis refers us to the following passages: 
[S]ignificatio orationis differt a 
significatione nominis uel uerbi, quia 
nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem 
intellectum, oratio autem significat 
intellectum compositum.
19
 
 
The signification of a proposition differs 
from the signification of a noun or verb, 
because a noun or a verb signifies a simple 
understanding, a proposition signifies a 
composite understanding. 
 
Set dicendum est quod duplex est operatio 
intellectus, ut supra habitum est; ille qui 
dicit nomen uel uerbum secundum se, 
constituit intellectum quantum ad primam 
operationem, que est conceptio alicuius . . . 
non autem constituit intellectum quantum 
ad secundam operationem, que est 
intellectus componentis et diuidentis.
20
 
It should be said that the operation of the 
intellect is twofold, as was said above; and 
he who speaks a noun or a verb by itself 
brings about an understanding with respect 
to the first operation, which is the 
conception of something . . . but [the verb 
or the noun said by itself] does not bring 
about an understanding with respect to the 
second operation, which belongs to the 
intellect composing and dividing. 
 
In the first text, verbs are said to signify a simple understanding as opposed to a 
composite understanding; that is, verbs signify a “concept” rather than a judgment. 
Furthermore, in the second text, the conception signified by verbs is linked to the first 
operation of the intellect, not the second. If the verb forms of esse signify a simple 
conception, then clearly a “concept” of esse is possible.  
Next, Régis addresses Gilson’ claim of the “impredicability” of the verb ‘is’ or 
‘est’. As we are about to see, Gilson’s denial that ‘is’ is a predicate is closely linked to his 
denial that a “concept” of esse is possible. Before examining Régis’ objections on the 
matter, let us look at Gilson’s argument for the ‘impredicability’ of the verb ‘is’.  
                                                 
19
 In I Periher., lect. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32, lines 20-23.  
20
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 “Propositions,” Gilson writes, “are usually defined as enunciations which affirm 
or deny one concept of another.”21 A proposition consists in the union of two concepts (or 
of the disunion of two concepts, in the case of a negation). It follows from there that 
predicates are concepts. Gilson distinguishes two types of propositions: “one-term” and 
“two-term” propositions. An example of a two-term proposition is ‘Man is rational’, 
where ‘man’ and ‘rational’ are terms but ‘is’ is not. The reason ‘is’ is not a term, Gilson 
explains, is that “it designates, not a concept, but the determinate relation which obtains 
between two terms.”22 An example of a one-term proposition is ‘Peter is’, where there is 
only one term, ‘Peter’. Gilson asks, then: “if all propositions entail either a composition 
or division of concepts, how can there be a proposition in which there is only one 
concept?”23 One could answer that in the proposition ‘Peter is’, ‘is’ is the predicate, just 
as in the proposition ‘Peter runs’, ‘runs’ is the predicate. Gilson observes, though, that 
while ‘John runs’ may be turned into the two-term proposition ‘John is running’, the 
transformation is not possible for a proposition such as ‘Peter is’. Gilson explicates the 
matter as follows: 
Now, in such cases, as I am or God is the transformation is not even possible, 
because in I am being or God is being, the predicate is but a blind window which 
is put there for mere verbal symmetry. There is no predicate even in the thus-
developed proposition, because, while running did not mean the same thing as is, 
being does. In other words, is-running does not mean is, and this is why, in the 
first case, the verb is a copula, which it is not in the second case. The 
metaphysical truth that existence is not a predicate is here finding its logical 
verification.
24
 
 
Gilson explains that ‘is’ cannot be a predicate because esse or existence falls 
outside the scope of conceptual or abstract representation. Esse or existence is rather 
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 Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 190. 
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 Ibid., 191. 
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attained in judgment or, more precisely, in the judgment of existence. In Gilson’ analysis, 
a judgment of existence has no predicate. A judgment of the form ‘x is’, or merely ‘is’, 
does not predicate existence of its subject; rather, it “posits” the existence of the subject.  
If the proposition, “Peter is,” means anything, it means that a certain man, Peter 
by name, actually is, or exists. Is does not predicate anything, not even existence; 
it posits it.
25
  
 
In the judgment of existence Gilson finds a distinct and superior type of cognition than 
abstract conceptualization because in judgment essence is restored to its act of existing.  
Let us rather say that such a judgment intellectually reiterates an actual act of 
existing. If I say that x is, the essence of x exercises through my judgment the 
same act of existing which it exercises in x.”26 
 
The act of judging thus reflects the structure of reality where essence is composed with 
esse. Gilson finds confirmation of this doctrine in Aquinas’ Commentary on Boethius’ 
De trinitate, q. 5, a. 3. The reference is significant because this is a parallel text to In I 
Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 on the subject of the apprehension of esse.
27
 
 Let us now review Régis’ objections to the “impredicability” of the verb ‘is’. 
Régis points out that in the commentary on the Peri hermeneias Aquinas speaks of the 
verb ‘is’ as a predicate. He refers us to the following passage: 
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in 
enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut 
cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil 
aliud intendimus significare quam quod 
Sortes sit in rerum natura; quandoque uero 
non predicatur per se, quasi principale 
predicatum, set quasi coniunctum principali 
[T]his verb ‘is’ is sometimes predicated in 
a proposition in itself, as when one says 
‘Socrates is’, by which we do not intend to 
signify anything other than that Socrates 
exists in reality. But sometimes the verb 
‘is’ is not predicated in itself, as if [it were] 
the principal predicate, but, as it were, 
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 Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 201. 
26
 Ibid., 203. 
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 See De trin., q. 5, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 147, lines 96-101: “Prima quidem operatio 
respicit ipsam natua rei . . . . Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei.” For the passage 
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where the correlation between the two operations of the intellect and the principles of reality, 
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predicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto, 
sicut cum dicitur : «Sortes est albus» : non 
enim est intentio loquentis ut asserat 
Sortem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat 
ei albedinem mediante hoc uerbo ‘est’; et 
ideo in talibus ‘est’ predicatur ut adiacens 
principali predicato, et dicitur esse tercium 
non quia sit tercium predicatum, set quia 
est tercia dictio posita in enunciatione, que 
simul cum nomine predicato facit unum 
predicatum, ut sic enunciatio diuidatur in 
duas partes, non in tres.
28
 
 
conjoined to the principal predicate in order 
to connect it to the subject, as when one 
says ‘Socrates is white’. For, it is not the 
intention of the speaker to assert that 
Socrates exists in reality, but to attribute to 
him whiteness by means of the verb ‘is’; 
and for this reason ‘is’ in such cases is 
predicated as ‘adjacent to’ the principal 
predicate, and it is said to be ‘third’, not 
because it is a third predicate, but because 
it is a third term in the proposition, which 
together with the noun predicated make one 
predicate, and thus the proposition has two 
parts, not three. 
 
In light of this passage, Régis observes that Gilson’s distinction between “one-term” and 
“two-term” propositions finds no support in Aquinas. For Aquinas, every proposition 
contains two terms: a subject and a predicate term. The difference between the 
propositions ‘Socrates is’ and ‘Socrates is white’ is that in the proposition ‘Socrates is 
white’, the predicate is composed of the verb ‘is’ and the term ‘white’; whereas in the 
proposition ‘Socrates is’, the verb ‘is’ alone constitutes the predicate.  
Régis further observes that the metaphysical reason for the function of the verb 
‘is’ as copula comes directly from its object, which, for Régis, is not existence in general 
but the actual and present ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’. He cites the following passage from 
Aquinas’ commentary on the Peri hermeneias:  
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ . . . significat enim id 
quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum 
actualitatis absolute; nam ‘est’ simpliciter 
dictum significat esse actu, et ideo 
significat per modum uerbi. Quia uero 
actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc 
uerbum ‘est’, est communiter actualitas 
omnis forme uel actus, substancialis uel 
accidentalis, inde est quod, cum uolumus 
significare quamcumque formam uel actum 
[T]his verb ‘is’ . . . signifies that which first 
falls into the intellect in the mode of 
actuality absolutely; for, ‘is’ simply said 
signifies being in act, and thus it signifies 
in the mode of a verb. But because the 
actuality that is principally signified by the 
verb ‘is’ is, in common, the actuality of 
every form or act, whether substantial or 
accidental, it follows that when we wish to 
signify that some form or act is actually in 
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actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, 
significamus illud per hoc uerbum ‘est’, 
simpliciter quidem secundum presens 
tempus, secundum quid autem secundum 
alia tempora.
29
 
 
some subject, we signify this by means of 
the verb ‘is’, either simply or according to 
some qualification; simply, in the present 
tense; according to some qualification, in 
the other tenses. 
 
For Aquinas, Régis concludes, esse is grasped through and in a concept. Régis 
thus rejects Gilson’s claim that concepts are only of essences: “there are concepts in 
Thomism which neither are nor can be quidditative, because the reality which they 
signify is not quiddity but being.”30 Such is the case of the noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘esse’ 
or ‘est’; the concept each of these terms signifies is by no means quidditative.  
Régis’ critique of the assertion that for Aquinas no concept of esse is possible, a 
critique made in light of Aquinas’ logic, was echoed by Jean Isaac in his review of Being 
and Some Philosophers.
31
 Isaac’s contribution to the discussion consists in the 
introduction of the idea that the noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘esse’ signify the same abstract 
concept in the mind, only grasped in different ways: in the first case (‘ens’), as a subject; 
in the second case (‘esse’ or ‘est’), as the act of a subject. The latter, Isaac adds, is only 
possible in judgment.
32
 To this extent Isaac considers Gilson to be right. Indeed, esse as 
the act of a subject is grasped by the intellect only in judgment, for the act of a subject 
cannot be understood without its subject. However, Isaac notes, there is an abstract 
concept of esse that precedes the grasping of esse in judgment. 
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Gilson must have considered Régis’ and Isaac’s objections to the doctrine of the 
impossibility of a simple conception of esse sufficiently serious, for in the second edition 
of Being and Some Philosophers, he devotes an appendix to them. In the following 
section, we review Gilson’s response to Régis and Isaac. 
 
1.2 A Concept of Esse: Aristotelian or Thomistic Logic? 
 
 
In reference to the apparent inconsistency referred to by Régis between the 
doctrine of the judgment of esse and Aquinas’ commentary on the Peri hermeneias, 
Gilson asks:  
In his commentaries on Aristotle does Saint Thomas always express his deepest 
personal thought on a given question? Unless we admit that logic is a strictly 
formal science wholly unrelated to metaphysics, it is hard to imagine that the true 
Thomistic interpretation of a logic applicable to habens esse can be identically the 
same as that of a logic applicable to a metaphysics of ousia.
33
 
 
Gilson insinuates that Aquinas’ metaphysics requires a different sort of logic from that of 
Aristotle. For Aquinas, Gilson insists, there can be no “concept” of esse because 
“concepts” are only of essences and esse is not an essence. One may speak of a “concept” 
of esse only when esse is mistaken for essence. There is, however, a “conception” of esse 
in judgment. Gilson often goes back to his distinction between “concept” and 
“conception,” insisting that he has not denied a “conception” of esse.  How this 
distinction serves to dissolve the difficulty remains unclear. At some point, however, 
Gilson seems to recognize that the difficulties regarding the cognition of esse cannot be 
reduced to the level of names:  
Whether or not our conceptions of verbs should be called ‘concepts’ is, outside of 
history, of secondary importance. What does matter is to know if nouns and verbs 
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express cognitions of the same nature and if they point out the same constitutive 
element in the metaphysical structure of being.
34
 
 
Gilson’s assessment of what Régis’ observations amount to is on target. If nouns and 
verbs signify “cognitions of the same nature,” then concepts are not restricted to being 
about one metaphysical constituent alone, essence, and thus a concept of esse may be 
possible. Furthermore, if a simple conception of esse, expressed by a verb, is possible, 
then we have reason to question the traditional reading of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 as 
ruling out the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse.  
Of course, Gilson’ answer to the question of whether or not the cognitions 
signified by verbs and nouns are of the same nature is in the negative. Gilson remains 
firm in his interpretation of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 as ruling out the possibility of a 
conceptual apprehension of esse. Based on the idea that esse cannot be the object of 
conceptualization because esse is not an essence, Gilson concludes that nouns and verbs 
cannot express the same kind of cognition. Having limited conceptualization to essences, 
Gilson has no difficulty inferring that since verbs do not point out essences, verbs cannot 
possibly signify a concept and must therefore signify a judgment. For Gilson, Aquinas’ 
distinction between essence and esse entails the distinction between conceptualization 
and judgment as well as the distinction between nouns and verbs:  
[T]he same metaphysical distinction between esse and essentia . . . entails the 
logical distinction between simple apprehensions and judgments, as well as the 
grammatical distinction between nouns and verb.
35
 
 
According to the logic Gilson attributes to Aquinas, nouns signify essences and their 
concepts, whereas verbs signify esse and the judgment of esse.  
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Regarding the relation between the linguistic expressions ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, Gilson 
observes that ‘ens’ is not properly a noun since it signifies not essence but esse; ‘ens’ is a 
“verbal” noun. Here Gilson presents us with the following texts where ‘ens’ is said to 
signify esse not essence: “Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi” (In 
I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2); and “nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen 
entis ab esse” (SCG I, c. 25). From the observation that ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ signify esse, not 
essence, Gilson concludes, contrary to what Isaac suggests, that there is no “concept” of 
esse common to ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ that is grasped in different ways; for, only essence may 
be an object of conceptualization. Once again, there is no concept of esse. There is only 
esse or the act of existence which is signified in abstracto by ‘ens’ and in concreto by 
‘esse’: “Ens signifies in abstracto the act concretely signified by is.”36 In support of his 
analysis of ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, Gilson refers us to the following passage in Aquinas: 
[V]ita non hoc modo se habet ad vivere, 
sicut essentia ad esse; sed sicut cursus ad 
currere; quorum unum significant actum in 
abstracto, aliud in concreto.
37
 
The relation between ‘vita’ and ‘vivere’ is 
not the same as that between ‘essence’ and 
‘esse’; it is rather the same as ‘cursus’ and 
‘currere’, one of which signifies the act in 
the abstract, the other in the concrete.  
 
According to Gilson, the correct parallel to ‘cursus’ and ‘currere’, and to ‘vita’ and 
‘vivere’, would be ‘ens’ and ‘esse’. The verb ‘est’ signifies the act of existing in the 
concrete, for ‘est’ signifies ‘something is’. The verbal noun ‘ens’ signifies the same act 
but in the abstract, for ‘ens’ signifies ‘habens esse’, that is, ‘an existing being’. Earlier in 
the text, Gilson has observed that the apprehension of ‘ens’ (i.e., of ‘habens esse’) 
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implies the apprehension of its esse, for it is because ‘it has esse’ that a thing is an ens. 
Hence ‘ens’ expresses the same object as the verb ‘est’.38  
At the outset, there is a serious problem with Gilson’s response to the objections 
raised by Régis and Isaac: his argument begs the question. 
 
1.3 The Problem of a Concept of Esse: Begging the Question 
 
 
In his Being and Predication, Ralph McInerny has pointed out that, in answering 
Régis and Isaac, Gilson begs the question when he uses the equation between concept 
and essence as a reason to dismiss the texts referred to by Régis and echoed by Issac 
where Aquinas speaks of a concept of esse. For, the equation between concept and 
essence is precisely what those texts bring into question.
39
 McInerny, it seems to me, is 
correct. According to Gilson, a logic applicable to the metaphysical doctrine of the real 
distinction between essence and esse cannot admit a “concept” of esse because concepts 
are only of essences and, for Aquinas, esse is not an essence. In Gilson’s estimation, the 
texts where Aquinas speaks of a concept of esse must represent the logic, not of Aquinas, 
but of Aristotle, at least as viewed by Aquinas.
40
 But, here is the problem: whether or not 
Aquinas’ remarks in the commentary on the Peri hermeneias regarding a concept of esse 
are representative of the logic to which Aquinas subscribes is an issue that can only be 
resolved on the basis of an independent examination of Aquinas’ logic. 
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Gilson provides us with a series of statements on the signification of nouns and 
verbs, as well as of ‘ens’ and ‘est’, that he claims represent the logic of Aquinas as 
contrasted with the logic of Aristotle: 
(i) Nouns and verbs signify objects and cognitions of a diverse nature. 
Whereas nouns signify essences and their concepts, verbs signify esse and 
the judgment of esse.  
(ii) The verbal expressions ‘ens’ and ‘est’ signify, not a concept of esse, but 
the judgment of esse.  
(iii) Esse or the act of existence is signified in abstracto by ‘ens’ and in 
concreto by ‘est’. 
(iv) The verb ‘est’ is not a predicate. For, predicates are concepts, and ‘est’ is 
not a concept. 
(v) A judgment of existence (i.e., a judgment of the form ‘x is’) contains not 
two terms but one.  
Although Gilson introduces the aforementioned statements as representing a ‘Thomistic 
Logic’ as contrasted with an ‘Aristotelian Logic’, he presents no direct evidence that 
Aquinas indeed subscribes to them. In fact, they downright contradict Aquinas’ 
affirmations on the matter in his commentary on the Peri hermeneias. Gilson is right in 
his assessment of the logic that would follow from the denial of a concept of esse. But 
whether or not Aquinas subscribes to such logic is yet to be seen.  
There is, however, one observation made by Gilson on the problem of a concept 
of esse which is very much on target. Gilson observes that the answer to the question of 
whether there is a concept of esse requires first an answer to the question of whether 
17 
 
nouns and verbs “express cognitions of the same nature.”41  I agree, and I submit that the 
answer to the question is to be found by examining Aquinas’ account of the signification 
of nouns and verbs in general. If Aquinas’ theory of signification reveals that nouns and 
verbs signify cognitions of the same nature, then, there would be no reason to suppose 
that, when in the commentary on the Peri hermeneias Aquinas writes that the verb ‘is’ or 
‘est’ signifies a simple conception produced by the first operation of the intellect, he is 
not expressing, as Gilson terms it, “his deepest personal thought.”42 
 
1.4 An Alternative Approach to the Problem 
 
 
Before we consider my proposal for an alternative approach to the problem, let 
me offer a short recount of the problem itself. We have two conflicting sets of texts. In 
the first place we have In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 where Aquinas establishes a correlation 
between the two operations of the intellect and the two metaphysical principles in a thing, 
essence and esse. The essence of a thing is apprehended by the first operation, the esse of 
a thing by the second operation. The traditional reading of this passage understands it as 
ruling out the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse, that is, as denying the 
possibility of a “concept” of esse. On the other hand, we have Aquinas’ Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias where he specifically links the kind of conception that nouns 
and verbs signify to the first operation of the intellect alone. Nouns and verbs signify a 
simple conception rather than a composite conception, that is, they signify a “concept” 
rather than a judgment. Hence, a concept of esse is possible. Here is then the problem: 
The denial of the possibility of a genuine conceptual apprehension of esse is inconsistent 
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with the semantic theory of the Commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias. According 
to the latter, the signification of nouns and verbs is constituted, at least in part, by their 
“signing relation” with some concept in the mind. If, as on the traditional reading of In I 
Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, there is no concept of esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without 
signification.  
In order to address the problem and dissolve the inconsistency between texts, we 
have two possible paths to follow. In the first, we take as our starting point the claim that 
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 rules out the possibility of conceptual apprehension of esse. 
From here, our best explanation of the apparent inconsistency of texts is to agree with 
Gilson’s assessment of Aquinas’ commentaries on Aristotle. The inconsistency 
disappears since the conflicting semantic remarks do not represent Aquinas’ own theory 
of signification, but that of Aristotle, at least as viewed by Aquinas. We have seen the 
problems with such an approach. The other possible path is to take Aquinas’ semantic 
theory as our starting point.  One first task would then be to show that Aquinas’ remarks 
in his commentary on the Peri hermeneias regarding the signification of nouns and verbs 
and of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ are consistent with the general semantic theory Aquinas 
subscribes to. Recent research, unknown or little used by mainstream Aquinas scholars 
prior to 1970, greatly simplifies this project by having already established the nature of 
twelfth-thirteenth century “terminist” logic, and the fact that Aquinas was conversant in 
and an active contributor to this tradition. The real challenge we face, however, by taking 
Aquinas’ semantic theory as our starting point is to offer an alternative interpretation of 
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that allows for the possibility of a conceptual apprehension 
of esse, thus solving the apparent inconsistency. 
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The second path is the one I pursue. There is much to be gained by approaching 
the issue of the human intellect’s apprehension of esse from the point of view of 
Aquinas’ semantic theory. Moreover, the same holds true regarding other issues 
pertaining to Aquinas’ doctrine of esse. As any reader of Aquinas can tell, Aquinas’ 
metaphysical claims regarding esse are very often accompanied by a series of semantic 
remarks regarding the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ which are apparently intended to illuminate 
the corresponding metaphysical claims. Yet to the contemporary reader these semantic 
remarks are anything but illuminating. As a result, scholars tend for the most part either 
to ignore them or to take them as dispensable accessories to the comparatively 
substantive claims. However, Aquinas’ semantic remarks function as more than outdated 
explanatory tools. In fact, as Gyula Klima has noted, the very form of discourse within 
which Aquinas’ metaphysical claims are formulated presupposes a distinct semantic 
theory which sets the stage for the language game in which Aquinas and his 
contemporaries participate.
43
 Therefore, if we are not only to make sense of but also to 
join in the discussion with some degree of competence, we need to be proficient in the 
rules governing the game and thus the semantic theory in which it is framed. In short, our 
understanding of Aquinas’ metaphysical doctrine of esse is enriched if we take seriously 
his semantic remarks. 
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 CHAPTER II 
 
 
AQUINAS AND THE TRADITION OF TERMINIST LOGIC 
 
 
This chapter serves two purposes at once. It provides the conceptual tools 
necessary for the next chapter’s discussion of Aquinas on the terms that signify esse, 
namely, of the noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘esse’. In the process, the chapter also shows that 
Aquinas’ theory of signification is no different from the standard semantic theory of the 
mid-thirteenth century, ‘terminist logic’, which has its origins in an original interpretation 
of the logical works of Aristotle that emerged in the twelfth century.  
The chapter is divided into two parts, the first of which is devoted to terminist 
logic, focusing especially on the authors whose semantics parallels Aquinas’ and who 
may have influenced Aquinas, directly or indirectly. After reviewing the historical 
background leading to the development of terminist logic in the Latin west, I examine the 
terminist theory of signification as found in logical treatises of the mid-thirteenth 
century.
1
 Naturally, the focus will be on the notion of signification (significatio), but I 
will also consider three other related notions: consignification (consignificatio), modes of 
signification (modi significandi), and analogy (analogia) or signification per prius et 
posterius. In addition, I briefly review the notion of supposition (suppositio), given that 
Aquinas occasionally uses supposition theory to explain some features of a term’s 
signification. In the second part of the chapter, I review Aquinas’ theory of signification. 
                                                 
1
 The most comprehensive work on terminist logic is that of L. M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum: 
A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, 2 vols. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962-7). 
Other relevant literature can be found in Elizabeth Ashworth, The Tradition of Medieval Logic 
and Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth Century. A Bibliography 
from 1836 Onwards (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978); Fabienne Pironet, 
The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the End of the 
Seventeenth Century. A Bibliography (1977-1994) (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997). 
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Aquinas’ understanding of the notion of modi significandi will be of particular interest to 
us in view of the next chapter’s discussion on Aquinas’ account of the signification of the 
terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, which discussion largely centers on the modes of signification 
Aquinas assigns to these terms. As we shall see, following on the logicians’ use of the 
notion, Aquinas relates the notion of modi significandi with that of modi intelligendi. For 
Aquinas, the modes of signification of terms follow from the modes of understanding of 
the intellect; thus, an examination of the mode of signification of ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ will 
help us ascertain the sort of conception these terms signify. 
 
2.1 Thirteen Century Logic: The Tradition of Terminist Semantics 
 
 
Throughout the Middle Ages the area of study which today is identified as 
“semantics” was traditionally placed under the province of logic.2 For the greater part of 
the thirteenth century (up until around 1275) terminist logic was the prevailing logical 
theory. Terminist logic, also known as ‘modern logic’ (logica moderna) as opposed to the 
‘ancient logic’ (logica antiqua) of Aristotle, was the culmination of a century-old 
tradition which begins with the rediscovery of Aristotle’s logical works in the twelfth 
century. The name ‘terminist’ results from the theory’s focus on the properties of terms. 
Generally speaking, a term (terminus) can be any word in a given language. Strictly 
speaking, however, a term is defined as any part of speech which may be “subjected to 
the predicate or predicated of the subject in an ordinary categorical proposition.”3 
                                                 
2
 On the scope of grammar and logic in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Michael 
Covington, Syntactic Theory in the High Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), 8-12. 
3
 Paul Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval 
Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 188. 
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According to this definition, whole phrases may be terms, but only a certain kind of 
words may be terms in a proposition. Medieval logicians classified words into two kinds: 
categorematic words (categoremata) and syncategorematic words (syncategoremata). 
Only categorematic words are terms in their own right since they can function by 
themselves as subjects and predicates of propositions; thus, nouns, adjectives, and verbs 
are the only kind of words included within this category. Terminist logicians recognize 
two main properties of terms: signification (significatio), which is the property a term has 
of ‘signing’ a concept in the mind and an object in the real world; and supposition 
(suppositio), which is the property a term has of ‘standing for’ a particular object or 
individual. 
In the following pages, I consider, first, the notion of suppositio, and next, the 
notion of significatio, together with the subordinate notions of consignificatio, modi 
significandi, and signification per prius et posterius, as found in treatises of logic of the 
mid-thirteenth century. Before analyzing the notions of supposition and signification, 
though, it is helpful to locate them against their background. I begin, then, with a review 
of the historical background leading to the standard semantic theory of the mid-thirteenth 
century. 
 
2.1.1 Historical Background 
 
 
At the turn of the twelfth century, the only logical works of Aristotle that were 
available in the Latin west were the Categories and De interpretatione. The rest of 
Boethius’s translations (the Prior Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistical Refutations) 
23 
 
were lost and not rediscovered until the 1120s.
4
 During the first haft of the twelfth 
century, Latin translations of other previously unknown works of Aristotle (including the 
Posterior Analytics) were made and disseminated throughout the Latin west. By 1150 the 
complete Aristotelian logical corpus was available to scholars in Latin translation.
5
 The 
influx into the Latin west of new translations of original texts as well as of commentaries 
on those texts by Arabic and other Greek authors continued over the second half of the 
twelfth century and into the thirteenth century. The wealth of new material circulating in 
Western Europe at this time inspired the development of original new work by medieval 
scholars. During this period the logica moderna took form and with it the theory of the 
properties of terms. 
It was previously thought that the development of the logica moderna, or 
terminist logic as it was later known, was primarily the result of the assimilation of 
Byzantine and Arabic logic. It is true that some Arabic treatises on logic were available to 
scholars in Latin translation since the second half of the twelfth century,
6
 but they appear 
to have to have had little influence on the development of the logica moderna. In his 
Logica Modernorum De Rijk has effectively shown that the logica moderna developed 
authentically in Latin Europe. It was the result of the creative minds of medieval 
                                                 
4
 Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles latinus,” in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg (eds), Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 46. 
5
 James of Venice completed a Latin translation of the Posterior Analytics between 1125 and 
1150. He also produced a new translation of the Sophistical Refutations. See Dod, “Aristoteles 
latinus,” 74-79. 
6
 Early in the second half of the twelfth century Al-Ghazali’s Intentions of the Philosophers was 
translated in full into Latin. Parts of Avicenna’s Book of Healing, namely the part on Porphyry’s 
Isagoge and some fragments of the part on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, were also available to 
twelfth century scholars. In addition, small fragments of Al-Farabi’s logic works were also 
circulating. Henrik Lagerlund, “The Assimilation of Aristotelian and Arabic Logic up to the Later 
Thirteenth Century,” in Logic Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 2, Medieval and 
Renaissance, ed. Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008), 284-85. 
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logicians who, having appropriated the logica nova of the recently rediscovered 
Aristotelian texts on logic, expanded the range and application of logic to previously 
unconsidered problems. According to De Rijk, it was in part the rediscovery of the 
Sophistical Refutations, which deals primarily with fallacies, that set in motion the 
development of the theory of the properties of terms and, in particular, the notion of 
supposition.
7
 Although the theory of the properties of terms comprises both signification 
and supposition, it developed primarily as a theory of supposition. Early terminist 
logicians had a contextual approach to semantics; the discussion was centered on the 
properties of terms in a proposition. Supposition theory is “a theory describing how the 
structure of a sentence indicates what kind of items its terms ‘stand for’ (stant pro) or 
‘suppose for’ (supponunt pro).”8 Terminist logicians were certainly not unaware of the 
new departures of the logica moderna, but at the same time they did not see themselves 
as truly going beyond Aristotle, whom they regarded as the pre-eminent logician whose 
theory is virtually complete.
9
 Supposition theory, however, is genuinely a European 
invention. Unlike the notion of signification, which has its roots in the Peripatetic 
tradition, the notion of supposition has no counterpart in Greek scholasticism.
10
  
By the turn of the thirteenth century, logic had firmly reestablished itself as a 
major discipline of study, and terminist logic was widely acknowledged as a common 
                                                 
7
 In addition to the discussion of fallacies in the early Latin commentaries on the Sophistical 
Refutation, the development of grammar in the twelfth century also played an important role in 
the formulation of the theory of supposition; De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, 2:95-125. 
8
 Sten Ebbesen, “The Dead Man is Alive,” Synthese 40, no. 1 (1979): 45. 
9
 Sten Ebbesen, “What Counted as Logic in the Thirteenth Century?” in Methods and 
Methodologies. Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500, ed. Margaret Cameron and John 
Marenbon (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 99-101. 
10
 Sten Ebbesen, “Dead Man is Alive,” 45-46. 
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frame of reference for logical and semantic analysis.
11
 At the newly established 
universities of Paris and Oxford, logical studies quickly became the main feature of the 
arts curriculum.
12
 As noted by Ashworth, “Logic was at the heart of the arts curriculum, 
for it provided the techniques of analysis and much of the vocabulary found in 
philosophical, scientific, and theological writing. Moreover, it trained students for 
participation in the disputations that were the central feature of medieval instruction.”13 
Aristotle’s Organon, Porphyry’s Isagoge, and Boethius’ logical treatises were the core of 
the logic curriculum of the trivium.
14
 The central place of logic in medieval instruction is 
further evidenced by the fact that Aristotle’s logical works remained largely unaffected 
by the prohibitions on Aristotle of the 1210-1230s. Logic was never very controversial. It 
was the Metaphysics, Physics and other Aristotelian works on natural philosophy that the 
authorities of the time found objectionable.
15
 During the first half of the thirteenth 
century, the most influential treatises of logic written within the tradition of terminist 
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 Alain De Libera, “The Oxford and Paris Traditions in Logic,” in Kretzmann, Kenny, and 
Pinborg (eds), Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 174. 
12
 Richard Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 
182; Ashworth, “Terminist Logic,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert 
Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1:146. The medieval universities were 
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F. M. Powicke, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1936); Gordon Leff, Paris and Oxford 
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(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968).  
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 Ashworth, “Terminist Logic,” 146. 
14
 For an account of the standard textbooks used by students at the Arts Faculty in Paris in the 
thirteenth century, see C. H. Lohr, “The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle,” in Kretzmann, 
Kenny, and Pinborg (eds), Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 84-86. 
15
 Lagerlund, “Aristotelian and Arabic Logic,” 283-84. By the end of the twelfth century scholars 
had in Latin translation all of On Generation and Corruption, On the Senses, On the Heavens, 
and the Physics, as well as books I-V of the Meteorologics. Dod, “Aristoteles latinus,” 47. 
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logic were composed: Peter of Spain’s Tractatus; William of Sherwood’s Introductiones 
in logicam; and Lambert of Auxerre’s Logica, also known as Summa Lamberti.  
Of all the logical treatises produced in the thirteenth century, Peter’s of Spain’s 
Tractatus (written between 1230 and 1245) was by far the most influential. It was used 
throughout European universities as a standard logic textbook well into the seventeenth 
century.
16
 There is some uncertainty as to the true identity of Peter of Spain, but recent 
evidence suggests that, unlike what was previously thought, the author of the Tractatus is 
not Pope John XXI, but rather a Spanish Dominican.
17
 Although not as influential in 
subsequent centuries as Peter’s Tractatus, Sherwood’s Introductiones in logicam (written 
in the late 1230s or early 1240s) was highly regarded among his contemporaries. The 
Franciscan Roger Bacon acknowledges his influence in his Opus tertium (written in 
1267).
18
 It is likely that Sherwood lectured at both Oxford and Paris; he is believed to 
have been a master in the Arts Faculty at Paris between 1240 and 1248.
19
 Regarding 
Lambert’s Logica, it was likely written in the mid 1250s. The author of the Logica is 
generally identified with the Dominican Lambert of Auxerre, but recent studies have 
showed that the author could very well be his contemporary Lambert of Lagny.
20
 There 
are strong similarities in composition, organization, and doctrine among the above-
                                                 
16
 On the diffusion of Peter’s Tractatus, see L. M. De Rijk, introduction to Tractatus, by Peter of 
Spain (Assen: Van Gordum, 1972), xcv-cx. As De Rijk notes, Peter’s Tractatus was repeatedly 
copied and commented upon; the earliest commentaries date to the second half of the thirteenth 
century. There exist today no less than 300 manuscripts and 200 printed editions of the Tractatus, 
the latter dating from 1474 to 1639. 
17
 On Peter of Spain as a member of the Dominican Order, see Angel d’Ors, “Petrus Hispanicus 
O.P., Auctor Summularum,” Vivarium 35 (1997), 39 (2001), 41 (2003). For Peter of Spain as 
Pope John XXI, see Joseph Bochenski, introduction to Summulae Logicales, by Peter of Spain 
(Turin: Marietti, 1947), xii. 
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 For a quote of the relevant passage, see Norman Kretzmann, introduction to Introduction to 
Logic, by William of Sherwood (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 5. 
19
 Kretzmann, introduction, 8. 
20
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Summa Lamberti?” International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2009). 
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mentioned logical treatises. However, given the uncertainties of authorship and dating 
surrounding them, lines of influence among them cannot be properly traced.
21
 As noted 
by De Rijk, the similarities between the treatises are better explained by the authors’ 
standing in a common tradition.
22
 
Although Arabic logic was not as influential in the development of Latin tradition 
of terminist logic as it was previously thought, it had not an insignificant influence either. 
In a recent study, Langerlund has traced some lines of influence of Arabic logic on the 
work of mid-thirteenth century Latin commentators of the logical works of Aristotle, 
among them Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), Albert the Great (d. 1280), and Robert 
Kilwardby (d. 1279).
23
 The most notable line of influence is the section on logic from Al-
Ghazali’s Intentions of the Philosophers, which was the basic text from which Latin 
scholars acquired their knowledge of Arabic philosophy. Latin scholars assumed that the 
Intentions of the Philosophers contained the views of Al-Ghazali himself, but it was in 
fact intended as a reworking of Avicenna’s doctrines contained in his Book of Science.24 
Al-Ghazali’s work was translated in full into Latin early in the second half of the twelfth 
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Problems in Arabic Philosophy, ed. M. Maróth (Piliscsaba, Hungary: Avicenna Institute of 
Middle East Studies, 2003), 37–49. 
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century, but it was not widely read until the thirteenth century.
25
 Al-Ghazali’s 
presentation of Avicenna’s division of the matter of syllogism is found in several logic 
texts of the mid-thirteenth century.
26
Avicenna’s view of logic as a science of second 
intentions was also influential. Another line of influence explored by Lagerlund is 
Averroes’ commentaries on the logical works of Aristotle. Latin translations of Averroes’ 
middle commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, De interpretatione, Prior Analytics, and 
Posterior Analytics, as well as his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, became available 
to Latin scholars between the 1220s and 1230s. Averroes’ views on differentia and modal 
propositions appear to have been influential, but Averroes’s most notable influence is 
manifested in the tendency of mid-thirteenth century Latin scholars to read metaphysics 
and epistemology into the logic.
 27
 
Other scholars have remarked that what characterizes the mid-thirteenth century 
approach to semantics is the close connection between logic as a theory of language and 
discussions on epistemology and ontology, a connection that was absent in the early 
tradition of terminist logic.
28
 In this new approach to semantics, which dominated the 
discussion at Paris from around 1250 to 1275, the key notion is that of signification 
(significatio) as opposed to supposition (suppositio).
29
 The new developments in logic 
during this period were determined by reflections on the discussions on equivocation, 
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 Henrik Lagerlund, “Al-Ghazali on the Form and Matter of Syllogisms,” Vivarium 48 (2010): 
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univocation, and analogy as found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and as developed by Arabic 
authors, as well as by discussions on the operations of the soul from Aristotle’s De 
anima.
30
 The period between 1250 and 1275 is often described as a pre-modistic period.
31
 
During the last decades of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth 
century, logic at Paris was dominated by speculative grammar or ‘modistic’ theory, so-
called because of its focus on the notion of modus significandi or mode of signification; 
those who wrote within this theory were accordingly called ‘modistae’.32 Some 
characteristics of modistic theory are prefigured in the semantic discussions of mid-
thirteenth terminist authors, most notably the connection between a theory of language 
and epistemology and ontology. They saw parallels between modi significandi, modi 
intelligendi, and modi essendi, a parallelism that has been taken to define ‘modism’.33 In 
effect, they could be called ‘pre-modist terminists’.34 However, there are significant 
differences on how this parallelism is approached. The modistae were most interested in 
metalinguistic questions, such on the nature and structure of language, than in the 
semantic analysis of terms. The modistae offered an ontological interpretation of the 
structure of language. The modi significandi, the basic components of meaning, were 
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 See Van der Lecq, “Logic and Theories of Meaning,” 348; De Libera, “Oxford and Paris,” 182-
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held to be reflections of the properties of real-world objects, that is, of the modi essendi 
of extra-mental reality.
35
 Pre-modist terminist logicians of the mid-thirteenth century had 
a more epistemological approach to the study of language.
36
 Discussions were centered 
on the semantics of terms. The focus was on the property of signification and on the 
connection between the modi significandi of terms and the modi intelligendi of our 
intellect. 
Let us turn next to a review of terminist logic. We begin with a brief overview of 
the property of supposition; next, I focus the discussion on the property of signification 
(significatio), as did thirteenth century logicians. Our primary sources will be the logical 
treatises of Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood, and Lambert of Auxerre. 
 
2.1.2 Thirteenth-Century Theory of Supposition 
 
 
Aquinas was familiar with terminist theory of supposition and used it occasionally 
throughout his works. He did not develop a theory of supposition, but he uses supposition 
theory, not only in explaining theological statements such as concerning the Trinity, but 
also to explain other notions related to signification, such as imposition and modes of 
signification.  
The theory of supposition was developed to address the relation between terms 
and the real-world objects they ‘refer to’ or ‘stand for’ when used in a proposition. As 
Spade notes, “Supposition is a property of categorematic words only when they serve as 
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terms (in the strict sense), or extremes of sentences.”37 Accordingly, Peter of Spain 
explains the difference between significatio and suppositio as follows: 
Differunt autem suppositio et significatio, 
quia significatio est per impositionem vocis 
ad rem significandam, suppositio vero est 
acceptio ipsius termini iam significantis 
rem pro aliquo. Ut cum dicitur ‘homo 
currit’, iste terminus ‘homo’ supponit pro 
Sorte vel pro Platone, et sic de aliis.
38
 
Signification and supposition differ 
because signification is the result of the 
imposition of a vocal [expression] upon a 
thing to be signified, whereas supposition 
is the taking of a term that already signifies 
a thing for something; as when ‘a man 
runs’ is said, this term ‘man’ stands for 
Socrates, or for Plato, and similarly in other 
cases. 
 
The term ‘man’ signifies human nature, but it can ‘stand for’ or ‘supposit for’ several 
things on different occasions of its use.  
Terminist logicians distinguished various types of supposition according as to 
what a term might stand for when used in a proposition. Supposition is then generally 
divided into simple, material, and personal supposition. Simple supposition occurs when 
a term stands for the nature it signifies, as in ‘homo est species’. A term has material 
supposition when it stands for itself, as in ‘homo est disyllabum’. Finally, a term may 
stand for one or more members of the class it signifies, as in ‘homo currit’; in this case, a 
term is said to have personal supposition.
39
  
For the most part, the propositional context in which a term occurs dictates what 
the term supposits for in any particular occasion of its use. However, for both William of 
Sherwood and Peter of Spain the context required for supposition is not necessarily 
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 Spade, “Semantics of Terms,” 192. 
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propositional.
40
 They distinguish between the supposition a term has in virtue of its 
signification alone and the supposition a term has in virtue of its actual occurrence. When 
a term acquires signification, it also acquires a natural capacity for supposition. William 
of Sherwood refers to a term’s natural capacity for supposition as ‘habitual’ (suppositio 
in habitu), and he contrasts it with ‘actual’ supposition (suppositio in actu), which is the 
supposition of a term in an actual occurrence.
41
  For Peter of Spain, the distinction is 
between ‘natural’ and ‘accidental’ supposition.42 Peter’s natural supposition is no 
different from William’s habitual supposition inasmuch as no propositional context is 
required. For Peter of Spain, a term’s natural capacity for supposition is the capacity of a 
term to stand for all actual and possible individuals that are of such nature as to partake in 
the form signified by the term.  Thus, outside of any propositional context, the term 
‘man’ supposits for all particular men, past, present and future. In contrast, for William of 
Sherwood, a term’s natural capacity for supposition covers only actually existent 
individuals.
43
 
 
2.1.3 Thirteenth-Century Theory of Signification 
 
 
In this section, I take up: the terminist notion of signification (significatio); the 
distinction between consignification (consignificatio) and modes of signification (modi 
significandi); and a type of signification of terms named ‘analogy’ (analogia). 
 
 
                                                 
40
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A. The Signification of Terms 
 
 
The first thing to note regarding the terminist notion of signification or 
significatio is that it is associated with “signing” rather than, as we might suppose, 
meaning.
44
 Signification is not meaning. For medieval logicians, the question about the 
signification of terms is not a question about meaning but about what it is that terms sign. 
Signification is understood as the property that a term has to sign something, that is, to 
represent or make something known beyond itself. Thus, another common formula for 
signification is “to establish an understanding” (intellectum constituere).45 This is not to 
say that medieval logicians did not have a general notion of meaning. They talked about 
sense (sensus) and about the thought or content (sententia) of a phrase. As Umberto Eco 
writes, “meaning (be it mental correlate, semantic content, intension, or any form of 
noematic, or ideal, or cultural entity), is represented in the Middle Ages, as well as in the 
whole Aristotelian tradition, not by ‘significatio’, but by ‘sententia’ or by ‘definitio’.”46  
The notion of significatio so understood has a long tradition; it has its roots in 
Aristotle’s observation at the beginning of De interpretatione (16a3-8) that spoken words 
are conventional “symbols” or “signs” of concepts, which in turn are likeness or icons of 
things: 
Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks 
symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, 
neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—
                                                 
44
 On the medieval notion of ‘signification’ as distinct from ‘meaning’, see Spade, “Semantics of 
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affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are 
likenesses of—actual things—are also the same.47 
 
From ancient to modern times, this passage has been the subject of multiple 
commentaries.  According to Boethius, by “affections of the soul” Aristotle means a 
concept or understanding (intellectus).
48
 Boethius characterizes the relation between word 
(vox) and concept (intellectus) with the term ‘signify’ (significare or designare). A word 
signifies a concept in the soul; the concept signified by a word is the conception or 
understanding of a thing.
49
 It would appear that words signify only concepts.
50
 However, 
we should notice that the relation of signification is transitive.
51
 Accordingly, Boethius 
remarks that words signify concepts primarily, but they also signify things in a secondary 
way.
52
  Later terminist authors explicitly remark on the transitive character of 
signification. Lambert writes:  
Vox que est signum signi, scilicet 
intellectus, erit signum significati, scilicet 
rei, sed immediate est signum intellectus, 
mediate autem signum rei.
53
 
 
A word that is a sign of a sign, i.e. of a 
concept, will be a sign of what is signified, 
i.e. of a thing; but it is a sign of the concept 
directly, and a sign of the thing indirectly. 
 
Following Boethius, then, terminist logicians interpreted Aristotle’s remarks at the 
beginning of De interpretatione along these lines: words primarily signify concepts and 
only secondarily, through the mediation of concepts, things in the external world. 
Accordingly, the property of significatio was thought to involve a twofold signing 
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relation. A term signifies or is a sign of both a concept in the mind and the res that is the 
object of that conception. 
One of the most debated issues regarding the signification of terms in the Middle 
Ages concerns the status of the res significata of terms. What are the “things” terms are 
said to signify in a secondary way? This is the well known problem of universals. With 
the exception of syncategorematic terms such as ‘not’ and of terms referring to mental 
entities such as ‘concept’, the res significata of a term is typically considered to be a res 
extra animam.
54
 Now, the general consensus was that, to use William of Sherwood’s 
definition, “signification is a presentation of the form of something to the mind.”55 How 
this claim is interpreted depends on the status assigned to common natures. From the 
point of view of a realist position, common natures are the secondary significates of 
terms. For nominalists, common natures exist only inasmuch as they are conceived by the 
intellect. From this point of view, the duality of concept and ‘thing signified’ appears to 
be lost. Indeed, some logicians held the view that the res significata of a term is the 
intellect’s conception it signifies.56 One cannot, however, hold the view that terms signify 
only concepts without committing oneself to the view that the only purpose of language 
is to make our thoughts known. Thus, nominalists often held the view that individual 
objects are the secondary significates of terms.
57
 Among terminist logicians there was 
general agreement that terms do not signify individual objects; rather, terms “supposit 
for” or “stand for” individual objects and “signify” the common nature in which they 
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participate.
58
 Lambert makes it clear that the term ‘man’ signifies humanity, but stands 
for Plato or for Socrates.
59
 When thirteenth century logicians asked whether terms 
primarily signify concepts or things, the issue was whether concepts or common natures 
should be taken as primary significates of terms.
60
 
A further characteristic of the notion of significatio is that it is regarded as a 
natural or essential property of terms.
61
 In order to understand this doctrine, we need to 
consider a related notion to signification, that of “imposition” (impositio).62 Peter of 
Spain, contrasting signification and supposition, writes:  
Differunt autem suppositio et significatio, 
quia significatio est per impositionem vocis 
ad rem significandam, suppositio vero est 
acceptio ipsus termini iam significantis rem 
pro aliquo.
63
 
Signification and supposition differ 
because signification is the result of the 
imposition of a word upon a thing to be 
signified, whereas supposition is the 
acceptance of a term, already signifying a 
thing, for someone. 
 
Imposition is a conventional act by which some entity, in this case a vocal word, is 
appointed to sign something else. This is supposed to work as follows: a first “impositor” 
investigates things and their properties and then “imposes” (imponit) vocal words to 
signify things with such and such properties; when a word is “imposed” to signify a 
certain thing, it acquires signification and becomes a sign or more precisely a term.
64
 
From the point of view of the act of imposition, terms are said to have a conventional 
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signification whereas concepts have natural signification.
65
 Presumably we all share the 
same concepts of (elementary) things, but the terms we use to signify these concepts vary 
since they are appointed by convention.
66
 Accordingly, Peter of Spain defines the 
signification of a term as “the conventional representation of a thing by a word.”67 Once a 
term acquires signification, however, its signification is considered a natural property 
inasmuch as the relation of signing or signification between term and concept is essential 
to the term. A term is a significative vocal expression. Lambert writes: 
[S]ignificatio enim est intellectus rei qui 
per vocem representatur, ante cuius 
unionem cum voce non est terminus, sed 
constituitur terminus in unione illius 
intellectus rei cum voce.
68
 
Signification is the concept of the thing 
represented by means of a word, and before 
the union of it with the word there is no 
term; rather, a term is constituted in the 
union of that concept of a thing with a 
word. 
 
One of the consequences of the doctrine of imposition is that a term has 
signification prior to its use in a proposition.
69
 Medieval logicians were certainly aware of 
the variations in the signification of terms in a propositional context. Their analysis of 
fallacies, for instance, made those variations evident. However, use and context are 
downplayed in favor of the view that the signification of a term on a particular occasion 
of its use can ultimately be deduced from its fundamental signification.  As a way to 
explain the perceived variations in the signification of terms, medieval logicians 
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introduced the idea that from the moment of imposition a term acquires, in addition to its 
fundamental signification, a set of consignifications (such as time and number); modes of 
signification (such as those explaining the distinction between abstract and concrete 
terms), and secondary significations (as in the case of analogous terms). Let’s investigate 
the notions of consignification and mode of signification, before turning to the secondary 
signification of analogous terms. 
 
B. Consignifications and Modes of Signification 
 
 
 In the context of logic and grammar, the consignification of terms was sometimes 
linked to a term’s mode of signification, so that the two notions were used 
interchangeably.
70
 Grammarians and logicians distinguished between two main groups of 
modes of signification: ‘essential modes’ and ‘accidental modes’. When used as 
equivalent to the notion of consignification, the notion of mode of signification refers to 
‘accidental’ modes of signification.71 Aquinas keeps the notions of consignification and 
mode of signification separate,
72
 which is why I have elected to treat them separately. 
 
a. Consignification 
 
 
The notion of consignification is used in two different contexts, each having to do 
with a type of word. First, syncategorematic words are said to have consignification 
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because they signify only when joined to categorematic words in a proposition.
73
 Second, 
categorematic words are said to have consignification insofar as they have a secondary or 
additional signification. For instance, based on Aristotle’s De interpretatione 16b6, as 
translated by Boethius, verbs (unlike nouns) were thought to consignify time because the 
notion of time is added to their proper signification.
74
 Notice that a verb’s 
consignification of time differs from the signification of time by nouns such as ‘today’ 
and by adverbs of time.
75
 Just as verbs consignify time, nouns and adjectives consignify 
gender, number, and case.
76
 In this context, the consignifications of a term were regarded 
as accidental properties in contrast to the natural or essential property of signification. 
Nonetheless, the consignification of a term is not dependent on use or context; rather, it is 
assigned to a term from the moment of imposition. Peter of Spain, for instance, points out 
that the one who imposes a term to signify such and such thing, also imposes it to signify 
such and such gender and number.
77
 Peter does not include case among a term’s 
consignification because, as he explains, a term’s case is assigned to it only so that it can 
be ordered to other terms and thus it does not contribute to a term’s signification.78 Peter 
considers case as an example of what he calls an “accidens respectivus,” which he 
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contrasts with the “accidentia absoluta” of terms, such as time in the case of verbs, and 
gender and number in the case of nouns.
79
 
 
b. Modes of Signification 
 
 
Regarding modes of signification, we begin by noting that although there are 
remote foundations in Boethius and the Latin grammarian Priscian,
80
 the notion of modus 
significandi is distinctively medieval. It developed primarily during the twelfth century 
and by the late thirteenth century became one of the central notions in speculative 
grammar.
81
 In the mid-thirteen century, within the context of logic and grammar, the 
notion of modus significandi was used in two different senses, each resulting from its 
application to a variety of semantic and grammatical issues.
82
   
Grammatical Sense. The most common use of the notion was within the context 
of grammar, where the term ‘modus significandi’ identifies diverse parts of speech. 
Modes of signification include being a noun, an adjective, and a verb.
83
 In this context, 
the mode of signification of a term was understood in connection with the res significata 
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of the term. Thus, in distinguishing parts of speech, grammarians speak of a noun as a 
term having the mode of signifying a substance, that is, an independent object, whereas 
an adjective is a term having the mode of signifying something dependent and inherent, 
such as a quality, a quantity, etc.
84
  
Logical Sense. Within the context of logic, the notion of modus significandi 
acquires a different connotation, wherein it conveys the general idea of signifying 
‘according to’ or ‘in the manner of’ (significate sic, significare ut). In its logical sense, 
the notion of modus significandi is used to analyze the signification of terms that belong 
to the same family or that share the same root, such as ‘white’ (‘albus’) and ‘whiteness’ 
(‘albedo’). The focus here is not the grammatical opposition between a substantive name 
(‘whiteness’) and an adjectival name (‘white’), although such opposition is often in the 
background, but the different mode or manner in which these terms signify the same res. 
In discussing modes of signification, logicians distinguish between signifying a 
substance and signifying substantively (substantive); the latter says nothing about the 
thing signified, it merely designates the mode or manner in which the thing is signified.
85
 
Following on this line of thought, Peter of Spain argues against the use of the descriptive 
terms ‘substantive’ and ‘adjectival’ in reference to the modi significandi of nouns and 
adjectives. He explains that “being adjectival” and “being substantive” are modes of 
things signified, not modes of signification. He recommends instead the use of the 
adverbs ‘substantivally’ and ‘adjectivally’: 
Significationis alia est rei substantive et 
habet fieri per nomen substantivum, ut 
‘homo’; alia est rei adiective et habet fiery 
per nomen adiectivum vel per verbum, ut 
One sort of signification is that of a 
substantive thing and it is effected by a 
substantive noun like ‘man’. Another is 
that of an adjectival thing and it is effected 
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‘albus’ vel ‘currit’. Quare propie non est 
significatio substantiva vel adiectiva, sed 
aliquid significatur substantive et aliquid 
adiective, quia adiectivatio vel 
substantivatio sunt modi rerum que 
significantur, et non significationis.
86
 
 
by an adjectival noun or by a verb like 
‘albus’ or ‘currit’. As a result, signification 
is not properly substantive or adjectival; 
rather, something is signified substantivally 
and something adjectivally, since being 
adjectival or being substantive are modes 
of the things that are signified, not modes 
of signification. 
 
For Peter, then, the notion of modus significandi relates to the res significata of a term 
only to the extent that it designates the manner in which the res significata is signified by 
the term. As one will recall from our previous discussion of the terminist notion of 
signification, the res significata of a term is signified through the mediation of the 
intellect’s conception of it, which conception the term immediately signifies. Thus, the 
mode of signification of a term, as understood by Peter, is ultimately a reflection of the 
mode in which the res significata is conceived by the intellect. Peter’s understanding of 
the notion of modus significandi in connection with the intellect’s conception signified by 
terms explains why Peter uses the term ‘modus intelligendi’ as a synonymous with the 
term ‘modus significandi’.87  
As we indicated earlier, the notion of modus significandi, taken in its logical 
rather than grammatical sense, was used to analyze the signification of terms that belong 
to the same family or that share the same root (although distinctions among parts of 
speech are also often mentioned). Logicians analyze such terms as signifying the same 
res according to different modes (alio modo, aliter et aliter).
88
 The source for this use of 
the notion is Boethius, who, distinguishing between the noun ‘cursus’ and the verb 
‘currit’, remarks: 
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Omne enim verbum aliquod accidens 
designat. Cum enim dico cursus, ipsum 
quidem est accidens, sed non ita dicitur ut 
id alicui inesse vel non inesse dicatur. Si 
autem dixero currit, tunc ipsum accidens in 
alicuius actione proponens alicui inesse 
significo.
89
 
 
Every verb signifies an accident. When I 
say ‘cursus’, an accident is signified, but it 
is not said in such a way that it is said to be 
or not to be in someone. But if I say 
‘currit’, by asserting the accident in the 
action of someone, I signify it as being in 
someone. 
 
Notice that the implication here is that the terms ‘cursus’ and ‘currit’ signify the same 
res, in this case an accident, running, but in different modes. Notice also that although the 
noun ‘cursus’ signifies an accident, i.e., something dependent and inherent, it does not 
signify it in the mode of an accident, i.e., as inherent in someone (ut id alicui inesse). The 
verb ‘currit’, on the other hand, signifies an accident in the mode of accidents. Peter of 
Spain would say that the noun ‘cursus’ signifies its res “substantivally” whereas the verb 
‘currit’ signifies its res “adjectivally.”  
 Next, we consider a case of terms having secondary significations, which came to 
be known in the thirteenth century as ‘analogia’, and which logicians analyzed in terms 
of signification: specifically, as they put it, signification per prius et posterius. 
 
C. Analogy: Signification per prius et posterius 
 
 
Logicians of the thirteenth century treated analogy or analogia as a species of 
equivocation, given that equivocation covered all cases in which one and the same term 
displays different significations on different occasions of its use.
90
 For, the signification 
of analogous terms varies on different occasions of their use. The term ‘healthy’, for 
example, has different significations as it is predicated of animal and food. Before we 
consider the semantic structure of analogous terms, let us begin with an overview of the 
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three different sources that framed the semantic discussion of equivocation and analogy 
in the thirteenth century.
91
 
 
a. Background of the Discussion of Equivocation and Analogy 
in the Thirteenth Century 
 
 
Boethius and Aristotle’s Categories. The first source is Boethius’ translation and 
interpretation of Aristotle’s distinction between equivocal and univocal terms at the 
beginning of the Categories. Equivocal terms are defined as having a name in common 
but a different ratio. Univocal terms, on the other hand, have both a name in common and 
the same ratio.
92
 Boethius divided equivocal terms into two groups: chance equivocals 
(aequivoca a casu) and deliberate equivocals (aequivoca a consilio).
93
 Our interest lies 
with deliberate equivocals where there is a relation between the occurrences of the 
equivocal term. Boethius further subdivided deliberate equivocals into four groups 
according to the way the occurrences of the equivocal term are related: (i) resemblance, 
(ii) proportion (‘proportio’ in Latin, ‘analogia’ in Greek), (iii) “from one” (ab uno), and 
(iv) “to one” (ad unum).94 The last two subdivisions were sometimes joined together 
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under the label of signification ‘ut unum’.95 In the thirteenth century, the last two were 
covered under the term ‘analogia’.96 
The Discussion of Equivocation in Aristotle’s De sophisticis elenchis. The 
second source is Aristotle’s De sophisticis elenchis, where Aristotle distinguishes 
between three modes of equivocation: (i) when the term signifies more than one thing, 
(ii) when the term is used equivocally by custom, and (iii) when terms signify more than 
one thing in combination, but alone only one thing.
97
 In his Tractatus, Peter of Spain 
identifies Aristotle’s second mode of equivocation as involving diverse things that are 
signified secundum prius et posterius. His example is ‘healthy’ (‘sanum’) as said of a 
person and of urine.
98
 He does not use ‘ens’ as an example, but later in the treatise Peter 
speaks of a sort of unity “by proportion” which is said secundum prius et posterius; his 
examples are ‘ens’ as said of all beings, and ‘sanum’ as said of all healthy things:  
Et est aliud unum simpliciter quod est 
unum et sub uno nomine. Et hoc subdivitur 
per quinque partes. Quia huius unius 
quoddam est quod est unum proportione, et 
est illud quod est dictum secundum prius et 
posterius, ut ‘ens’ de omnibus entibus et 
‘sanum’ de omnibus sanis et ‘bonum’ de 
omnibus bonis.
99
 
[Among the modes of unity,] there is a 
second ‘one’, simply speaking, which is 
[both] one and under one name. This is 
subdivided into five parts. For, to this ‘one’ 
belongs something that is one 
proportionally, and it is that which is said 
secundum prius et posterius, as ‘ens’ is 
said of all beings, and ‘healthy’ of all 
healthy things, and ‘good’ of all good 
things. 
 
In addition, earlier in the treatise, Peter remarks that ‘ens’ is equivocal because different 
rationes were involved: 
Predicari autem univoce est predicari 
secundum unum nomen et rationem unam 
To be predicated univocally is to be 
predicated according to one name and one 
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sumptam secundum nomen . . . Et ob hoc 
ens non potest esse genus quia, licet 
secundum unum nomen predicetur de 
omnibus, non tamen secundum rationem 
unam. Ratio enim entis, secundum quod 
dicitur de substantia, est ens per se; 
secundum autem quod dicitur de aliis 
novem predicamentis, est ens in alio. Et ita 
predicatur secundum diversas rationes. Et 
ideo non predicatur univoce, sed potius 
equivoce aut multipliciter.
100
 
ratio taken according to that name . . . That 
is why ens cannot be a genus; for, although 
it is predicated of all things according to 
one name, [it is not predicated] according 
to one ratio. The ratio of ens, as said of a 
substance, is ens per se; as said of the other 
nine predicaments, it is ens in alio. Thus, 
the name ‘ens’ is predicated according to 
different rationes. And, for that reason, it is 
not predicated univocally but equivocally 
or in different ways. 
 
Peter’s remarks above indicate that there is a kind of unity among the different 
conceptions or rationes involved in the signification of analogous terms. The various 
conceptions or rationes involved are ‘one’ according to a certain ‘proportio’ or ‘relation’, 
so that one is ‘prior’ and the others ‘posterior’. Hence, the language of signification 
secundum prius et posterius. 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the Work of Arabic Authors. The recovery of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the introduction into the Latin west of the work of Arabic 
authors constitute a third source.
101
 In Metaphysics 4.2 (1003a33-35) Aristotle remarks 
that ‘ens’ is predicated of both substance and accidents without being equivocal.102 This 
remark directly contradicts Porphyry’s claim in his Isagoge that ‘ens’ is said 
equivocally.
103
 In order to solve the difficulty, logicians interpreted Aristotle’s remark in 
the Metaphysics as a denial that ‘ens’ is equivocal according to the first mode of 
equivocation distinguished in De sophisticis elenchis. The term ‘ens’ is equivocal 
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according to the second mode of equivocation. In the long commentary on Metaphysics 
4.2 (1003a33-1003b10), Averroes remarks that Aristotle classifies the term ‘healthy’ as a 
case of relation to one as an end, the term ‘medical’ as a case of relation to one as an 
agent, and the term ‘ens’ as a case of relation to one subject.104 Accordingly, to 
accommodate ‘ens’ into Boethius’ subdivision of deliberate equivocals, logicians 
expanded the last two subdivisions into three.
105
 Another important Arabic source was 
Al-Ghazali’s Logic, through which logicians acquired the notion of ambiguous terms (of 
which ‘ens’ is an example) which are intermediaries between equivocal and univocal 
terms and which are said of different things in a prior and a posterior way (secundum 
prius et posterius).
106
 Al-Ghazali refers to such ambiguous terms as ‘convenientia’, that 
is, terms related by agreement.
107
  
 
b. The Semantic Structure of Analogous Terms 
 
 
Lambert’s exposition of analogous terms illustrates how the various sources 
discussed above came together in the mind of mid-thirteenth century logicians. Indeed, of 
the three authors we are studying, Lambert alone incorporates the term ‘analogia’ into his 
discussion of equivocation. He writes: 
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Secunda species provenit ex eo quod aliqua 
dictio significat unum predicatum tamen a 
pluribus, ita quod ab uno per prius, ab alio 
sive aliis per posterius, unde secundum 
istam speciem equivocatio fit in terminis 
analogis. Terminus analogus unum 
significat sub diversis tamen intentionibus: 
hoc est, sub ratione prioris et posterioris in 
hiis a quibus predicatur, ut ens unum 
significat, sed prius est predicatum a 
substantia, per posterius ab accidente, unde 
est terminus analogus.
108
 
 
 
The second species [of equivocation] arises 
from the fact that an expression signifies 
one thing that is nonetheless predicated of 
many in such a way that it is [predicated] 
primarily of one, and secondarily of 
another or of others. Thus, this species of 
equivocation occurs in analogous terms. 
An analogical term signifies one thing, 
nonetheless under different concepts 
(intentionibus), that is, under the concept 
(ratio) of priority and posteriority in 
connection with those things of which it is 
predicated, as ‘ens’ signifies one thing, but 
it is predicated primarily of substance and 
secondarily of accident; thus ‘ens’ is an 
analogous term. 
 
Following this passage, Lambert examines the term ‘healthy’ (‘sanum’) as said of animal, 
urine, food, and diet. He explains that the “one thing” signified by the term ‘sanum’ is 
health. When ‘sanum’ is said of the animal, health is signified per prius; when ‘sanum’ is 
said of urine, food, and diet, health is signified per posterius. Lambert suggests that 
‘sanum’ is said per prius of the animal inasmuch as health is first in the animal as in a 
subject, whereas it is said per posterious of the others inasmuch as each of the objects 
involved relates to the health in animals in some way, e.g., as a sign or as a cause of 
health.
109
 Based on Lambert’s definition of analogy in the passage quoted above, we may 
deduce that the term ‘sanum’, when said of animal, urine, food, and diet, signifies the 
same thing, namely health, but under different concepts (ratio or intentio). 
Several other points regarding the logicians’ understanding of the semantic 
structure of analogous terms are important before we conclude this section. 
We begin with a quick note regarding analogy and imposition. When the term 
‘ens’ is predicated of an accident, or when the term ‘sanum’ is predicated of food, it 
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appears as if the term ‘ens’ and ‘sanum’ acquire a new signification which, as it happens, 
is neither the same nor completely different from their original signification (i.e. from the 
signification they have standing outside a propositional context).
110
 Yet, from the point of 
view of terminist logic and the doctrine of imposition, the “new” signification, cannot be 
the direct result of use and context. Within the semantic framework of terminist logic, 
words signify precisely what they were imposed to signify. Terminist logicians were 
generally willing to concede that some grammatical features such as case are relational, 
but there was a strong belief that once a term’s signification is set by imposition, it is not 
altered by sentential context.
111
 Thus, in order to explain the perceived alterations in the 
signification of terms like ‘ens’ and ‘sanum’ when they are predicated of different 
objects, without at the same time destroying the theory of signification, logicians needed 
to place the source of the new signification at the moment of the imposition of the term 
with signification.
112
 This does not mean, of course, that all significations of a term must 
be ascribed to its original imposition; within the terminist framework, it is possible for a 
term to acquire an additional or secondary signification by an additional act of 
imposition. The central point here is that the signification of a term must be the result of 
an act of imposition. This proved to be quite a challenge for terminist logicians when 
applied to equivocal terms in general. The most common account runs as follows. Purely 
equivocal terms (such as ‘canis’) are imposed to signify more than one thing, when taken 
alone, and only one thing, when taken in certain propositional contexts. The case of 
analogous terms was thought to be the opposite. They are imposed to signify only one 
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thing when taken alone (e.g., the term ‘ens’ by itself signifies only substance), and one or 
the other significate, when taken in a propositional context, so that senses must be 
distinguished before verification can take place.
113
  
In examining the semantic structure of analogous terms, terminist logicians in 
general shared the view that the variation in signification of analogous terms has nothing 
to do with their res significata but rather with the intellect’s conception of the res 
significata. Discussions on analogy in the thirteenth century were largely centered on the 
precise nature of the conception or conceptions involved.
114
 One subject of debate, 
having to do with the interpretation of the phrase ‘per prius et posterius’, concerns the 
question of whether the various significations of an analogous terms are either the result 
of one ratio or intentio used in different ways (William of Sherwood) or the result of 
more than one ratio or intentio used in very similar ways (Lambert of Auxerre and Peter 
of Spain).
115
 Aquinas, we shall see, takes diverse positions on the matter, eventually 
arriving at the claim that the conceptions involved are neither one nor many. In 
addressing the issue, William agrees that a term must have signification before it enters a 
proposition, but he argues that within a propositional context slight variations in a term’s 
signification can take place. “This applies,” he writes, “not to every word, but to that 
[word] whose signification or consignification is one concept (intentio) shared 
(participata) by many secundum prius et posterius.”116 But, even if one claims that there 
is in fact more than one ratio involved, there is no denying the similarities among them. 
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Peter of Spain, we have seen, speaks of a certain unity among the various rationes or 
conceptions involved, which, he explains, are “one” according as they are ordered 
secundum prius et posterius.
117
 Thus, with regards to the number of rationes involved in 
analogous signification, we may say that there is a sense in which more than one ratio or 
conceptio is involved, and there is another sense in which only one ratio or conceptio is 
involved. When we look at the internal semantic structure of the analogous term, we find 
a single res significata and distinct but similar conceptiones or rationes. There is a 
primary (prior) conception, which provides the primary signification of the term, and one 
or more secondary conceptions which are consequent upon (posterius) the primary one. 
In this manner, the primary conception is somehow contained in all secondary 
conceptions, so that one may speak of there being only one ratio involved. 
We turn next to the second part of the chapter, devoted to a review of Aquinas’ 
theory of signification. 
 
2.2 Aquinas’ Theory of Signification 
 
 
Now that I have reviewed the main notions of the standard thirteenth-century 
theory of signification, I turn to that theory in Aquinas. In examining Aquinas’ theory of 
signification, I consider the following topics: Aquinas’ view on the nature of the 
conceptio and res signified by terms; his theory of modi significandi, specially the 
concrete and abstract modes of signification; and his account of the semantic structure of 
analogous terms. As we shall see from the following discussion, there is significant 
overlap between Aquinas’ theory of signification and that of terminist logicians of the 
mid-thirteenth century.   
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2.2.1. Aquinas’ Account of the Nature of the Conceptio and Res 
Signified by Terms 
 
 
In terminist semantics, we might recall, the notion of signification was understood 
to entail a twofold ‘signing’ relationship: between a term, on the one hand, and a concept 
or a thing, on the other. For Aquinas, a term immediately signifies a concept or 
conception in the mind (conceptio, intellectus, ratio, intentio, or verbum interius)
118
, but 
ultimately it signifies the thing (res) that is the object of that conception.
119
 The 
signification of the res is thus for Aquinas always mediated by the conceptio signified by 
the term. He writes: 
Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum 
Philosophum, voces sunt signa 
intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum 
similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces 
referuntur ad res significandas, mediante 
conceptione intellectus. Secundum igitur 
I answer that, according to the Philosopher, 
words are signs of ‘intellections’ and 
‘intellections’ are the likenesses of things. 
And so, it is evident that words are related 
to the things signified through the 
mediation of the conception of the intellect. 
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quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci 
potest, sic a nobis potest nominari.
120
 
 
Therefore, according as something is 
known by us in an ‘intellection’, in this 
way it can be named by us. 
 
The doctrine of the mediation of the intellect’s conceptio in the signification of the res 
establishes a relation between signification and intellection, and more broadly between 
semantics and epistemology, that deeply shapes Aquinas’ theory of signification.121 As I 
indicated earlier, the relation between semantics and epistemology is characteristic of the 
version of terminist logic that is distinctive of mid-thirteenth century Latin Europe (c. 
1250-75), a version sometimes called ‘pre-modism’, in which is highlighted a 
correspondence between the modi significandi of terms and the modi intelligendi of our 
intellect.
122
 Notice how this theme emerges in the passage last quoted: the manner in 
which something is named parallels that in which it is known. We will encounter this 
same theme often as we discuss Aquinas’ account of the nature of the res and conceptio 
signified by terms. 
 
A. The Res Signified in Aquinas 
 
 
Regarding the nature of the res significata of a term, we should mention first that 
Aquinas identifies the res significata of a term with a form or nature rather than with an 
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individual or a collection of individuals.
123
 The res significata of the term ‘man’, for 
example, is not any particular man but human nature or humanity. As Aquinas explains, 
the term ‘man’ signifies (significat) human nature and stands for (supponit) individuals 
having that form, i.e., individual human beings.
124
 
[H]oc enim nomen homo non significat 
aliquem singularium hominum, sed solum 
hominem in communi.
125
 
 
This name ‘man’ does not signify any 
individual man, but only man in general. 
The fact that a term signifies a nature has implications, of course, for what it of itself 
stands for in propositions, for its per se supposition. And so, Aquinas observes: 
Quia enim forma significata per hoc 
nomen homo, idest humanitas, realiter 
dividitur in diversis suppositis, per se 
supponit pro persona.
126
 
 
Since the form signified by this name 
‘man’, namely, humanity, is really divided 
in different subjects, in itself it supposits 
for a person [i.e., an individual of a 
rational nature]. 
 
One might think that the term ‘humanity’ signifies human nature while the term ‘man’ 
signifies an individual human being. The difference in signification between these terms, 
however, does not rest in the res they signify. Aquinas points out that the terms ‘man’ 
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and ‘humanity’ signify the same res, human nature or humanity, according to different 
modes of signification.
127
 
The identification of the res significata of a term with a form or nature rather than 
with an individual thing is a direct consequence of the mediation of the intellect’s 
conceptio in the signification of the res. The res significata of a term is the object of the 
intellect’s conception immediately signified by the term.128 As such, the res significata is 
that which the conceptio signified by the term makes us aware of, and this is some form 
or nature without its individuating conditions.
129
 The object of the intellect’s conception, 
the thing that is understood and subsequently signified, is thus intrinsically qualified by 
the way in which the intellect works. Aquinas writes: 
Ulterius autem considerandum est quod 
intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, 
intelligendo format in seipso quandam 
intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio 
ipsius, quam significat definitio. Et hoc 
quidem necessarium est: eo quod 
intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem 
In addition, it must be considered that the 
intellect, informed by the species of the 
thing, forms in itself in understanding a 
certain intention of the thing understood, 
which is its ratio, which the definition 
signifies. This is necessary because the 
intellect understands a thing indifferently, 
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absentem et praesentem, in quo cum 
intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed 
intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam 
intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus 
materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura 
non existit; et hoc non posset esse nisi 
intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam 
formaret.
 130 
 
[whether] absent or present. In this the 
imagination agrees with the intellect. But, 
in addition, the intellect has that it 
understands the thing as separated from the 
material conditions without which it does 
not exist in reality. And this could not be so 
unless the intellect forms for itself the 
aforementioned intention. 
 
Accordingly, the object of the intellect’s conception signified by the term ‘man’ cannot 
be humanity in its individual and material particularity, i.e. this or that man. The res 
significata of the term ‘man’, the object of the intellect’s conception signified by this 
term, is not an individual human being, but human nature or humanity. 
We should be careful, however, not to mistake the res significata of terms with a 
universal that can only exist in the mind. Aquinas explains that “humanity is something 
in reality, but there it does not have the ratio of a universal, for there is not some 
humanity outside the soul that is common to many.”131 Human nature as such exists in 
reality only in this or that man; it is only accidental to this nature to be apprehended by 
the intellect without its individuating conditions:  
[H]umanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi 
in hoc vel in illo homine, sed quod 
humanitas apprehendatur sine 
individualibus conditionibus, quod est 
ipsam abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio 
universalitatis, accidit humanitatis 
secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in 
quo est similitudo naturae speciei, et non 
individualium principiorum.
132
 
 
The humanity which is understood exists 
only in this or that man, but that humanity 
be apprehended without the conditions of 
individuality, that is, that it be abstracted, 
[such that] to it belongs the intention of 
universality, befalls humanity according as 
it is perceived by the intellect, in which 
there is that likeness of the nature of a 
species and not [that of] individuating 
principles. 
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 SCG I, c. 53, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 150, lines 3-14B.  
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 In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 486: “Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, 
non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis 
communis.” 
132
 ST I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 5, p. 334. 
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Certainly, the form signified by a term in this particular thing is numerically different 
from the form signified by the same term in that particular thing. Nevertheless, there is 
something in reality that is the same in this and that particular thing and that corresponds 
to the object of the conception formed by the intellect. As Aquinas explains: 
[N]on enim oportet, si hoc est homo et illud 
homo, quod eadem sit humanitas numero 
utriusque, sicut in duobus albis non est 
eadem albedo numero; sed quod hoc 
similetur illi in hoc quod habet 
humanitatem sicut illud; et  intellectus 
accipiens humanitatem non secundum quod 
est hujus, sed ut est humanitas, format 
intentionem communem omnibus.
133
 
 
[I]t is not necessary that, if this is a man 
and that is a man, they both have 
numerically the same humanity, just as in 
two white things whiteness is not 
numerically the same; but rather that this 
man be ‘assimilated’ to that man in that 
this man has humanity just as does that 
man; and the intellect, taking humanity not 
as it belongs to this [man], but as it is 
humanity, forms an intention that is 
common to all. 
 
Therefore, although the res significata is generally identified with some form or nature 
without its individuating conditions, it should not be regarded in itself as a universal, as a 
one over the many; what is common to many and has the ratio of universality is rather the 
conception or intention formed by and as in the intellect. What the conception of ‘man’ 
makes us aware of, i.e. the object of this conception, is, not the intention of humanity, but 
human nature.  
The res significata of the term ‘man’ is, therefore, neither a particular nor a 
universal;
134
 it is rather that which in the nature of things renders this and that man 
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 In II Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 414. 
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 Avicenna’s logical conception of common natures, i.e. of nature as considered in an absolute 
way, is at the background. See, Sten Ebbesen, “Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Thirteenth 
Century Debate about Problems Relating to Such Terms as Album,” in Meaning and Inference in 
Mediaeval Philosophy. Studies in the Memory of Jan Pinborg, ed. Norman Kretzmann 
(Dordrecht: 1988), 114. For a discussion on the threefold consideration of common natures, see 
Ignacio Angelelli, “The Logical Significance of the ‘Absolute Consideration’ of Nature,” in Atti 
del IX congresso Tomistico internazionale, vol. 2 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 
1991). On the absolute consideration of nature in Aquinas, see Frederick Wilhelsem, “A Note: 
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equally a man. So considered, the res significata of a term is often characterized as the 
form or nature that renders an individual such that it actually falls under the term. The res 
significata of a term is that on account of which the term is said of (also “imposed upon”) 
some individual. The res significata of ‘man’ is that on account of which the term ‘man’ 
is said of this and that man. Humanity is that by which something is denominated ‘man’, 
just as whiteness is that by which something is denominated ‘white’. At the same time, if 
one considers the “imposition” of a term with signification, the res significata of a term is 
identified with the form or nature from which the term is originally “imposed with” 
signification. On this distinction Aquinas writes: 
[I]n quolibet nomine est duo considerare: 
scilicet id a quo imponitur nomen, quod 
dicitur qualilas nominis; et id cui 
imponitur, quod dicitur substantia nominis. 
Et nomen, proprie Ioquendo, dicitur 
significare formam sive qualitatem, a qua 
imponitur nomen; dicitur vero supponere 
pro eo cui imponitur.
135
 
 
In a name two things can be considered: 
that from which the name is imposed, 
which is called the quality of the name; and 
that upon which the name is imposed, 
which is called the substance of the name. 
A name, properly speaking, is said to 
signify the form or quality from which it is 
imposed, and it is said to stand for that 
upon which it is imposed. 
 
We will discuss in some detail the dynamics of imposition and denomination in Aquinas 
shortly. For now I will remark on the assigned role of the res significata in the passage 
just quoted. The res that a term signifies is the form or nature from which the term is 
imposed with its signification as well as that on account of which an individual is 
denominated by a term.
136
 Thus, to use Aquinas’ terminology, the res significata of the 
term ‘man’, i.e. human nature or humanity, is that from which the term ‘man’ is 
                                                                                                                                                 
The Absolute Consideration of Nature in Quaestiones Quodlibetales VIII,” New Scholasticism 57 
(1983). 
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 In III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 232. The distinction between the 
substance and the quality of a name has its origin in Priscian’s claim that a name signifies 
substance with quality. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 47.  
136
 This role of the res significata of terms will help us identify the res significata of the terms 
‘ens’ and ‘esse’ in Chapter III. 
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“imposed with” its signification as well as that on account of which the term ‘man’ is 
“imposed upon” individual human beings.137  
As a final note on the nature of the res significata, I want to point out that, as 
Klima rightly remarks, “the significata of common terms need not necessarily be 
regarded metaphysically as forms in all cases.”138 Without doubt, a significant number of 
terms signify a res that is metaphysical a form and that has actual existence in the nature 
of things. However, the intellect can conceive and hence signify not only forms that exist 
in reality, but also something completely non-existent as well as something that exists 
only in the operation of the intellect itself. For example, there are terms such as ‘genus’ 
and ‘species’ that signify a res that has nothing but mental existence.139 On the other 
hand, there are terms such as ‘blind’ that signify a privation, and terms such as ‘chimera’ 
that signify an imagination. On the diversity of things signify by terms, Aquinas writes: 
[E]orum quae significantur nominibus, 
invenitur triplex diversitas. Quaedam enim 
sunt quae secundum esse totum completum 
sunt extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt entia 
completa, sicut homo et lapis. Quaedam 
There is a three-fold diversity among 
things signified by names. For some are 
outside the soul according to their total, 
complete being; and of this kind are 
complete beings, such as a man and a 
                                                 
137
 Notice that a term stands for and is imposed upon the things having the form or nature the term 
signifies. A term signifies the form or nature from which it was imposed, and stands for, for 
example, the individuals having the form signified by the term and upon whom the term is 
imposed precisely on account of their having that form. 
138
 Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 107n37. Klima’s observation highlights the fact that although 
there is a historical relation between Aquinas’ semantics and a hylomorphist metaphysics, the 
former does not imply the later. Indeed, Klima notes that even for those thinkers who were 
otherwise committed to a hylomorphist metaphysics, the fact that not all terms signify a res that is 
metaphysically a form was a commonplace.  
139
 The type of conception signified by these terms is called ‘second intention’ because it has as 
its object an intention or conception. The terms that signify such type of conception are called 
‘terms of second imposition’. For discussion and references on second intentions in Aquinas, see 
Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 99-102; Robert Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint 
Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 117-29. Since neither ‘ens’ nor ‘esse’ are 
identified as terms of second imposition, we will not concern ourselves with the signification of 
such terms beyond what has been noted. It is sufficient to know that they too signify a res and a 
conceptio in the mind, but the res significata is not metaphysically a form. The same is true for 
‘ens’ and ‘esse’, as we shall see. 
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autem sunt quae nihil habent extra animam, 
sicut somnia et imaginatio Chimerae. 
Quaedam autem sunt quae habent 
fundamentum in re extra animam, sed 
complementum rationis eorum quantum ad 
id quod est formale, est per operationem 
animae, ut patet in universali.
140
 
 
stone. Some have nothing outside the soul, 
such as dreams and the imagination of a 
chimera. And some have a foundation in 
reality outside the soul, but the 
completeness of their ratio, with respect to 
that which is formal, is through the 
operation of the soul, as is clear in the case 
of the universal. 
 
Therefore, although the res significata is characterized as a form or nature, we should not 
take this claim to imply that the res significata of terms is in every case metaphysically a 
form. ‘Form’ is used here for the object of semantics, as, for example, ‘humanity’, not as, 
first of all, an ontological feature such as ‘a substantial form’ (which is not humanity, but 
the soul). 
What should we make, then, of the characterization of the res significata as a 
form or nature? When the res significata of a term is characterized as a ‘form’, what is 
implied is that the res a term ultimately signifies is signified in the mode of form. As 
Aquinas explains: 
[I]llud a quo aliquid denominatur, non 
oportet quod sit semper forma secundum 
rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur 
per modum formae, grammatice 
loquendo.
141
 
 
That by which something is denominated 
need not always be a form in reality; it is 
sufficient for it to be signified, 
grammatically speaking, in the mode of a 
form. 
 
We mentioned before that the res significata of a term is identified with that which 
renders an individual such that it actually falls under the term. Now, although there is 
nothing in the nature of things that is, say, a chimera – and hence no ‘form’ of chimera 
actually exists – from a semantic perspective the term ‘chimera’  is said to signify a res 
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 In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 486. To this threefold division of the res 
significata corresponds a threefold division of the conceptio intellectus signified by terms; some 
concepts have a foundation in reality, either immediate or remote, and some concepts do not, such 
as ‘genus’, as opposed to ‘universal’ (see In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3). A similar division of 
conceptions is found in De pot., q. 1, a. 1, ad 10. 
141
 De pot., q. 7, a. 10, ad 8, Marietti ed., p. 211. 
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which is that by which something is denominated a chimera. In this sense, we speak of 
the res signified by the term ‘chimera’ as a form. The same analysis applies to the res 
significata of the term ‘blind’, which signifies a privation: blindness is that by which 
something is denominated ‘blind’, and as such it is signified as if it were some form. This 
analysis is consistent with Aquinas’ theory of predication. Aquinas remarks that in 
forming a proposition the intellect either applies to or removes from the thing signified by 
the subject-term some form signified by the predicate-term.
142
 In the case of a privation 
or deformity, which has no being in the nature of things, Aquinas says that the privation 
is predicated of a subject “as if it were some form.”143 
Notice that although some terms signify a res that is nothing in the nature of 
things, it is not the case that there is no identifiable res significata for these terms. The 
mediation of the intellect’s conceptio in the signification of the res – i.e. the fact that the 
res significata is the object of the intellect’s conception immediately signified by the 
term– makes it possible for terms to retain their signification even if the external objects 
they denote become extinct;
144
 similarly, it makes possible for terms like ‘chimera’ to 
have signification even if there is no such thing as a chimera in the nature of things. As 
Aquinas points out, anything our intellect is able to conceive we are able to name.
145
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 ST I, q. 16, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 208: “[I]n omni propositione aliquam formam 
significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab 
ea.” 
143
 In II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 947: “[I]ntellectus componit 
privationem cum subjecto, sicut forman quamdam.” 
144
 De ver., q. 18, a. 4, ad 10, Leonine ed., vol. 22/2, p. 543: “Alio modo dicitur aliquis 
cognoscere rem in propria natura per modum definitionis: dum scilicet cognoscit aliquis quid sit 
propria natura alicuius rei; et sic etiam res non existens potest in propria natura cognosci, ut si 
omnes leones essent mortui, possem scire quid est leo;” also SCG I, c. 66. 
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 See ST I, q. 13, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 139: “[A]liquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, 
sic a nobis potest nominari.” Note that this claim does not commit Aquinas to the view that the 
possession of a concept is a sufficient condition for being able to express that concept; the 
possession of a concept is rather a necessary condition for our ability to use language 
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From a purely semantic perspective, the terms ‘man’ and ‘chimera’ share the same 
semantic structure; each signifies some conception in the mind and the object of that 
conception. The fact that the conception signified by the term ‘man’ has an immediate 
foundation in reality adds nothing to the signification of ‘man’ over that of ‘chimera’. 
Whether or not the res significata of a term is actually realized in some individual or 
another does not enter into the signification of the term. Indeed, one may know what a 
term signifies without knowing whether there is something in reality to which the term 
applies. Furthermore, knowledge of what a term signifies does not guarantee that we are 
able to provide a proper definition of the term.
146
 
 
B. Aquinas and the Conceptio Signified 
 
 
We turn our attention now to the nature of the intellect’s conception signified by 
terms. As we have seen, although our terms are ultimately imposed to signify some res, 
they do not do so directly. For Aquinas, a term immediately signifies an intellectual 
conception, namely, the intellect’s conception of the res that the term is ultimately 
imposed to signify. Accordingly, Aquinas describes the conceptio signified by a term as 
“the intellect’s conception of the res signified by the term.”147 There are two points to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
successfully. Given that significant words immediately signify a concept in the mind, a 
significant word necessarily entails the existence of a corresponding mental concept in the 
original linguistic community. Pasnau, “Thought’s Linguistic Nature,” 563-66. Now, a mental 
concept may or may not have a foundation in reality, but in either case there surely is some 
identifiable res intellecta, i.e. the object of the mental concept. 
146
 What is in the background here is the distinction between ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ definition, or 
between the quid nominis and the quid rei. The distinction is frequently mentioned by Aquinas. In 
II Post. Anal., lects. 6 and 8; In V Meta., lect. 4, n. 805; SCG I, c. 35; De pot., q. 7, a. 2; ST I, q. 2, 
a. 2, ad 2.  
147
 ST I, q. 13, a. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 144: “Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio 
intellectus de re significata per nomen.” Aquinas’s use of the term ‘ratio’ in the context of 
signification can be rather ambiguous. The term ‘ratio’ is used in reference to both the 
‘conception’ signified by a term (ST I, q. 13, a. 4 just quoted) and the ‘form’ that is the object of 
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made regarding the nature of this conception: (i) it is a simple or non-composite 
conception, and (ii) it is not equivalent to knowledge. 
 
a. Simple vs. Complex Conceptions 
 
 
Let us begin by distinguishing between the signification of a term and the 
signification of a proposition. Aquinas writes: 
[S]ignificatio orationis differt a 
significatione nominis uel uerbi, quia 
nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem 
intellectum, oratio autem significat 
intellectum compositum.
148
 
 
The signification of a proposition differs 
from the signification of a noun or verb, 
because a noun or a verb signifies a simple 
understanding, a proposition signifies a 
composite understanding. 
 
Both a term and a proposition signify an intellectual conception (here: ‘intellectus’), but 
the nature of each conception differs. The conception signified by a term is simple, 
whereas the conception signified by a proposition is complex or composed. Aquinas 
relates the conception signified by a term to the first operation of the intellect and the 
conception signified by a proposition to the second operation of the intellect: 
Set dicendum est quod duplex est operatio 
intellectus, ut supra habitum est; ille qui 
dicit nomen uel uerbum secundum se, 
constituit intellectum quantum ad primam 
operationem, que est conceptio alicuius . . . 
non autem constituit intellectum quantum 
ad secundam operationem, que est 
intellectus componentis et diuidentis.
149
 
It should be said that the operation of the 
intellect is twofold, as was held above; and 
he who speaks a noun or a verb by itself 
brings about an understanding with respect 
to the first operation, which is the 
conception of something, . . . but [the verb 
or the noun said by itself] does not bring 
about an understanding with respect to the 
second operation, which belongs to the 
intellect composing and dividing. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that conception. For the latter use, see In VIII Meta., lect. 1, n. 1687, Marietti ed., p. 403-404: 
“Forma vero, quae et ratio nominatur, quia ex ipsa sumitur ratio speciei, dicitur substantia quasi 
ens aliquid actu, et quasi ens separabile secundum rationem a materia.” For a discussion of 
Aquinas’ doctrine of the ratio signified by terms as being both in the mind and in the thing, see 
Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 99-104. 
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 In I Periher., lect. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32, lines 20-23.  
149
 In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 29, lines 277-86. 
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Therefore, a term, as opposed to a proposition, immediately signifies the intellect’s 
simple conception of some res – a conception that is effected by the intellect through its 
first operation. 
Especially in epistemological contexts, Aquinas calls the conception formed by 
the intellect, whether simple or composed, ‘word’ (‘verbum’) or ‘inner word’ (‘verbum 
interius’). He writes: 
Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum, 
quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re 
intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive 
enuntiatio, secundum quod ponuntur duae 
operationes intellectus, in III de Anima. 
Hoc autem sic ab intellectu conceptum 
dicitur verbum interius, hoc enim est quod 
significatur per vocem; non enim vox 
exterior significat ipsum intellectum, aut 
formam ipsius intelligibilem, aut ipsum 
intelligere, sed conceptum intellectus quo 
mediante significat rem: ut cum dico, 
«homo» vel «homo est animal».
150
 
Therefore, what is primarily and per se 
understood is what the intellect in itself 
conceives about the thing understood, 
whether it be a definition or a proposition – 
according as two operations of the intellect 
are affirmed in De Anima 3. And this 
[thing] conceived by the intellect in this 
way is called the interior word, for this is 
what is signified by the voice; for, the 
exterior voice does not signify the intellect 
itself, or its intelligible form, or the act of 
understanding, but the concept of the 
intellect through whose mediation it 
signifies the thing: as when I say, ‘man’, 
or, ‘Man is an animal’. 
 
[V]erbum intellectus nostri, secundum 
cuius similitudinem loqui possumus de 
verbo divino, est id ad quod operatio 
intellectus nostri terminatur, quod est 
ipsum intellectum, quod dicitur conceptio 
intellectus, sive sit conceptio significabilis 
The word of our intellect, according to 
whose likeness we can speak of the divine 
word, is that in which the operation of our 
intellect terminates, which is what is 
understood itself, which is called the 
conception of the intellect – whether it be a 
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 De pot., q. 9, a. 5, Marietti ed., p. 236. Note that here the terms ‘definitio’ and ‘enuntiatio’ are 
used to refer, not to the external linguistic expression, but to the internal conception, and that 
propositions are also “conceived.” For the use of ‘definitio’ as the internal conception signified, 
see also, De pot., q. 8, a. 1, Marietti ed., p. 215: “Intellectus enim sua actione format rei 
definitionem, vel etiam propositionem affirmativam seu negativam. Haec autem conceptio 
intellectus in nobis proprie verbum dicitur: hoc enim est quod verbo exteriori significatur: vox 
enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum, neque speciem intelligibilem, neque actum 
intellectus, sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem” (note in this passage that 
the conception signified by a term is differentiated from the intelligible species and from the act 
of the intellect); In I Post. Anal., lect. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/2, p. 19, line 11: “[D]effinitio enim 
est ratio quam significat nomen;” and In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3. For an example of the use 
of ‘definitio’ as the external linguistic expression, see SCG I, c. 53 in note 130. 
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per vocem incomplexam ut accidit quando 
intellectus format quidditates rerum, sive 
per vocem complexam ut accidit quando 
intellectus componit et dividit.
151
 
 
conception signifiable by (i) a non-complex 
word (vox), as occurs when the intellect 
forms the quiddities of things; or by (ii) a 
complex word (vox), as occurs when the 
intellect composes and divides. 
 
The ‘inner word’, then, is that which the intellect conceives about the thing understood. It 
is the immanent product of the intellect, that which the intellect produces through either 
of its two operations. Aquinas calls the ‘inner word’ alternatively conception (conceptio) 
and concept (conceptus),
152
 although intention (intentio) is also used.
153
  
Now, according to the two operations of the intellect, two different kinds of 
conceptions are produced, each kind is signified by linguistic expressions of diverse 
nature: one simple, the other complex or composed. The conception signified by a simple 
‘external word’, such as the term ‘man’, is a simple conception. The conception signified 
by a complex ‘external word’, such as the proposition ‘Man is an animal’, is complex. On 
the distinction between simple and complex words Aquinas writes: 
Voces enim incomplexae neque verum 
neque falsum significant; sed voces 
complexae, per affirmationem aut 
negationem veritatem aut falsitatem habent 
. . . Et cum voces sint signa intellectuum, 
similiter dicendum est de conceptionibus 
intellectus. Quae enim sunt simplices, non 
Non-complex words signify neither truth 
nor falsity; but complex words, through 
affirmation or negation, have truth and 
falsity . . . And, since words are the signs 
of concepts, the same is said with respect to 
the conceptions of the intellect. Those 
which are simple do not have truth and 
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 De ver. q. 4, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 22/1, p. 123-24, lines 101-109. 
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 De pot., q. 9, a. 5; De ver. q. 4, a. 2, both quoted above. In light of these texts, Gilson’s 
terminological distinction between ‘conceptio’ and ‘conceptus’ (where ‘judgment’ is a 
‘conceptio’ but not a ‘conceptus’) is highly questionable. 
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 SCG IV, c. 11, Leonine ed., vol. 15, p. 32, lines 32-33B: “[I]psa intentio verbum interius 
nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum.” On the different meanings of the term 
‘intentio’ in Aquinas, see Henri-Dominique Simonin, “La notion d’ ‘intentio’ dans l’oeuvre de s. 
Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 19 (1930); also Schmidt, 
Domain of Logic, 94-129. A nice summary of the role of ‘intentio’ in Aquinas’ doctrine of 
cognition can be found in L.M. De Rijk, “Medieval Intentionality,” 113-126. For the Arabic 
sources of the notion of ‘intentio’ in its logico-semantic sense, see Kwame Gyekye, “The Terms 
‘Prima Intentio’ and ‘Secunda Intentio’ in Arabic Logic,” Speculum 46 (1971); Christian 
Knudsen, “Intentions and Impositions,” in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg (eds), Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 479-82. 
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habent veritatem neque falsitatem, sed 
solum illae quae sunt complexae per 
affirmationem vel negationem.
154
 
 
falsity, but only those which are complex 
through affirmation or negation [have truth 
and falsity]. 
 
Notice that the simplicity of the internal and external ‘word’ is not material but formal. 
The term ‘man’ is materially simple, but it is equivalent to phrases such as ‘rational 
animal’ or ‘animal with two legs’, which are materially composite. These phrases and the 
single term ‘man’ signify a conception that is formally simple, although it too can be 
linguistically expressed by a phrase such as ‘what has humanity’ (‘habens 
humanitatem’).155 The complexity of the interior and exterior ‘word’ is associated with its 
being the subject of truth and falsity, and hence with predication. As noted by Aquinas, 
only in predication is a comparison made between the thing denoted by the subject-term 
and the form signified by the predicate-term.
156
 Such comparison makes possible the 
conception of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei.
157
 The conception signified by simple 
words is not subject to truth and falsity because it contains no predication. A conception 
is said to be simple or non-composite (conceptio incomplexa) because it lacks the 
composition of a proposition. As Aquinas explains: 
Cum aliquod incomplexum vel dicitur vel 
intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum, 
quantum est de se, non est rei aequatum 
nec rei inaequale: cum aequalitas et 
inaequalitas secundum comparationem 
dicantur; incomplexum autem, quantum est 
de se, non continet aliquam comparationem 
vel applicationem ad rem. Unde de se nec 
verum nec falsum dici potest: sed tantum 
complexum, in quo designatur comparatio 
When something non-complex 
(incomplexum) is said or understood, the 
incomplexum, as it is in itself, is neither 
equal nor unequal to the thing; because 
equality and inequality are said according 
to a comparison. But the incomplexum, as it 
is in itself, does not contain a comparison 
or application to the thing. Thus, in itself, it 
cannot be said to be true or false; but only 
the complexum, in which is designated a 
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 In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223-1224, Marietti ed., p. 309. 
155
 The reason for this phrasing of the conception signified by the term ‘man’ will be explained in 
the next section, once we discuss ‘modes of signification’. 
156
 See, ST I, q. 16, a. 2. 
157
 We shall explore this connection further in Chapter IV in examining Aquinas’ theory of 
predication. 
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incomplexi ad rem per notam 
compositionis aut divisionis.
158
 
 
comparison of the incomplexum to the 
thing through the note of composition and 
division [is said to be true or false]. 
 
Truth and falsity are not per se found in the first operation of the intellect and in its 
product (conceptio, intentio, definitio).
159
 The first operation results in a simple, non-
composite conception which is signified by a linguistic expression such as the single term 
‘man’ or the phrase ‘rational animal’. 
We have shown, then, that for Aquinas the intellect’s conception signified by 
terms is simple or non-composite, that is, it lacks the composition of subject and 
predicate, which characterizes the sort of conception that propositions signify. 
 
b. Signification and Knowledge 
 
 
After the distinction between simple and composite conception and signification, 
the second point to be made regarding the nature of the intellect’s conception of the res 
signified by our terms is that it is not equivalent to knowledge.
160
 Even though we can 
come to know the real definition of what our terms signify, this knowledge is not required 
for signification, that is, for our ability to use the terms of a language successfully. Our 
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 SCG I, c. 59, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 167, lines 24A-1B. 
159
 There is a sense, nonetheless, in which both truth and falsity are found in the first operation of 
the intellect. Aquinas notes that falsity may be accidentally found in the ‘definition’ in three 
ways: because one applies the definition to the wrong thing, because the definition contains a 
logical contradiction (e.g. ‘non-sensitive animal’), or because the definition does not denote a real 
thing (e.g. ‘four-footed flying animal’). In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; In IX Meta., lect. 11, n. 
1908; ST I, q. 58, a. 5; q. 85, a. 6. Similarly, in a certain respect, truth may also be found in the 
first operation or in the ‘definition’. In I Post. Anal., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/2, p. 26, lines 
179-82: “[L]icet deffinitio in se non sit propositio in actu, est tamen uirtute proposition, quia, 
cognita deffinitione, apparet deffinitionem de subiecto uere praedicari;” and In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, 
a. 1, ad 7, where the definition is said to be true insofar as the quiddity is an ens rationis: 
“[Q]uidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis, et secundum istud esse dicitur veritas in prima 
operatione intellectus: per quem etiam modum dicitur definitio vera;” Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 
489. 
160
 Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 100, 104. 
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intellect can have an initial apprehension of human nature without its individualizing 
conditions, even without this apprehension yet amounting to a determinate and complete 
knowledge of what such nature is in itself.  
Aquinas’ discussion on the imposition of the term ‘lapis’ with signification is 
helpful on this issue.
161
 He points out that we know substances only indirectly through 
their properties and effects; yet we impose our terms to signify, not these properties and 
effects, but the form or nature of the substance. Thus, even though we know stones 
through their propensity to hurt feet (laedere pedem), we impose the term ‘lapis’ to 
signify the nature, stone.
162
 Indeed, we do not apply the term ‘lapis’ to everything that 
has the propensity to hurt feet. It would thus be a mistake to identify the res signified by 
the term ‘lapis’ with ‘foot-hurting’. The least cognition we have of a stone as such 
provides the basis for our imposing a term to signify the stone’s nature. In this sense, the 
nature of stone can still be viewed as that from which, on the part of the thing, the name 
was imposed.
163
 Since we know a stone’s nature only through its properties and effects, 
the intellect’s conception of the nature of stone does not in itself guarantee that we are 
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 ST I, q. 13, a. 8 corpus and ad 2; q. 13, a. 2, ad 2; q. 59, a. 1, ad 2. For a more detailed 
discussion of Aquinas’ handling of the lapis example, see Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 
49-50. 
162
 De ver., q. 4, a. 1, ad 8, Leonine ed., vol. 22/1, p. 121-22, lines 343-46: “[L]apis imponitur ab 
effectu qui est laedere pedem, et hoc non oportet esse principaliter significatum per nomen sed 
illud loco cuius hoc ponitur.” 
163
 Aquinas distinguishes between id a quo nomen imponitur ex parte rei and id a quo nomen 
imponitur ex parte imponentis. Thus, in the case of the term ‘lapis’, that from which the term was 
imposed ex parte rei is the nature of stone, whereas that from which it was imposed ex parte 
imponentis is the property to hurt feet (De ver., q. 4, a. 1, ad 8). We must not confuse this 
distinction with the one previously discussed between that from which a term is imposed (id a quo 
imponitur nomen) and that upon which a term is imposed (id cui imponitur nomen). For a 
discussion on the two distinctions, including references to their historical background, see 
Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 47-50. A useful overview on the imposition of words in 
Aquinas can be found in McInerny, Logic and Analogy, 54-59. 
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able to provide a real definition of the nature of stone; such conception suffices, however, 
for us to be able to use the term ‘lapis’ successfully.164 
In regards to our ability to use terms in a language successfully, it makes no 
difference whether or not one has complete knowledge of what the res signified is. One 
may know the meaning of a term or its nominal definition (the quid nominis) without 
knowing what the thing signified is in itself (the quid rei). Our terms have signification 
inasmuch as they signify or sign a conception in the mind, but having such a conception 
is not equivalent to knowing what the object of that conception is. Moreover, having such 
a conception does not amount to knowledge of whether the term in question denotes a 
real thing, that is, whether the things the term stands for have actual existence in the 
nature of things.
165
 Thus, knowing the signification of the term precedes any answer to 
the questions ‘is it’ and ‘what is it’. Aquinas observes that knowledge of whether 
something is (an sit) precedes knowledge of what something is (quid sit), but knowing 
whether something is presupposes knowledge of the signification of the term.
166
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 De ver., q. 4, a. 1, ad 9, Leonine ed., vol. 22/1, p. 122, lines 350-58: “[Q]uantum ad rationem 
verbi pertinet non differt utrum aliquid intelligatur per similitudinem vel essentiam: constat enim 
quod exterius verbum significat omne illud quod intelligi potest, sive per essentiam sive per 
similitudinem intelligatur. Et ideo omne intellectum, sive per essentiam sive per similitudinem 
intelligatur, potest verbum interius dici.” 
165
 De pot., q. 9, a. 4, ad 18, Marietti ed., p. 64: “[L]icet universale non possit esse praeter 
singularia, potest tamen intelligi, et per consequens significari. Et propter hoc sequitur, si non est 
aliquod singularium, quod non sit universale. Non tamen sequitur, si non intelligitur aut 
significatur aliquod singularium, quod non intelligatur vel significetur universale: hoc enim 
nomen homo non significat aliquem singularium hominum, sed solum hominem in communi.”  
166
 In I Post. Anal., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/2, p. 11, lines 63-69: “[Q]uia antequam sciatur de 
aliquo an sit, non potest sciri proprie de eo quid est (non entium enim non sunt deffinitiones), 
unde quaestio «an est» praecedit quaestionem «quid est»; sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit 
nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen;” In II Post. Anal., lect. 7, Leonine ed., vol. 
1*/2, p. 199, lines 122-24: “[E]st impossibile, ut scilicet sciamus quid est, ignorantes si est;” In 
VII Meta., lect. 7, n. 1666, Marietti ed., p. 397: “Nam esse est praesuppositum ad hoc quod 
quaeritur quid est.” On the relation between the questions ‘an sit’ and ‘quid sit’ in Aquinas, see 
Jan Aertsen, Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 12-
53; David Twetten, “To Which ‘God’ Must a Proof of God's Existence Conclude for Aquinas?” 
70 
 
To conclude our discussion on Aquinas’ understanding of the nature of the 
conceptio and res signified by terms, I want to point out that Aquinas recognizes that the 
duality of signing of conceptio and res is a source of ambiguity when one inquires about 
what a term signifies.
167
 Even though it is important for the purpose of our investigation 
to keep these two notions separated, it is equally important not to lose sight of the fact 
that a term’s signification is always comprised by the ‘conception signified’ and the 
‘thing signified’. Even more important is not to lose sight of the interconnection between 
the two sides of a term’s signification. We must keep in mind that, for Aquinas, the 
signification of the res is always mediated by the intellect’s conceptio of the res. One 
corollary of the aforementioned semantic structure of terms is that the res significata of a 
term is signified according to the mode or manner in which it is conceived by the 
intellect. The mediated character of the signification of the res grounds, as we are about 
to see, Aquinas’ claim of a correlation between modi significandi and modi intelligendi, a 
correlation that will be key to identifying the sort of simple conception the terms ‘ens’ 
and ‘esse’ signify. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Laudemus Viros Gloriosos: Essays in Medieval Philosophy in Honor of Armand Augustine 
Maurer, C.S.B., ed. R. E. Houser (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) 146-
83, at 155-59. It should be noted that in early texts Aquinas states that the quiddity of a thing may 
be known without knowing whether the thing exists (see, e.g., De ente, c. 4; In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, 
a. 2). This statement is a central premise of the so-called “intellectus essentiae argument” for the 
distinction between being and essence, an argument that has been the subject of great debate. The 
discussion centers on the question whether or not the argument proves that the distinction 
between being and essence is real and not merely conceptual. For a survey of the discussion, see 
Walter Patt, “Aquinas’ Real Distinction and Some Interpretations,” New Scholasticism 26 (1988).  
167
 De ver., q. 4, a. 4, ad 3. 
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2.2.2. Aquinas on Modes of Signification 
 
 
A. Preliminary Remarks 
 
 
Thirteenth-century theologians made use of the logical notion of modi significandi 
in order to address questions regarding religious language, especially the possibility of 
naming God. Their approach to the notion varies just as it did for logicians. Bonaventure 
(1227-1274), for example, links the notion of modus significandi with that of modus 
intelligendi or ratio cognoscendi: the ‘mode of signification’ of a term follows on the 
‘mode of understanding’. For Albert the Great (1200-1280), on the other hand, modus 
intelligendi and modus significandi correspond primarily to the modus essendi of the 
thing understood and signified.
168
 Aquinas too uses the notion of modus significandi 
primarily in the context of religious language and the divine names.
169
 Regarding 
Aquinas’ approach to the notion of modus significandi, I have found that Aquinas’ 
understanding of the notion resembles that of Peter of Spain.
170
 Aquinas’s doctrine of 
modes of signification links the modus significandi of a term to the modus intelligendi of 
the conception of the res. As it did for Peter of Spain, the doctrine of the mediation of the 
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 On Bonaventure and Albert the Great, see Rosier, “Res significata et modus significandi,” 
147-50. On the general use of the notion of modus significandi among theologians of the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, see M.-D. Chenu, “Grammaire et théologie aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles,” in 
Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 10 (1935-36). 
169
 We shall briefly touch on the topic of divine names in Aquinas at the end of this section. 
170
 Ashworth, on the contrary, identifies Aquinas’s use of the notion of modus significandi with 
the most common use of the notion wherein ‘modus significandi’ is linked with the different parts 
of speech. See “Signification and Modes,” 57; and “Analogy and Equivocation,” 105. She 
expresses, however, some hesitation in the face of selected passages (In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2; 
ST I, q. 13, a. 11) where Aquinas does not link the notion of modus significandi very closely to 
the notion of word-class: “It is not clear,” she writes, “whether we are dealing with word-class or 
with an extended notion of modi significandi that is independent of word-class” (“Signification 
and Modes,” 58-59). Perhaps the reason is that in her review of modes of signification, Ashworth 
does not recognize the second, logical, sense of modus significandi distinguished earlier in this 
chapter.  
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intellect’s conception in the signification of the res significata plays a central role in 
Aquinas’ understanding of modes of signification. Given that the res significata of a term 
is signified thorough the intellect’s conception, the mode in which the res is signified by 
a term is a consequence of the mode in which the res is conceived by the intellect. 
Aquinas writes: “the mode of signification in the terms that are by us imposed upon 
things follows on [our] mode of understanding.”171 Therefore, the modus significandi of a 
term is a reflection of the modus intelligendi in which the res significata is conceived by 
the intellect. As such, though, the modus significandi of a term is a feature, not of the 
intellect’s mode, but of the conceptio signified by the term. The term ‘man’ signifies a 
conception of humanity which is linguistically expressed by a phrase like ‘what has 
humanity’ (‘habens humanitatem’). The mode in which the term ‘man’ signifies 
humanity is contained in the conception signified: ‘man’ signifies humanity ‘as subsisting 
in a subject’ or ‘as a substance’ (per modum substantiae). 
There is in Aquinas a necessary correspondence between the modus intelligendi 
and modus significandi, but there is no necessary correspondence between the modus 
essendi of the res significata and the modus significandi of the term.
172
 The mode in 
which the res significata of a term is conceived by the intellect may or may not 
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 De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 7, Marietti ed., p. 56: “[M]odus significandi in dictionibus quae a nobis 
rebus imponuntur sequitur modum intelligendi; dictiones enim significant intellectuum 
conceptiones, ut dicitur in principio Periher.” See, also, SCG I, c. 30, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 92, 
lines 31-32A: “Nam nomine res exprimimus eo modo quo intellectu concipimus;” ST I, q. 45, a. 
2, ad 2; De pot., q. 7, a. 5, ad 2; In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 1253-54.  
172
 On this point, see Keith Buersmeyer, “Aquinas on the Modi Significandi,” Modern Schoolman 
64 (1987): 79-81; Rosier, “Res significata et modus significandi,” 151-52; and Rocca, “Res 
Significata and Modus Significandi,” 189-90. This is an essential point for Aquinas. As Rocca 
remarks, it is precisely because there is no correspondence between the creaturely mode of 
signification of the terms we predicate of God and God’s objective mode of being that Aquinas is 
able to maintain that, although the reality (res) signified by the predicate term might be suitable to 
God, we need to deny our mode of signification in all divine predication. 
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correspond to the mode of being of the res. The term ‘whiteness’ (‘albedo’), for instance, 
signifies whiteness in the mode of a substance (per modum substantiae), yet whiteness 
does not have the mode of being of a substance.
173
 In addition, observe that within this 
semantic framework it is possible for more than one term to signify the same res 
according to different modes; such is the case of the term ‘man’ (‘homo’) and the term 
‘humanity’ (‘humanitas’).174 As a result, terms cannot be differentiated only in reference 
to their res significata. Indeed, Aquinas points out that the unity or diversity of words, 
whether simple or complex, does not depend merely on the unity or diversity of the thing 
signified; it depends, rather, on the unity or diversity of either the external word (as in the 
case of synonyms that signify the same res) or the understanding (as in the case of ‘man’ 
and ‘humanity’).175 
Throughout his writings Aquinas recognizes various modes of signification, some 
of which overlap. Following on the traditional distinctions made by logicians, Aquinas 
maintains that substantive names signify thorough the mode of substance (per modum 
substantiae) or substantively (substantive), while adjectival names signify through the 
mode of accident (per modum accidentis) or adjectivally (adiective).
176
 However, as we 
shall see next, a term like ‘white’ (‘albus’), which is an adjectival name, is also said to 
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 In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 894, Marietti ed., p. 239: “Hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum 
ex consequenti, inquantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex 
consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi 
significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae.” 
174
 See De ente, c. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 373, lines 292-94: “Sic igitur patet quod essentiam 
hominis signifìcat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diuersimode.” 
175
 See Quodl. IV, q. 9, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 25/2, p. 338-39, lines 58-60/63-66: “Manifestum est 
autem quod unitas uocis significatiue uel diuersitas non dependet ex unitate uel diuersitate rei 
significate . . . Dependet igitur unitas uel diuersitas uocis significatiue, siue complexe siue 
incomplexe, ex unitate uel diuersitate uocis aut intellectus.”  
176
 ST I, q. 39, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 400: “[N]omina substantiva significant aliquid per 
modum substantiae: nomina vero adiectiva significant aliquid per modum accidentis;” also In I 
Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2; In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 894. 
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signify in a concrete mode (in concretione). In the following pages I shall concentrate on 
the distinction between abstract and concrete modes of signification given that these are 
the modes of signification Aquinas frequently assigns to the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’.177  
 
B. Concrete and Abstract Modes of Signification in Aquinas 
 
 
The distinction between an abstract and a concrete term may be summarized as 
follows: A concrete term signifies something as composite and as subsistent, either as a 
subject or in a subject, whereas an abstract term signifies something as simple and as that 
whereby something is. Aquinas writes: 
[Q]uod significatur concretive, significatur 
ut per se existens, ut homo vel album . . . 
quod significatur in abstracto, significatur 
per modum formae, cujus non est operari 
vel subsistere in se, sed in alio.
178
 
 
What is signified concretely is signified as 
existing per se, as ‘man’ or ‘white’ . . . 
what is signified in the abstract is signified 
in mode of form, to which it belongs, not to 
act or to subsist in itself, but [to subsist] in 
another. 
 
[O]mnia nomina a nobis imposita ad 
significandum aliquid completum 
subsistens, significant in concretione, prout 
competit compositis; quae autem 
imponuntur ad significandas formas 
simplices, significant aliquid non ut 
subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut 
albedo significat ut quo aliquid est 
album.
179
 
 
[A]ll words imposed by us to signify 
something complete and subsistent signify 
in the concrete, as befits composite things. 
Words imposed to signify simple forms 
signify something not as subsistent, but as 
that whereby something is, as ‘whiteness’ 
signifies as that whereby something is 
white. 
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 On the distinction between abstract and concrete modes of signification in Aquinas, see e.g. 
Ralph McInerny, “Can God Be Named By Us. Prolegomena to Thomistic Philosophy of 
Religion,” Review of Metaphysics 32 (1978) 53-73; Buersmeyer, “Aquinas on the Modi 
Significandi,” 79-83; Jordan, “Modes of Discourse,” 411-15. Klima discusses the distinction in 
relation to supposition theory (“Semantic Principles,” 110-113). For Aquinas’ use of the 
grammatical distinction between abstract and concrete terms in his Trinitarian theology, see 
James Egan, “Naming in St. Thomas’ Theology of the Trinity,” in From an Abundant Spring, ed. 
The Thomist staff (New York: P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1952). 
178
 In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 770. 
179
 ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 140. 
75 
 
If we consider signification alone, a concrete term and its abstract counterpart differ only 
with respect to the conceptio they signify, not with respect to the res they signify. The 
terms ‘man’ and ‘humanity’, for instance, signify the same res (humanity inherent in 
composite things), but the conceptio differs: ‘humanity’ signifies humanity with 
precision, that is, by ‘prescinding’ from other things, as ‘that whereby something is’, 
whereas ‘man’ signifies humanity without prescinding, but ‘mixed together’ with other 
things, and as subsisting.
180
 Thus, Aquinas points out that the terms ‘humanity’ and ‘man’ 
signify the same nature but while the term ‘humanity’ signifies human nature “ut partem” 
or “per modum partis,” the term ‘man’ signifies human nature “ut totum” or “per modum 
totius.”181 Similarly, the modi significandi of abstract and concrete terms are said to differ 
inasmuch as a concrete term signifies “per modum completi participantis” and an abstract 
term signifies “per modum diminuti et partis formalis.”182 Notice that the difference in 
mode of signification between the terms ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ explains why we predicate 
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 See De ente, c. 2; In I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1. On the difference between signification “with 
precision” (cum praecisione materiae designatae) and “without precision” (sine praecisione 
materiae designatae), see Joseph Owens, “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the 
Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas,” in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: Collected 
Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980). 
Owens speaks of “abstraction” with or without precision, but that is not an expression Aquinas 
uses. On the other hand, the semantic distinction between abstract and concrete terms corresponds 
to two ways of abstraction Aquinas distinguishes: abstraction of the form from matter, and 
abstraction of the universal from the particular (De Trin., q. 5, a. 3; ST I, q. 40, a. 3; In I Meta., 
lect. 10, n. 158). 
181
 De ente, c. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 373, lines 292-304: “Sic igitur patet quod essentiam 
hominis significant hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diuersimode, ut dictum est: 
quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non precidit designationem 
materie sed implicite continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet 
differentiam; et ideo predicatur hoc nomen homo de indiuiduis. Sed hoc nomen humanitas 
significat eam ut partem, quia non continet in significatione sua nisi id quod est hominis in 
quantum est homo, et precidit omnem designationem; unde de indiuiduis hominis non 
predicatur;” In VII Meta., lect. 5, n. 1379, Marietti ed., p. 339: “[H]omo significat ut totum, 
humanitas significat ut pars;” and Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1. 
182
 Super De causis, prop. 22, Saffrey ed., p. 116, lines 25-27: “[O]mne nomen a nobis 
impositum, vel significat per modum completi participantis sicut nomina concreta, vel significat 
per modum diminuti et partis formalis sicut nomina abstracta.” 
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the term ‘man’ and not ‘humanity’ of a human being, even though the term ‘man’ 
signifies humanity, and a human being is denominated ‘man’ from his humanity.183 
But the distinction between concrete and abstract modes of signification applies 
not only to names, substantive or adjectival; it also applies to infinitive verbs and their 
respective verbal nouns and participles, for instance, ‘esse’, ‘essendum’, and ‘ens’. 
Aquinas contrasts the pair ‘esse’ and ‘ens’ and the pair ‘currere’ and ‘currens’ as 
signifying in the abstract and concrete respectively: 
Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod 
dicimus esse et aliud per id quod dicimus id 
quod est, sicut et aliud significamus cum 
dicimus currere et aliud per hoc quod 
dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse 
significantur in abstracto sicut et albedo; 
sed quod est, id est ens et currens, 
significantur sicut in concreto, uelut 
album.
184
  
We signify one thing by saying ‘to be’ 
(esse) and another by saying ‘that which is’ 
(id quod est), just as also we signify one 
thing when we say ‘to run’ (currere) and 
another when ‘the [one] running’ (currens) 
is said. For, ‘currere’ and ‘esse’ are 
signified in the abstract, as is ‘whiteness’; 
but ‘quod est’, namely ‘ens’, and ‘currens’ 
are signified in the concrete, as is ‘white’. 
 
The semantic structure of the pair ‘currens’ and ‘currere’, as well as that of ‘ens’ and 
‘esse’, is parallel to that of ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’; they share the same res significata 
but differ in their mode of signification. The pair ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, then, is simply one 
among other examples of a concrete term and its abstract counterpart. They signify the 
same res, but while ‘ens’ signifies esse in a concrete mode, ‘esse’ signifies esse in an 
abstract mode. 
A problem arises, however, with regards to Aquinas’ account of the mode of 
signification of verbs of the infinitive mode when one considers the following passage: 
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 I shall return to this topic at the end of the section. Also, notice that in light of the introduction 
of ‘modes of signification’, the previous account of the imposition of a term upon things, wherein 
a term is imposed upon a thing on account of its having the ‘form’ signified by the term, needs 
further qualification.  
184
 In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 270-71, lines 39-45. 
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[V]ita non hoc modo se habet ad vivere, 
sicut essentia ad esse; sed sicut cursus ad 
currere; quorum unum significant actum in 
abstracto, aliud in concreto.
185
 
The relation between ‘vita’ and ‘vivere’ is 
not the same as that between ‘essence’ and 
‘esse’; it is rather the same as ‘cursus’ and 
‘currere’, one of which signifies the act in 
the abstract, the other in the concrete.  
 
In the preceding translated text (In De hebdom., lect. 2) Aquinas claims that the term 
‘currere’ signifies in the abstract, yet in this text (ST I, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2) he declares that it 
signifies in the concrete. How is it possible for ‘currere’ to signify both in the abstract 
and in the concrete? The answer is found in the following passage, where Aquinas 
distinguishes the different modes in which action is signified: 
[P]otest autem actio significari tripliciter: 
uno modo, per se in abstracto, uelut 
quedam res, et sic significatur per nomen; 
ut ‘actio’, ‘passio’, ‘ambulatio’, ‘cursus’ et 
similia; alio modo per modum actionis, ut 
scilicet est egrediens a substancia et 
inherens ei ut subiecto, et sic significatur 
per uerba aliorum modorum, que 
attribuuntur personis; sed, quia etiam ipse 
processus uel inherencia actionis potest 
apprehendi ab intellectu et significari ut res 
quedam, inde est quod ipsa uerba infinitiui 
modi, que significant ipsam inherenciam 
actionis ad subiectum, possunt accipi ut 
uerba, ratione concretionis, et ut nomina, 
prout significant quasi res quasdam.
186
 
Action can be signified in three ways. In 
one mode, per se in the abstract, as a 
certain thing, and thus it is signified by a 
noun, such as ‘action’, ‘passion’, ‘a walk’, 
‘a run’ (cursus), and the like. In another 
mode, through the mode of action, as 
proceeding from a substance and inhering 
in it as in a subject, and in this way it is 
signified by verbs of the different modes, 
which [verbs] are attributed to persons. But 
because the proceeding itself or the 
inherence of an action can be apprehended 
by the intellect and signified as a certain 
thing, verbs in the infinitive mode, which 
signify inherence of action in a subject, can 
be taken as verbs by reason of ‘concretion’ 
and as nouns according as they signify, as 
it were, certain things. 
 
We should observe that this distinction is brought out to explain why verbs of the 
infinitive mode, unlike other modes of verbs, can be placed in the subject position. In 
light of the distinction, then, there are three modes of signifying action. In the first place, 
action is signified per se as a certain thing and in the abstract by a noun such as ‘cursus’. 
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It is evident that when an action is signified by a noun as a certain thing, the term may 
serve as a subject or a predicate term. In another mode, action is signified “as proceeding 
from a substance and inhering in it as in a subject.” In this way action is signified by 
verbs, in any of their grammatical modes, with their indications of person, tense, and 
mood. An example would be ‘currit’ (he or she runs). Aquinas accordingly describes this 
mode of signification as “per modum actionis.”187 And, just as actions are not found in 
the world as existing per se, but as existing in their subjects, so verbs are predicated of 
subjects; thus, the mode in which verbs signify action explains why the verb is always in 
the predicate role: action as action requires a subject. Finally, action is signified by one 
term (a verb of the infinitive mode, such as ‘currere’) in two different modes according 
to the mode in which the “inherence of action” is conceived by the intellect. In the first 
place, when the intellect apprehends the inhering action as a certain thing, the action is 
signified in the abstract. In this case the infinitive takes on the function of a noun and thus 
may occupy the subject position (Aquinas’ principal interest in the context). But when the 
intellect takes the inhering action per modum concretionis, namely, in the concrete as 
mixed together with the subject in whom it inheres as its action, the infinitive is a verb 
proper and thus cannot be placed in the subject position. 
Here we begin to see the answer to our question. Just as two terms can signify the 
same res in different modes (as the terms ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ do), so it is possible for 
one and the same term to signify the same res in different modes. According to the mode 
in which the res significata is conceived by the intellect, the term ‘currere’ signifies the 
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same res, the act of running, either in the concrete, in which case the term functions 
grammatically as a verb (as in the proposition ‘dux dicit Pheidippidem currere’: ‘the 
commander tells Pheidippides to run’), or in the abstract, in which case the term functions 
grammatically as a noun and may thus serve as the subject of a proposition.  
Let us now return to the texts in question in order to resolve the dilemma. In the 
first passage (In De hebdom., lect. 2), the term ‘currere’ is the abstract counterpart of the 
concrete term ‘currens’; the relation between these terms is paralleled with that of 
‘whiteness’ and its concrete counterpart ‘white’. A particular attribute of this kind of 
concrete-abstract pairs of terms is that the abstract term both signifies and stands for its 
res significata (in what the terminists call ‘simple’ supposition), which is the res 
significata of its concrete counterpart. This is why we can refer to the res significata of 
the concrete term by its abstract counterpart: we say that ‘man’ signifies humanity (but 
stands for a human being, (in what is called ‘personal’ supposition).188 Now, in the 
second passage (ST I, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2) a different kind of concrete-abstract pair of terms 
is introduced. The relation between the terms ‘cursus’ and ‘currere’ is paralleled to that 
of ‘vita’ and ‘vivere’. Here the abstract terms are ‘cursus’ and ‘vita’, and the concrete 
terms are ‘currere’ and ‘vivere’. Notice that unlike the abstract terms at In De hebdom., 
lect. 2, the abstract terms ‘cursus’ and ‘vita’ do not stand for their respective res 
significata. That role belongs to the abstract terms ‘currere’ and ‘vivere’ because, as we 
shall see next, the terms ‘currere’ and ‘vivere’ signify their res as a form or as ‘that by 
which’, whereas ‘cursus’ and ‘vita’ signify their res as existing per se. 
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Now, at In De hebdom., lect. 2, grammatically speaking, the contrast is between 
two names (noun and/or adjective) that signify the same res in different modes, while at 
ST I, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2 the contrast is between a name (a noun) and a verb that signify the 
same res in different modes. Consider the following parallel text: 
‘[C]ursus’, quia  significat actionem non 
per modum actionis, set per modum rei per 
se existentis, eo quod est nomen, non 
significat tempus; ‘currit’ vero, cum sit 
verbum significans actionem, consignificat 
tempus.
189
 
 
The term ‘cursus’, because it signifies an 
action, not in the mode of action but in the 
mode of a thing existing per se, by the fact 
that it is a noun does not signify time. The 
term ‘currit’, however, since it is a verb 
signifying action, consignifies time. 
 
If we consider signification alone, the abstract terms ‘cursus’ and ‘currere’ and the 
concrete terms ‘currit’ and ‘currens’ all signify the same res, the act of running, in 
different modes according to different modes of understanding. Therefore, although the 
res significata is the same, the conception signified varies. The terms ‘cursus’ and 
‘currere’ signify in the abstract inasmuch as the res is conceived and signified as simple 
and not as composite; they differ, however, in that while ‘cursus’ signifies action as 
existing per se, ‘currere’ signifies action as a form or as ‘that by which’. The terms 
‘currit’ and ‘currens’ signify in the concrete inasmuch as the res is conceived and 
signified as composite. They differ inasmuch as ‘currit’ signifies the res as in a subject 
while ‘currens’ signifies the res as a subject. Incidentally, it is the abstract ‘currere’ 
which both signifies and stands for the res significata of all four terms. 
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C. Concluding Remarks on Aquinas’ Account of Modes of 
Signification 
 
 
By way of conclusion, I want briefly to comment on two general points regarding 
Aquinas’ account of modi significandi that are gathered from the previous discussion on 
the different modes of signifying action.  
First, although different parts of speech are mentioned in connection to one mode 
of signification or another, the discussion of modes of signification is not intended to 
establish a grammatical distinction between different parts of speech. On the contrary, 
these distinctions are already presupposed, since what brings about the distinction of 
modes of signifying action is the question how a term (‘currere’) that would otherwise 
function as a verb in a proposition can sometimes function as a noun does. Aquinas 
certainly recognizes that the modi significandi of terms have grammatical implications 
(we have seen him, for example, describing verbs as signifying per modus actionis and 
substantive nouns as signifying per modus substantiae), but his theory of modes of 
signification does not link the notion of modus significandi as such to the grammatical 
properties of terms. Indeed, although references to different parts of speech in the context 
of the distinction between modes of signification are common in Aquinas, there are 
instances where the notion of modus significandi is not directly connected to any 
particular part of speech.
190
 The modi significandi of terms are for Aquinas first and 
foremost a function of our modi intelligendi. It is precisely in this capacity, that is, 
inasmuch as they reflect our modes of understanding, that the notion of modi significandi, 
as we shall see shortly, plays a central role in Aquinas’ theory of religious language.  
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Second, Aquinas’ approach to the notion of modi significandi is in line with one 
of the central doctrines in the tradition of terminist logic: it is not use and context that 
determines the signification of a term, but rather the signification of a term is what 
determines its use in any given propositional context.
191
 Whether a term can be placed in 
the subject position, in the predicate position, or both, ultimately depends for Aquinas on 
the mode of signification of the term. Now, regarding terms that can be placed in the 
predicate position, whether or not the term can be predicated of this or that subject is also 
determined by the mode of signification of the term. Early on we mentioned that the res 
significata of a term is that on account of which something is denominated by that term. 
The statement is true, but in light of the foregoing discussion on modes of signification it 
needs further qualification. Both ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ signify human nature, but only 
‘man’ may be predicated of an individual man. The term ‘man’ may be predicated of 
Socrates, not only on account of its res significata, that is, not on account of its signifying 
human nature, but also on account of the mode in which human nature is signified by the 
term ‘man’. The concrete term ‘man’ can be predicated of an individual man because it 
signifies human nature ut totum or per modum totius, that is, it signifies ‘what has 
humanity’ (‘habens humanitatem’). The abstract term ‘humanity’, on the other hand, 
cannot be predicated of an individual man because it signifies human nature ut partem or 
per modum partis, that is, it signifies humanity as a form or as ‘that by which’ [man is 
man].
192
 In the predication of a term, then, a distinction needs to be made between the res 
significata and the modus significandi of the term. Both belong to the conception 
signified. 
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The distinction is central to Aquinas’ account of the divine names. For Aquinas, 
our difficulty in naming God results primarily from imperfections in the modi 
significandi of our terms. There are indeed terms that are improper of God given their res 
significata, and these terms can be said of God only metaphorically. But, if we consider 
modes of signification alone, argues Aquinas, all of our terms fall short when naming 
God because we impose our terms with signification on the basis of our modes of 
understanding. Even when we impose our terms to signify absolute perfections which are 
suitable to God, such as wisdom and goodness, our modus intelligendi and therefore our 
modus significandi of those perfections will always fall short. Our terms have either a 
concrete or an abstract mode of signification. A concrete term predicated of God has the 
advantage of signifying what subsists, but the disadvantage of suggesting composition. 
An abstract term predicated of God has the advantage of simplicity, but the disadvantage 
of signifying as ‘that by which’. Accordingly, Aquinas writes: 
Quia igitur et Deus simplex est, et 
subsistens est, attribuimus ei et nomina 
abstracta, ad significandam simplicitatem 
eius; et nomina concreta, ad significandum 
subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, 
quamvis utraque nomina deficiant a modo 
ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non 
cognoscit eum ut est, secundum hanc 
vitam.
193
 
 
And because God is simple and subsistent, 
we attribute to Him abstract names to 
signify His simplicity, and concrete names 
to signify His subsistence and perfection; 
although both these names fall short of His 
mode [of being] just as our intellect in this 
life does not know Him as He is. 
As a result, Aquinas maintains that we have to deny or transcend the modus significandi 
of our terms when we predicate them of God, even if the perfection signified is otherwise 
suitable to God.
194
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Aquinas does not deny the possibility of predicating a concrete or an abstract term 
of God. We can use the same terms of God and creatures, that is, both God and creatures 
can receive the same predicate; thus, we say ‘God is good’ and ‘that woman is good’. In 
either case the mode of signification of the term ‘good’ is the same; whether ‘good’ is 
predicated of God or a woman, it signifies goodness in a concrete mode.
195
 Now, given 
that concrete mode of signification of the term ‘good’ is not suitable to God’s mode of 
being, we must transcend the mode of signification of goodness contained in the term 
‘good’ when we predicate it of God, that is, we must predicate goodness of God in a 
different mode from the one that belongs to creatures: God is goodness itself, we add. It is 
in the context of predication, then, that we have to deny or compensate for the mode of 
signification of the terms we apply to God. In order to account for the difference in modi 
predicandi when we predicate the same term of God and creatures, Aquinas introduces 
into the discussion the notion of ‘analogy’.196 
 
2.2.3. Aquinas on the Signification of Analogous Terms 
 
 
In this last section, I concentrate on Aquinas’ semantic account of analogous 
terms. We shall see that Aquinas’ treatment of the various issues related to the 
signification of these terms overlaps with that of contemporary terminist logicians.  
One of the issues regarding the signification of analogous terms that was subject 
to debate among terminist logicians was the number of conceptions or rationes involved.  
Aquinas offers different answers to this question.
197
  In his commentary on the Sentences, 
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he claims that only one intentio is involved which is used in different ways. In De 
principiis naturae he speaks of a plurality of rationes.
198
 In the Summa theologiae we are 
told that neither one ratio nor diverse rationes are involved.
199
 Similar remarks are made 
in the commentary on the Metaphysics. Here, Aquinas explains that the rationes involved 
are “partly different and partly not.”  
Sed sciendum quod aliquid praedicatur de 
diversis multipliciter: quandoque quidem 
secundum rationem omnino eamdem, et 
tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut 
animal de equo et bove. - Quandoque vero 
secundum rationes omnino diversas; et tunc 
dicitur de eis aequivoce praedicari, sicut 
canis de sidere et animali. - Quandoque 
vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt 
diversae et partim non diversae: diversae 
quidem secundum quod diversas 
habitudines important, unae autem 
secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem 
istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et 
illud dicitur «analogice praedicari».
200
 
 
It should be understood that something is 
predicated of different things in many 
ways. Sometimes it is predicated according 
to a ratio that is entirely the same, and then 
it is said to be predicated univocally of 
[things], as animal is predicated of a horse 
and of an ox. Sometimes it is predicated 
according to rationes that are entirely 
different, and then it is said to be 
predicated of them equivocally, as dog is 
predicated of a star and of an animal. 
Sometimes it is predicated according to 
rationes which are partly different and 
partly not; they are different inasmuch as 
they imply different relationships, and one 
inasmuch as these different relationships 
are referred to one and the same thing, and 
[then the term] is said to be predicated 
analogously. 
 
According to this passage, the rationes involved in analogical predication are different 
with respect to the relationships they imply but the same with respect to the one thing 
they signify. 
But, for Aquinas, as for the logicians, the unity among the rationes or conceptions 
involved results not only from their sharing one res significata. In the Summa theologiae 
Aquinas suggests that the one thing which serves as the focal point for the rationes 
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involved in analogous predication is not the nature signified, but the ratio according to 
which the term is predicated primarily (per prius). Speaking of terms which are 
predicated analogically of many, Aquinas points out that a term of this kind must be 
predicated primarily of that which is placed in the definition or ratio of the things of 
which the term is predicated secondarily. The example is ‘healthy’ (‘sanum’): ‘healthy’ 
as predicated of animals comes into the definitio or ratio of ‘healthy’ as predicated of 
medicine inasmuch as medicine is said to be ‘healthy’ according as it is the cause of 
health in animals.
201
 Therefore, the ratio according to which a term is predicated 
primarily must be contained in the ratio according to which the term is predicated 
secondarily. The reason the ‘primary ratio’ is contained into the ‘secondary rationes’ is 
that the secondary rationes are the result of some qualification to the primary ratio. In De 
veritate Aquinas writes: 
[Q]uod aliquid simpliciter dictum 
intelligitur quandoque de eo quod per 
posterius dicitur ratione alicuius adiuncti, 
sicut ens in alio intelligitur accidens; et 
similiter vita ratione eius quod adiungitur, 
scilicet liber, intelligitur de vita creata, 
quae per posterius vita dicitur.
202
 
 
That which is said simpliciter is sometimes 
understood of that which is said 
secondarily by reason of something 
adjunct. As when ‘a being’ [with the 
adjunct] ‘in another’ is understood [as] an 
accident. And similarly ‘life’, by reason of 
what is added, namely, ‘book’, is 
understood of created life, which is called 
‘life’ secondarily. 
 
Without doubt different conceptions or rationes are involved in analogous predication, 
but an analogous term is not purely equivocal, because there is one primary conception 
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from which all others are derived by reason of some addition or qualification. All 
secondary significations of analogous terms contain, therefore, a reference to the primary 
signification of the term. In this sense, each secondary signification is an extension of the 
original signification of the term. 
The examples in the previous translated text show how the original ratio of an 
analogous term is subject to qualification by addition: when ‘in another’ is added to the 
primary ratio of ‘a being’ (‘ens’), the term is predicated of an accident. But the original 
or primary ratio of a term can also be subject to qualification by removing something 
from it, as when the element of composition is removed from the ratio of ‘good’ when 
predicated of God. We have seen that Aquinas often remarks that we need to deny or 
transcend the mode of signification of our terms when we predicate them of God.  It was 
also mentioned that the way to do so involves analogous predication. The doctrine of the 
modus significandi certainly plays a central role in Aquinas’ account of the divine names, 
but so does the doctrine of analogy. Within the context of the divine names, as others 
have pointed out, the doctrine of analogy extends that of modes of signification; analogy 
represents the means by which we transcend the bonds of the imperfect modi significandi 
of our terms.
203
 Notice that it is only within the context of Aquinas’ discussion on the 
divine names that the two doctrines come together. As Ashworth has shown, the notion of 
modus significandi plays no role on Aquinas’ theory of analogy as such.204 Unlike other 
cases where a term features various significations that contain the same res significata, 
the various significations of an analogous term are not the result of changes in the mode 
of signification of the res. The reason an analogous term retains its mode of signification 
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throughout its various significations is that the secondary significations share in the 
conception primarily signified, and it is the primary conception that sets the mode of 
signification of the term.  
The unity among the conceptions involved in analogous predication is what 
distinguishes the various significations of an analogous term from the various 
significations of an univocal term that signifies the same res according to different modi 
significandi. In the case of the term ‘currere’, which signifies the same res in the abstract 
and in the concrete mode, there are two very distinct conceptions of the same res 
involved. The only thing that relates the two conceptions signified by the term ‘currere’ 
is their sharing one res significata. In the case of ‘sanum’ or ‘ens’, on the other hand, the 
mode of signification remains the same even as the conception signified varies with each 
occurrence of the term. Indeed, an analogous term retains its mode of signification 
throughout its various significations.  For example, regardless of whether the term ‘ens’ 
is said of a substance or of an accident, ‘ens’ has the same mode of signification (it 
signifies esse in a concrete mode).
205
  
I would like to close this section with some final remarks regarding analogy and 
predication. In the semantic structure of an analogous term, the secondary significations 
of the analogous term are accounted for by the qualifications to the original ratio or 
conception signified. As we indicated earlier, within the framework of the theory of 
signification to which Aquinas subscribes, the secondary significations of a term are set 
by an act of imposition. Yet, it is only within a propositional context that the various 
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significations of an analogous term can properly be differentiated. Indeed, according to 
the logicians, an analogous term is so imposed that when standing alone it signifies only 
its primary signification.
206
 Therefore, although the notion of modus significandi is in no 
way central to analogous signification, the notion of modus praedicandi is. Aquinas 
seems to agree on this point, as he explicitly links a term’s analogous significations with 
the term’s modes of predication.207 The subject of the role of the notion of modus 
praedicandi in Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy is worth pursuing; but it is beyond the scope 
of our present investigation.  
What we need to take away from the present discussion is that although an 
analogous term is more complex in its signification than a univocal term, both kinds of 
term have the same basic semantic structure. Regardless of which signification an 
analogous term features, it signifies a conception in the mind and the object of that 
conception. Furthermore, the qualifications introduced to the primary conception 
signified by an analogous term so as to form secondary conceptions do not alter the mode 
of signification of the term. The term ‘ens’, for instance, regardless of the sense in which 
it is used, signifies its res significata, which is esse, in the concrete mode. In the next 
chapter, we shall examine Aquinas’ account of the signification of ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, both 
analogous terms. Our focus will be on their modes of signification. The question we shall 
consider is whether, for Aquinas, the conception signified by the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ is 
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simple (as with any other term) or complex (as the doctrine of the judgment of esse 
suggests). 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 
AQUINAS ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF ESSE 
 
 
Now that we have delineated Aquinas’ theory of signification in the preceding 
chapter, we are ready to examine Aquinas’ account of the signification of the terms that 
signify esse, namely, of ‘ens’ and ‘esse’. At the end of this chapter it will emerge that for 
Aquinas the conception of esse signified by these terms (given the language of Aquinas’ 
semantics reviewed in Chapter II) is simple in nature. Accordingly, this chapter offers 
conclusive evidence that, given his semantic theory, Aquinas recognizes a simple 
conception of esse.  
The chapter is divided into three sections, the first of which consists of a review 
of the main features of the signification of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ gathered from the 
preceding chapter’s discussion of Aquinas’ signification theory. In the subsequent two 
sections I examine Aquinas’ account of the signification of (i) the term ‘ens’ and its 
abstract counterpart ‘esse’, and (ii) the verb ‘est’. We shall see that Aquinas’ semantic 
analysis of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ is in essence no different from that of other pairs of 
concrete and abstract terms such as ‘currens’ and ‘currere’, ‘homo’ and ‘humanitas’. 
Likewise, his analysis of the verb ‘est’ is in essence no different from that of other verbs 
such as ‘currit’. The terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ signify the same res significata, which 
in this case is esse, but they signify according to different modi significandi, modes that 
track the different modi intelligendi of esse, which result in the conceptio incomplexa 
signified by each term.  
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Such semantic analysis of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ is perfectly in line with 
the theory of signification to which Aquinas subscribes. Let us point out at the outset, 
then, that there is no evidence to the claim advanced by Gilson that Aquinas subscribes to 
a semantic perspective wherein (all) verbs and verbal nouns, and notably, of course, 
‘esse’ and ‘ens’, signify esse and the ‘judgment’ of esse (whereas nouns such as ‘homo’ 
and ‘humanitas’ signify essences and their ‘concepts’).1 The semantic view Gilson 
attributes to Aquinas is dictated by the doctrine that essence alone, not esse, can be 
grasped in a ‘concept’; as Gilson puts it, esse “cannot be known by the simple conceptual 
apprehension of an essence, which it is not.”2 Indeed, if only essence can be 
conceptualized in a simple conceptio, then, as Gilson observes, verbs and verbal nouns, 
none of which signify an essence but rather an act, must signify in the mind not a 
‘concept’ but a ‘judgment’, namely, a complex conceptio.3 Having already identified 
essence and ‘concept’, on the one hand, and esse and ‘judgment’ on the other, Gilson has 
no problem declaring that “the same metaphysical distinction between esse and essentia . 
. . entails the logical distinction between simple apprehensions and judgments, as well as 
the grammatical distinction between nouns and verbs.”4  
Aquinas’ writings on logic and semantics, however, reveal a very different 
picture. The fundamental distinction is that between terms and propositions. Propositions 
signify the composition or division of the intellect, that is, they signify a complex 
conception. Categorematic terms, on the other hand, regardless of their grammatical 
                                                 
1
 Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1952), 230-32. According to Gilson’s terminology, a ‘concept’ (‘conceptus’) is the 
intellect’s simple apprehension of an essence; the term ‘conception’ (‘conceptio’), on the other 
hand, covers for him both judgment and conceptualization (221-27). 
2
 Ibid., 223.  
3
 Ibid., 231-32.  
4
 Ibid., 231. 
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function as nouns or verbs, signify the simple conception of some res.
5
 The grammatical 
distinction between nouns and verbs depends neither on the nature or content of the res 
significata, nor on that of the conceptio signified, but rather on the mode of signification 
of the res.
6
 Thus, ‘concepts’, the products of the first operation of the intellect, are not 
restricted to being signified only by nouns, as opposed to also by verbs. Moreover, as we 
shall see in the following pages, ‘concepts’ are not restricted to being about one 
metaphysical constituent alone, essence. Indeed, the noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘esse’ 
signify a ‘concept’ of esse, not the ‘judgment’ of esse; that is to say, the conception of 
esse signified by ‘ens’ and by ‘esse’ is as simple in nature or content as the conception 
signified by any other categorematic term. 
 
3.1 Preliminary Remarks on the Signification of the Terms 
‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’ in Aquinas 
 
 
This section provides an overview of the semantic features of the terms ‘ens’ and 
‘esse’ that are gathered from the preceding discussion on Aquinas’ theory of 
signification, and discusses some of the difficulties associated with some of those 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., In I Periher., lect. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32, lines 20-23: “[S]ignificatio orationis 
differt a significatione nominis uel uerbi, quia nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem 
intellectum, oratio autem significat intellectum compositum;” also De ver. q. 4, a. 2; De pot., q. 8, 
a.1; q. 9, a. 5; In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223-1224. On the nature of the conception signified by 
terms and proposition in Aquinas, see Chapter II (section 2.2.1). 
6
 See, ST I, q. 39, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 400: “[N]omina substantiva significant aliquid per 
modum substantiae: nomina vero adiectiva significant aliquid per modum accidentis;” In I 
Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 26, lines 59-72: “[P]otest autem actio significari 
tripliciter: uno modo, per se in abstracto, uelut quedam res, et sic significatur per nomen; ut 
‘actio’, ‘passio’, ‘ambulatio’, ‘cursus’ et similia; alio modo per modum actionis, ut scilicet est 
egrediens a substancia et inherens ei ut subiecto, et sic significatur per uerba aliorum modorum, 
que attribuuntur personis; sed, quia etiam ipse processus uel inherencia actionis potest apprehendi 
ab intellectu et significari ut res quedam, inde est quod ipsa uerba infinitiui modi, que significant 
ipsam inherenciam actionis ad subiectum, possunt accipi ut uerba, ratione concretionis, et ut 
nomina, prout significant quasi res quasdam.” On Aquinas’ use of modes of signification to 
differentiate between nouns and verbs, see Chapter II (section 2.2.2). 
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features. There are three issues to consider: the first regard the mode of signification of 
these terms; the second their character as analogous terms; and the third, the nature of the 
‘conceptio’ and ‘res’ signified by the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’. 
 
3.1.1 The Modes of Signification of the Terms ‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’  
 
 
Aquinas introduces the pair ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as an example of a concrete term and 
its abstract counterpart, paralleling the signification of ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ to that of ‘white’ 
and ‘whiteness’ as well as that of ‘currens’ and ‘currere’. 
Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod 
dicimus esse et aliud per id quod dicimus id 
quod est, sicut et aliud significamus cum 
dicimus currere et aliud per hoc quod 
dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse 
significantur in abstracto sicut et albedo; 
sed quod est, id est ens et currens, 
significantur sicut in concreto, uelut 
album.7  
We signify one thing by saying ‘to be’ 
(esse) and another by saying ‘that which is’ 
(id quod est), just as also we signify one 
thing when we say ‘to run’ (currere) and 
another when ‘the [one] running’ (currens) 
is said. For, ‘currere’ and ‘esse’ are 
signified in the abstract, as is ‘whiteness’; 
but ‘quod est’, namely ‘ens’, and ‘currens’ 
are signified in the concrete, as is ‘white’. 
 
For Aquinas, then, the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ signify the same res according to different 
modi significandi. That is to say, they share the same res significata but differ with regard 
to the conceptio signified inasmuch as the res is understood (and hence signified) 
according to different modi intelligendi. In addition, we should note that the term ‘esse’, 
like the term ‘currere’, is an ambiguous term that is ambiguous even in its mode of 
signifying. The term ‘esse’ may be taken as signifying either in the abstract (in which 
case it is the abstract counterpart term of the term ‘ens’) or in the concrete (in which case 
it is the infinitive form of the verb ‘est’, as in the sentences ‘Plato cognoscit Socratem 
esse’). In order to differentiate the two possible modes of signification of the term ‘esse’, 
I will refer from this point on to the verb ‘esse’ as ‘est’, leaving the term ‘esse’ to stand 
                                                 
7
 In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 270-71, lines 39-45. 
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for the abstract counterpart of ‘ens’.8 As a result, we have three rather than two terms that 
signify esse to work with: ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’. Each of these terms signifies esse 
according to different modi significandi. The term ‘esse’ signifies in the abstract mode, 
that is, it signifies esse with precision (cum praecisione materiae designatae) and as ‘that 
by which x is’ (quo est). The terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ signify in the concrete mode, that is, 
without precision (sine praecisione materiae designatae); however, whereas ‘ens’ 
signifies esse in the mode of substance, ‘est’ signifies esse in the mode of action as 
inhering as in a subject. Given that there is for Aquinas a direct correspondence between 
modus significandi and modus intelligendi, insofar as the former follows from the later,
9
 
the individual mode of signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ will play a central 
role in our investigation into the intellect’s conceptio each term signifies.  
 
3.1.2 Analogy of ‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’ 
 
 
We cannot fail to remark on the fact that we are dealing with analogous terms. On 
that note, a distinction needs to be made between the primary (per prius) and secondary 
(per posterius) significations of each term. Although we shall make reference to the 
secondary significations Aquinas identifies for the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’, our focus 
will be on their primary signification. More precisely, given the purpose of the present 
chapter, the discussion will center on the nature of the primary conceptio signified by the 
terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’.  
From a purely semantic perspective, our focus on the primary ratio or conceptio 
signified is justified by the fact that we are examining these terms as standing alone and 
                                                 
8
 When no distinction is made, however, the term ‘esse’ should be taken as standing for both its 
possible significations. 
9
 See ST I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2; De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 7; In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 1253-54.  
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not within a propositional context. Like other analogous terms, standing alone these terms 
signify only their primary signification. But the most important consideration, which we 
shall say more about later in the chapter, is that even as we add or remove from the 
primary conception of esse signified by each of these terms to form secondary 
conceptions, the conception signified remains a simple one, for the addition and division 
in question is not equivalent to the addition and division that constitutes a complex 
conception. For example, the addition of ‘in another’ to the simple conception ‘what has 
being’, forming the conception ‘(accidental) being’, does not turn the primary conception 
signified by ‘ens’ into a complex conception. Furthermore, although the term ‘ens’ may 
signify per posterius the composition of a proposition, as in ‘Socrates is wise’, as an ens 
rationis, the conception signified by ‘ens’ in this instance is not in itself a judgment or 
complex conception. 
 
3.1.3 The ‘Conceptio’ and ‘Res’ Signified by ‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’ 
 
 
As we saw in Chapter II, categorematic terms, on Aquinas’ theory of 
signification, immediately signify a conception in the mind, but ultimately they signify 
the object of that conception.
10
 The object of the intellect’s conception signified by the 
terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ – i.e., their res significata, is not difficult to identify; clearly, 
these terms signify esse as their res. Recall that in the case of a concrete term and its 
abstract counterpart, such as the pair ‘homo’ and ‘humanitas’ or the pair ‘currens’ and 
‘currere’, the abstract term both signifies and stands for or supposits for the res signified 
                                                 
10
 See In I Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 11, lines 109-12: “[I]deo necesse fuit 
Aristotili dicere quod uoces significant intellectus conceptiones inmediate, et eis mediatibus res;” 
ST I, q. 13, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 139: “[V]oces referuntur ad res significandas, mediante 
conceptione intellectus;” and ST I, q. 13, a. 4, ad 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 145: “[N]omen non 
significat rem, nisi mediante conceptione intellectus.” 
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by the concrete term (and, by parity of reasoning, the same is true for any such pair of 
terms). Thus, the term ‘humanitas’ both signifies and supposits for the res signified by 
the term ‘homo’. Similarly, the term ‘currere’ both signifies and supposits for the res 
signified by the terms ‘cursus’, ‘currens’, and ‘currit’. Given that Aquinas identifies the 
terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as an example of a concrete term and its abstract counterpart, 
paralleling their signification with that of ‘currens’ and ‘currere’,11 the abstract term 
‘esse’ must both signify and supposit for the res signified by the concrete term ‘ens’ and 
by the verb ‘est’. 
Recall also that the res significata of a concrete term is that on account of which 
something is denominated by that term. For instance, humanitas is that on account of 
which an individual is denominated ‘homo’, just as albedo is that on account of which 
something is denominated ‘album’. Aquinas identifies esse or actus essendi as that by 
which something is denominated ‘ens’ in act in the world: 
Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in 
quantum est ens, id est quo denominatur 
aliquid ens actu in rerum natura.12 
 
In another way, esse is said to be the act of 
‘a being’ inasmuch as it is ‘a being’, that is, 
that by which something is denominated ‘a 
being’ in act in reality. 
 
Therefore, the res significata of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’, the object of the 
intellect’s conception signified by these terms, is esse in the sense of actus essendi, that 
which the abstract term ‘esse’ not only signifies but also supposits for.  
The claim that the esse is the object of the conception signified by linguistic 
expressions such as ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ is not, I believe, a subject of contention. The 
                                                 
11
 See In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 270-71, lines 39-45 quoted above (note 7). 
12
 Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 25/1, p. 94, lines 41-43. See also In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 
553, Marietti ed., p. 155: “[H]oc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi;” ST I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 
1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 56: “[S]ecundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens 
simpliciter;” In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 195: “[H]oc nomen ‘qui est’ vel 
‘ens’ imponitur ab ipso actu essendi.” 
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real issue is whether or not esse may be conceived by the intellect in the same manner in 
which the intellect conceives a form or nature such as humanity and whiteness, that is, 
through the intellect’s first operation, in a simple or non-composite conception (conceptio 
incomplexa). Everyone agrees that esse as actus essendi is simple.
13
 The question is 
whether this ‘simple’ can be grasped in a non-complex mental act, and so can be the res 
significata of the simple terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’.  
If we consider Aquinas’ account of the nature of the conceptio signified by terms 
as opposed to propositions, wherein terms signify a simple conception whereas 
propositions signify a complex or composite conception,
14
 the nouns ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as 
well as the verb ‘est’ ought to signify a simple, non-composite conception of esse as act. 
However, according to the traditional doctrine of the judgment of esse, grounded on an 
interpretation of Aquinas’ comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences and Super De 
trinitate, a simple conception of esse is not possible.
15
 For Aquinas, it appears, what the 
intellect apprehends in simple conceptualization is essence. Since esse, for him, is not an 
essence, it cannot be the object of conceptualization. Therefore, most Aquinas scholars 
conclude, esse is grasped by the intellect only in judgment. 
A possible way to reconcile Aquinas’ theory of signification and the doctrine of 
the judgment of esse is to maintain that the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ constitute an 
exception on account of their res significata. One might argue that the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, 
and ‘est’ do not signify, as Aquinas’ theory of signification indicates, a simple conception 
                                                 
13
 Insofar as esse as actus essendi is one of the two principles in things, ‘that by which’ something 
is or exists in the reality, it is in itself simple. 
14
 See In I Periher., lect. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32, lines 20-23: “[S]ignificatio orationis 
differt a significatione nominis uel uerbi, quia nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem 
intellectum, oratio autem significat intellectum compositum.”  
15
 See chapter 1, passim. 
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of esse, since one is impossible, but rather the judgment of esse.
16
 But such a 
reconstruction of Aquinas’ semantic theory faces several problems, which we shall 
discuss in detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Aquinas’ account of the 
signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ contains every indication that these terms 
signify a simple conception. Aquinas explicitly denies that the noun ‘ens’ and the verb 
‘est’ signify a judgment or composed conception. Moreover, in several places the 
intellect’s conception of ens is identified explicitly as a simple conception. 17 There is 
ample evidence that Aquinas recognizes a simple conception of esse.
 
If that is indeed the 
case, and I submit that it is, then we have reason to question the doctrine of the 
impossibility of a simple conceptual apprehension of esse and the interpretation of 
Aquinas’ remarks in the commentaries on the Sentences and on the De trinitate that 
supports it.  
Whether or not Aquinas rules out the possibility of a simple conception of esse in 
those texts is a topic we shall address in the Chapter IV. Let us return now to the question 
of the simple conceptio of esse. In the next section I examine Aquinas’ account of the 
signification of the term ‘ens’ and its abstract counterpart ‘esse’ to show that, indeed, 
these terms signify a simple conception rather than a judgment.
18
 
                                                 
16
 For an example of this line of argument, see Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 
230-31. 
17
 See In III Sent., d. 23 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1; De pot., q. 9, a. 5; De ver. q. 4, a. 2 and q. 14, a. 1; SCG I, 
c. 59; Quodl. V, q. 5 a. 2; In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223-1224; In I Periher., lect. 5 and 6. 
18
 A similar endeavor has been undertaken by Ralph McInerny in Being and Predication: 
Thomistic Interpretations (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 173-
228. McInerny’s main concern is the “predicability” of existence; those who deny a “concept” of 
esse also deny that ‘est’ can function as a predicate term in an existential proposition such as 
‘Socrates is’. McInerny’s criticism of this doctrine is directed in particular at Gilson’s remarks on 
the matter in Being and Some Philosophers (including Gilson’s response to Louis-Marie Régis’ 
review of the first edition of the book). McInerny’s treatment of the issue of whether ‘est’ is a 
predicate contains multiple remarks regarding the nature of the conception signified by the terms 
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3.2 Aquinas on the Signification of the Concrete Term ‘Ens’ and 
its Abstract Counterpart ‘Esse’ 
 
 
3.2.1 The Signification of the Concrete Term ‘Ens’ 
 
 
If there is a term that appears to signify a complex conception, it is ‘ens’. The 
term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, says Thomas repeatedly; that is, it signifies ‘what is’ or 
‘what has being’. Accordingly, it appears to signify the complex conception ‘something 
is’. On this subject, Aquinas writes: 
Et tamen maxime uidebatur de hoc quod 
dico ‘ens’, quia ‘ens’ nichil aliud est quam 
‘quod est’, et sic uidetur <et> rem 
significare, per hoc quod dico <‘quod’, et 
esse, per hoc quod dico> ‘est’. Et si quidem 
hec dictio ‘ens’ significaret esse 
principaliter sicut significat rem que habet 
esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse; 
set ipsam compositionem, que importatur 
in hoc quod dico ‘est’, non principaliter 
significat, set consignificat eam in quantum 
significat rem habentem esse; unde talis 
consignificatio compositionis non sufficit 
ad ueritatem uel falsitatem, quia 
compositio in qua consistit ueritas et 
falsitas non potest intelligi nisi secundum 
quod innectit extrema compositionis.19 
Nevertheless, [that something is signified 
to exist] seemed [to Aristotle] especially 
[true] in the case of the expression ‘ens’, 
because ‘ens’ is nothing other than ‘what 
is’, and thus it appears to signify <both> a 
thing, by expressing <‘what’, and esse, by 
expressing> ‘is’. If the expression ‘ens’ 
were to signify esse principally just as it 
does signify a thing that has esse, without 
doubt it would signify that something is; 
but [‘ens’] does not principally signify the 
composition itself that is conveyed in 
saying ‘is’; rather, [‘ens’] consignifies 
[composition] inasmuch as it signifies a 
thing having esse. But such consignifying 
of composition is not sufficient for truth or 
falsity because the composition in which 
truth and falsity consist can be understood 
only according as it connects the extremes 
of a composition. 
 
In this passage, taken from the commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias, Aquinas 
comments on Aristotle’s remark that verbs, in and by themselves, have signification but 
they do not signify whether something is or is not (si est aut non est). That this is so, 
observes Aquinas, Aristotle proves by those terms most susceptible to appear to assert 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘ens’ and ‘est’ (See in particular pp. 181-87 and 218-27). In this regard, McInerny’s study points 
us in the right direction. 
19
 In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 362-76. 
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that something is, namely the verb ‘est’ and the participle ‘ens’. Indeed, ‘ens’, says 
Aristotle, in and by itself is nothing (ipsum ens nihil est).
20
  
After examining the readings of other commentators, Aquinas offers his own. The 
conception signified by ‘ens’ implies the composition of thing and esse inasmuch as ‘ens’ 
signifies ‘what is’, ‘what has esse’, or ‘a thing having esse’. Thus, it could appear to 
signify a thing to be. Yet, the term ‘ens’ does not signify the composition signified when 
one says ‘something is’, i.e., the kind of composition to which truth or falsity 
applies.Were ‘ens’ to signify esse principally (principaliter) in the way that it signifies ‘a 
thing that has esse’, adds Thomas, it would signify that something is. But, of course, it 
does not signify esse principally (but rather ‘that which is’).21Aquinas’ next point is one 
that we have not seen before. It should be said, he points out, that the term ‘ens’ 
consignifies composition inasmuch as it signifies ‘a thing having esse’. As for Aristotle’s 
remark that ‘ens’ by itself is nothing (ipsum ens nihil est), Aquinas explains: 
Et ideo, ut magis sequamur uerba 
Aristotelis, considerandum est quod ipse 
dixerat quod uerbum non significat rem 
esse uel non esse; addit autem quod non 
solum uerbum non significat rem esse uel 
non esse, set nec hoc ipsum ‘ens’ significat 
rem esse uel non esse, et hoc est quod dicit: 
«nichil est», id est non significat aliquid 
esse.22 
 
Therefore, so as to follow more [closely] 
the words of Aristotle, we should consider 
that he had said that the verb does not 
signify a thing to be or not to be; and he 
adds that not only does the verb not signify 
a thing to be or not to be, but not even this 
[term] ‘ens’ itself signifies a thing to be or 
not to be, and this is what [he means when] 
he says: ‘it is nothing’, that is, it does not 
signify something to be. 
 
                                                 
20
 See Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 16b19-25. The Latin translation Aquinas has reads ipsum 
‘est’ nihil est instead of ipsum ‘ens’ nihil est as corresponds to the Greek original. Aquinas is 
aware of this (see In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 30, lines 311-12) and comments 
on both readings.  
21
 Notice that when Aquinas denies that ‘ens’ signifies esse principally, he does not have in mind 
the res significata of ‘ens’, which is esse. He is referring to the way in which esse is signified by 
‘ens’. We shall discuss the sense of ‘principaliter’ as Aquinas uses it here shortly, but note that it 
should not be confused with ‘per prius’. 
22
 In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 355-61. 
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In short, the doctrine Aquinas relays for us here is that although ‘ens’ signifies ‘what is’ 
(‘quod est’), it does not signify ‘something is’ (‘aliquid est’). 
 In the following pages, I explore in detail two of Aquinas’ remarks regarding the 
signification of ‘ens’ found in the first of the two passages quoted above. The first is that 
“the term ‘ens’ consignifies composition.” Here I explain the distinction between 
signification and consignification and examine the sense in which ‘ens’ is said by 
Aquinas to consignify rather than signify composition. The second remark, closely related 
to the first, is that “the term ‘ens’ does not signify composition,” that is, it does not 
signify the kind of composition to which truth or falsity applies. The central issue here, 
we shall see, is the distinction between the sense in which a proposition signifies esse and 
the sense in which the term ‘ens’ signifies esse. After we have examined these two 
remarks by Aquinas on the signification of ‘ens’, we will be in a position to explain why 
‘ens’ does not signify ‘something is’ (‘aliquid est’), and hence, it does not signify a 
judgment. 
 
A. The Term ‘Ens’ Consignifies Composition 
 
 
The notion of ‘consignificatio’ has its origins in Boethius’ logical works. It was 
originally used to refer to the additional signification of time by verbs, which differs from 
the proper signification of time by nouns such as ‘today’ and by adverbs of time. 
Beginning in the late eleventh century logicians and grammarians progressively began to 
expand the notion to include the consignification of person, tense, and mood by verbs as 
well as the consignification of number, gender, and sometimes case by nouns and 
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adjectives.
23
 In the thirteenth century, the notion of ‘consignification’ acquired various 
connotations; one of them refers to the idea of a secondary signification, or signification 
ex consequenti, to that which the term signifies principally (principaliter).
24
 In this sense, 
the consignification of a term was regarded as an ‘accidental’ property, or as resulting 
from the accidental properties of a term. In addition, the notion of consignification at 
large was often linked to a term’s mode of signification, so that the two notions were 
used interchangeably.
25
 Specifically, in the sense of the notion that interests us here, to 
have consignification was to have an ‘accidental’ mode of signification.26 
Aquinas keeps the notions of consignification and mode of signification 
separate.
27
 He speaks of the consignification of time by verbs and participles, as in the 
case of the participle ‘datum’; he also mentions the consignification of gender, but he is 
not particularly concerned with such merely grammatical issues.
28
 Although Aquinas 
does not identify a term’s consignification as a mode of signification in the way logicians 
                                                 
23
 Irène Rosier, “Res significata et modus significandi: Les implications d’une distinction 
médiévale,” in Sprachtheorien in Spätantike und Mittelalter, ed. Sten Ebbesen (Tübingen: Gunter 
Narr Verlag, 1995), 137.  
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24
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 Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 57.  
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often did, I have found that the two notions are nonetheless closely related: one can speak 
of an “ex consequenti relation,” and at times Aquinas uses this language. A term’s 
consignification is not a mode of signification, but in some cases it results ex consequenti 
from the mode of signification of a term. For example, Aquinas points out that the term 
‘white’ (‘album’) signifies quality alone, namely whiteness, but given that it signifies 
whiteness per modum accidentis, its ratio includes ex consequenti the subject of 
whiteness and hence the term ‘white’ (‘album’) may be said to signify the subject of 
whiteness ex consequenti. The term ‘whiteness’ (‘albedo’), in contrast, does not signify 
whiteness per modum accidentis but rather per modum substantiae; as an abstract noun, it 
does not consignify any subject.  
Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod 
praedicata, quae sunt in generibus 
accidentis, principaliter significant 
substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut 
hoc quod dico album et musicum. Nam 
album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam 
qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen 
album significat subiectum ex consequenti, 
inquantum significat albedinem per modum 
accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex 
consequenti includat in sui ratione 
subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. 
Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non 
tamen per modum accidentis, sed per 
modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo 
consignificat subiectum.29 
 
What Avicenna says is not true: that 
predicates that belong to the genera of 
accidents principally signify a substance 
and secondarily an accident, as in what I 
call ‘white’ and ‘musical’. For, ‘white’, as 
it is said in the categories, signifies quality 
alone. But this term ‘white’ signifies a 
subject ex consequenti, inasmuch as it 
signifies whiteness in the mode of accident. 
Therefore, its ratio includes some subject 
ex consequenti, for, ‘to be’ (esse) for an 
accident is ‘to be in’ (inesse). The term 
‘whiteness’ also signifies an accident, yet 
not in the mode of accident, but in the 
mode of substance. Thus, in no way does it 
consignify a subject. 
 
Similarly, Aquinas relates the consignification of time by verbs to their mode of 
signification. Verbs signify action alone, but given that they are imposed to signify action 
per modum actionis, that is, in the concrete as mixed together with the subject from 
whom it proceeds, the notion of time is included ex consequenti, we may say, in the ratio 
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 In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 894, Marietti ed., p. 239. 
105 
 
or conceptio of the corresponding action. Consequently, verbs do not signify time 
principally (principaliter), in the way a term such as ‘today’ does; rather, they consignify 
time inasmuch as the notion of time is included ex consequenti in the conception verbs 
signify by virtue of their mode of signification: 
‘[C]ursus’, quia significat actionem non per 
modum actionis, set per modum rei per se 
existentis, eo quod est nomen, non 
consignificat tempus; ‘currit’ uero, cum sit 
uerbum significans actionem, consignificat 
tempus, quia proprium est motus tempore 
mensurari, actiones autem nobis note sunt 
in tempore; dictum est autem supra quod 
consignificare tempus est significare 
aliquid ut tempore mensuratum; unde aliud 
est significare tempus principaliter ut rem 
quamdam, quod potest nomini conuenire, 
aliud autem est significare cum tempore, 
quod non conuenit nomini, set uerbo. 30 
 
Since ‘cursus’, insofar as it is a noun 
signifies action, not in the mode of an 
action, but in the mode of a thing existing 
per se, it does not consignify time. But 
‘currit’, since it is a verb signifying action, 
consignifies time, because to be measured 
by time is proper to motion, and actions are 
known by us in time. It was said above, 
moreover, that to consignify time is to 
signify something as measured in time. 
Thus, it is one thing to signify time 
principally, as a certain res ([or] thing), 
which [signification] can belong to a noun; 
and another thing to signify with time, 
which belongs, not to a noun, but to the 
verb. 
Similar remarks can be made regarding the conception signified by concrete 
terms. The conceptio signified by concrete terms, by virtue of their modus significandi, 
implies composition; accordingly, a concrete term consignifies composition. We have 
seen in the previous chapter that a concrete term signifies its res without prescinding 
(sine praecisione materiae designatae) and hence as composite, either as a subject with 
attributes or as an attribute in a subject. Aquinas, then, describes the signification of 
concrete terms as signifying “ut totum” and “per modum completi participantis (through 
the mode of the complete thing as participating).”31 A concrete term such as ‘homo’ 
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 See In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 27, lines 93-105.  
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 Cf. In VII Meta., lect. 5, n. 1379 (Marietti ed., p. 339): “[H]omo significat ut totum, humanitas 
significat ut pars;” Super De causis, prop. 22 (Saffrey ed., p. 116, lns. 25-27): “[O]mne nomen a 
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lns. 292-304; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1. 
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signifies its res (humanity) without prescinding, but ‘mixed together with other things’, 
as their subject. Thus, the conceptio signified by the term ‘homo’ implies or includes 
composition inasmuch as it signifies its res significata (humanity) ut totum, as a whole. In 
order to represent linguistically the conception signified by the concrete term ‘homo’ 
grammarians use the phrase ‘habens humanitatem’ (‘what has humanity’). Similarly, the 
conception signified by the concrete term ‘ens’ may be linguistically represented by the 
phrase ‘habens esse’ (‘what has esse’). Notice that the term ‘ens’ and the term ‘homo’ 
were imposed to signify this whole unit: ‘the thing having esse’ and ‘the thing having 
humanitas’. Surely, then, a certain composition of thing and esse and of thing and 
humanitas is implied in the conception signified by the term ‘ens’ and by the term 
‘homo’, but none of these terms was imposed to signify this composition, namely, ‘the 
composition of a thing and esse’ or ‘the composition of a thing and humanitas’. Rather, 
the term ‘ens’ and the terms ‘homo’ were imposed to signify ‘the subject of esse’ and ‘the 
subject of humanitas’ respectively. In other words, neither ‘ens’ nor ‘homo’ signifies 
composition. Given their concrete mode of signification, though, the conceptio each term 
signifies includes composition ex consequenti; accordingly, we may say, they consignify 
composition. 
In order to understand fully the conceptual distinctions at work here, more needs 
to be said regarding the modus significandi of concrete terms. We mentioned already that 
Aquinas describes a concrete term as signifying ut totum, but another of Aquinas’ 
characterizations of the mode of signification of concrete terms is that they signify ut 
subsistens or ut per se existens. Aquinas writes: 
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[Q]uod significatur concretive, significatur 
ut per se existens, ut homo vel album.32 
 
What is signified in the concrete is 
signified as existing per se, as ‘man’ or 
‘white’. 
 
[O]mnia nomina a nobis imposita ad 
significandum aliquid completum 
subsistens, significant in concretione, prout 
competit compositis.33 
 
All nouns imposed by us to signify 
something as complete and subsistent 
signify in the concrete, as befits composite 
things. 
A concrete term signifies its res as complete and subsistent, either in the mode of a noun 
‘as a subject (of attributes)’ (as in the case of ‘homo’ and ‘ens’) or in the mode of an 
adjective, ‘as in a subject’ (as in the case of ‘album’). Although both ‘homo’ and ‘album’ 
signify some subject, the term ‘homo’, we may say, signifies the subject of humanity 
principaliter, not ex consequenti, whereas the term ‘album’ as an adjectival noun 
signifies the subject of whiteness ex consequenti. The term ‘album’ signifies the subject 
of whiteness ex consequenti because it signifies whiteness per modum accidentis, i.e., ‘as 
in a subject’.34 The subject of whiteness is implied or contained ex consequenti in the 
conception signified by ‘album’; as a result, ‘album’ consignifies the subject of 
whiteness. In contrast, the term ‘homo’ signifies the subject of humanity principaliter, we 
may say, because it signifies humanity per modum substantiae and ‘as a subject (with 
attributes)’.35 Like ‘homo’ the term ‘ens’ signifies its res, esse, in the concrete ‘as a 
subject (with attributes)’, for ‘ens’ signifies ‘what has esse’. Accordingly, the term ‘ens’ 
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 In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 770. 
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 ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 140. 
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 See In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 894 quoted above in note 29. 
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which fact explains why it neither signifies nor consignifies a subject. 
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signifies the subject of esse (subiectum essendi) principaliter, as Aquinas maintains in the 
following passage. Describing the signification of the concrete term ‘ens’ alongside the 
concrete term ‘currens’, Aquinas writes: 
[Q]uod est, idest ens et currens, 
significatur sicut in concreto velud album . 
. . . [S]et id ipsum quod est, significatur 
sicut subiectum essendi, sic id quod currit 
significatur sicut subiectum currendi: et 
ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod 
currit, sive de currente, quod currat, 
inquantum subiicitur cursui et participat 
ipsum; ita possumus dicere quod ens, sive 
id quod est, sit, inquantum participat actum 
essendi.36 
[T]hat which is, that is, ‘a being’ and ‘[one] 
running’, are signified as in the concrete, as 
is ‘white’. . . . ‘[T]hat which is’ is signified 
as the subject of being, as ‘that which runs’ 
is signified as the subject of running. Thus, 
just as we can say of ‘that which runs’, or 
of ‘a runner’, that it runs, inasmuch as it is 
the subject of running and participates in it, 
we can say that ‘a being’, or ‘that which 
is’, is, inasmuch as it participates in the act 
of being. 
 
As we mentioned before, given its concrete mode of signification, the conceptio 
signified by the term ‘ens’ implies or includes composition ex consequenti, not 
principally; as a result, ‘ens’ consignifies composition. Following Aquinas’ standard 
account of the conceptio signified by terms as opposed to propositions, the conception 
signified by ‘ens’, namely ‘quod est’ or ‘habens esse’, is a simple or non-composite 
conception (conceptio incomplexa), so that, as Aquinas puts it, “as in itself 
[incomplexum], does not contain a comparison or application to a thing.”37 On close 
examination we find that although some composition is implied in ‘ens’, there is, in fact, 
no comparison or application of esse to a thing in the conception signified by ‘ens’; there 
is only the subject of esse (subiectum essendi) or the thing having esse (habens esse). 
Since what is conceived by the intellect and subsequently signified by the term ‘ens’ is 
not the comparison or application of esse to a thing, the term ‘ens’ does not signify ‘the 
composition of a thing and esse’. Rather, the term ‘ens’ consignifies composition or 
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 In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 44-45, 52-59. 
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 SCG I, c. 59, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 167, lines 28-30: “[I]ncomplexum autem, quantum est de 
se, non continet aliquam comparationem vel applicationem ad rem.” 
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signifies composition ex consequenti. The term ‘ens’ consignifies composition inasmuch 
as the conceptio signified by ‘ens’ consists in the intellect’s conception of esse without 
prescinding (sine praecisione materiae designatae) and hence as composite.  
We have explained, then, the sense in which Aquinas says that ‘ens’ consignifies 
composition. I turn now to another remark by Aquinas regarding the signification of 
‘ens’, namely, that ‘ens’ does not signify composition.38 
 
B. The Term ‘Ens’ Does not Signify Composition 
 
 
We should not mistake the kind of composition ‘ens’ consignifies with the kind of 
composition it does not signify. In the passage quoted at the beginning of this section 
(3.2.1), Aquinas tells us that the composition consignified by ‘ens’ is not the kind of 
composition to which truth or falsity applies, for it lacks a connection between the 
extremes of the composition. 
[T]alis consignificatio compositionis non 
sufficit ad ueritatem uel falsitatem, quia 
compositio in qua consistit ueritas et 
falsitas non potest intelligi nisi secundum 
quod innectit extrema compositionis.39 
[S]uch consignifying composition is not 
sufficient for truth or falsity because the 
composition in which truth and falsity 
consist cannot be understood unless it 
connects the extremes of the composition. 
 
As we shall see next, the kind of composition ‘ens’ does not signify is the kind of 
composition sufficient for truth or falsity. The fact that ‘ens’ does not signify, and does 
not consignify, the kind of composition to which truth or falsity applies explains why, for 
Aquinas, ‘ens’ does not signify ‘something is’ (‘aliquid est’).40 We begin by examining 
what sort of composition Aquinas considers to be sufficient for truth or falsity.  
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 See In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 362-76. 
39
 In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 372-76. 
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 See In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 355-61. 
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On the subject of the conceptions of the intellect signified by words (voces), both 
complex and simple, Aquinas writes: 
Voces enim incomplexae neque verum 
neque falsum significant; sed voces 
complexae, per affirmationem aut 
negationem veritatem aut falsitatem habent 
. . . Et cum voces sint signa intellectuum, 
similiter dicendum est de conceptionibus 
intellectus. Quae enim sunt simplices, non 
habent veritatem neque falsitatem, sed 
solum illae quae sunt complexae per 
affirmationem vel negationem.41 
Non-complex words signify neither truth 
nor falsity; but complex words, through 
affirmation or negation, have truth and 
falsity . . . And, since words are the signs 
of concepts, the same is said with respect to 
the conceptions of the intellect. Those 
which are simple do not have truth and 
falsity, but only those which are complex 
through affirmation or negation [have truth 
and falsity]. 
 
There are two important points to take from this passage. The first one is that Aquinas 
considers as subject of truth or falsity only those conceptions which are complex 
(conceptiones complexae). Non-complex conceptions, or conceptiones incomplexae, on 
the other hand, do not have truth or falsity. Now, elsewhere, Aquinas points out that a 
proposition signifies a complex conception, whereas a term, namely a noun or a verb, 
signifies a simple conception. 
[S]ignificatio orationis differt a 
significatione nominis uel uerbi, quia 
nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem 
intellectum, oratio autem significat 
intellectum compositum.42 
 
The signification of a proposition (oratio) 
differs from the signification of a noun or 
verb, because a noun or a verb signifies a 
simple understanding, a proposition 
signifies a composite understanding. 
 
[D]uplex est significatio uocis, una que 
refertur ad intellectum compositum, alia 
autem que refertur ad intellectum 
simplicem, prima significatio competit 
orationi, secunda uero competit parti 
orationis.43 
 
[T]he signification of a word (vox) is 
twofold: one [signification] refers to a 
composite understanding; the other refers 
to a simple understanding. The first 
signification belongs to a proposition; 
whereas the second belongs to a part of a 
proposition. 
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 In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223-1224, Marietti ed., p. 309. 
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Furthermore, Aquinas, while paraphrasing Aristotle, links the conception signified by a 
noun or verb with the first operation of the intellect, and the conception signified by a 
proposition with the intellect’s second operation:  
Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum, 
quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re 
intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive 
enuntiatio, secundum quod ponuntur duae 
operationes intellectus, in III de Anima. 
Hoc autem sic ab intellectu conceptum 
dicitur verbum interius, hoc enim est quod 
significatur per vocem; non enim vox 
exterior significat ipsum intellectum, aut 
formam ipsius intelligibilem, aut ipsum 
intelligere, sed conceptum intellectus quo 
mediante significat rem: ut cum dico, 
«homo» vel «homo est animal».44 
  
Therefore, what is primarily and per se 
understood is what the intellect in itself 
conceives about the thing understood, 
whether it be a definition or a proposition – 
according as two operations of the intellect 
are affirmed in De Anima 3. And this 
[thing] conceived by the intellect in this 
way is called the interior word (verbum), 
for this is what is signified by the [exterior] 
word (vox); for, the exterior word (vox) 
does not signify the intellect itself, or its 
intelligible form, or the act of 
understanding, but the concept of the 
intellect through whose mediation it 
signifies the thing: as when I say, ‘man’, 
or, ‘Man is an animal’. 
 
Accordingly, the conceptio signified by a term, or simple word (vox), is that which the 
intellect produces through its first operation, that is, a simple conception (conceptio 
incomplexa), which is neither true nor false. A proposition, or complex word, on the other 
hand, signifies a complex conception (conceptio complexa), the product of the second 
operation of the intellect, and what is subject to truth or falsity.
45
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The second point to take from above, and which further confirms the doctrine 
regarding the second operation of the intellect, complex conceptions, and propositions, is 
that Aquinas explains that a conceptio complexa is complex through affirmation or 
negation. The complexity of the conception to which truth or falsity applies is, therefore, 
associated with predication. Only in predication are the extremes (the subject-term and 
predicate-term) connected inasmuch as the intellect establishes a comparison between the 
thing denoted by the subject-term and the form signified by the predicate-term wherein 
the form or nature is either applied or removed from the thing.
46
 Aquinas, thinking of the 
complexum in comparison with the incomplexum, writes: 
Cum aliquod incomplexum vel dicitur vel 
intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum, 
quantum est de se, non est rei aequatum 
nec rei inaequale: cum aequalitas et 
inaequalitas secundum comparationem 
dicantur; incomplexum autem, quantum est 
de se, non continet aliquam comparationem 
vel applicationem ad rem. Unde de se nec 
verum nec falsum dici potest: sed tantum 
complexum, in quo designatur comparatio 
incomplexi ad rem per notam 
compositionis aut divisionis.47 
When something non-complex 
(incomplexum) is said or understood, the 
incomplexum, as it is in itself, is neither 
equal nor unequal to the thing, because 
equality and inequality are said according 
to a comparison; the incomplexum, as it is 
in itself, does not contain a comparison or 
application to the thing. Thus, in itself, it 
cannot be said to be true or false; but only 
the complexum, in which is designated a 
comparison of the incomplexum to the 
thing through the note of composition or 
division [is said to be true or false]. 
 
The incomplexum or simple conception, then, does not contain a comparison to a thing by 
either affirmation or negation; as such it is not subject to truth or falsity. The complexum 
or complex conception, on the other hand, contains a comparison of the incomplexum to a 
thing. That is, a complex conception contains a comparison (through composition or 
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 See ST I, q. 16, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 208: “[N]am in ommi propositione aliquam formam 
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division) of the simple conception signified by the predicate-term to the thing the subject-
term denotes or supposits for. Note that although the conception signified by a 
proposition is complex, in itself it constitutes a unified unity. A conceptio complexa is 
one sole complex object of understanding.  
[P]redicatum comparatur ad subiectum 
sicut forma ad materiam . . . ex forma 
autem et materia fit unum simpliciter. 48 
 
[T]he predicate is related to the subject as 
form to matter . . . from form and matter 
results one thing simply. 
 
What is conceived by the intellect through its second operation and subsequently 
signified by a proposition is the comparison itself, i.e., the composition of res and 
incomplexum, or a division of one from the other. In other words, a proposition or 
statement signifies one thing, a comparison of one thing to another, by way of 
composition (per modum compositionis) or division (per modum diuisionis).
49
 
Accordingly, Aquinas holds that a proposition signifies the composition or division of the 
intellect.
50
 In other words, an affirmative proposition signifies composition, the 
composition of res and incomplexum. 
Let us consider an example: the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’. The intellect’s 
conceptio signified by the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’ is a complex conception 
(conceptio complexa) conceived by the intellect through its second operation. It consists 
in the comparison of the simple conception ‘what has humanity’ (signified by the 
predicate-term ‘man’) to the subject ‘Socrates’ in the manner of composition. 
Accordingly, the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’ signifies composition, namely, the 
composition of Socrates and the simple conception ‘what has humanity’. The term ‘man’, 
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in contrast, taken alone cannot be said to signify composition, for the intellect’s conceptio 
‘what has humanity’ which the term ‘man’ signifies does not consist in a comparison of 
one thing to another. The term ‘man’ does not signify that some x has humanity; rather, it 
signifies the humanity in a concrete mode, as a subject with attributes. The conceptio 
signified by the term ‘man’ is, therefore, a simple conception (conceptio incomplexa); it 
is the simple, non-composite conception of humanity as a subsistent subject which the 
intellect conceives through its first operation. Now, as a concrete term, the term ‘man’ 
consignifies composition, or signifies composition ex consequenti. But, the kind of 
composition the term ‘man’ consignifies is not the kind of composition the proposition 
‘Socrates is a man’ signifies, for the composition that ‘man’ consignifies does not 
consists in a comparison of one thing to another and as such is not subject of truth or 
falsity. Rather, the composition the term ‘man’ consignifies is the kind of composition 
contained ex consequenti in the conception signified by a concrete term insofar as its res 
is conceived by the intellect without prescinding (sine praecisione materiae designatae) 
and hence as composite. 
Given that the term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’ (‘what is’), it could appear to signify 
‘aliquid est’ (‘something is’). However, the expression ‘quod est’ is not equivalent to the 
expression ‘aliquid est’. The former represents to a simple conception, the latter a 
complex conception wherein a comparison is made between a thing and esse. Aquinas’ 
remarks regarding the verb ‘est’ within a propositional context are helpful here: 
Ad cuius euidenciam considerandum est 
quod hoc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in 
enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut 
cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil 
aliud intendimus significare quam quod 
Sortes sit in rerum natura; quadoque uero 
To understand this one must consider that 
this verb ‘is’ is sometimes predicated in a 
proposition in itself, as when one says 
‘Socrates is’, by which we do not intend to 
signify anything other than that Socrates 
exists in reality. But sometimes the verb 
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non predicator per se, quasi principale 
predicatum, set quasi coniunctum principali 
predicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto, 
sicut cum dicitur: «Sortes est albus»: non 
enim est intention loquentis ut assertat 
Sortem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat 
ei albedinem mediante hoc uerbo ‘est’; et 
ideo in talibus ‘est’ praedicatur ut adiacens 
principali praedicato.51 
 
‘is’ is not predicated in itself, as if [it were] 
the principal predicate, but, as it were, 
conjoined to the principal predicate in order 
to connect it to the subject, as when one 
says ‘Socrates is white’. For, it is not the 
intention of the speaker to assert that 
Socrates exists in reality, but to attribute to 
him whiteness by means of the verb ‘is’; 
and for this reason ‘is’ in such cases is 
predicated as adjacent to the principal 
predicate. . . . 
  
There are, then, according to Aquinas, two different kinds of propositions containing the 
verb ‘est’: one where ‘est’ is predicated per se (as in the proposition ‘Socrates is’, by 
which we signify that something is in reality), the other where ‘est’ is adjacent to the 
predicate (as in the proposition ‘Socrates is white’, by which we signify that whiteness 
inheres in Socrates). The first kind is the one that interests us here. In a proposition such 
as ‘Sortes est’ (‘Socrates is’), the verb ‘est’ is the predicate-term and ‘Sortes’ is the 
subject-term. The proposition ‘Sortes est’ signifies a complex conception. Specifically, 
the proposition ‘Sortes est’ signifies the intellect’s conception of the comparison or 
application of the simple conception of esse, signified by the predicate-term ‘est’, to the 
subject-term Socrates. This is why Aquinas remarks in the passage immediately quoted 
above that the proposition ‘Sortes est’ signifies that Socrates is in reality. Now, the kind 
of complex conception a proposition like ‘Sortes est’ signifies is the kind of complex 
conception the term ‘ens’ can appear to signify. The term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, but 
the ‘est’ in ‘quod est’ is not a predicate. The term ‘ens’ does not signify something to be 
in reality, that is, it does not signify ‘aliquid est’. What is conceived by the intellect and 
signified by the term ‘ens’ is rather what has esse, ‘quod est’. 
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 In II Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 35-46. 
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If ‘ens’ were to signify that something is (‘aliquid est’), it would signify esse 
principally (principaliter), which it does not. The term ‘ens’ signifies esse, but it does not 
signify esse principally. The term ‘ens’ signifies esse in the same way the term ‘homo’ 
signifies humanitas; that is to say, ‘ens’ signifies esse to the extent that esse is the object 
of the conception it signifies. Properly speaking the term ‘ens’ signifies not esse but the 
conception of esse in the concrete, i.e., it signifies the thing having esse (‘quod est’). In 
contrast, the proposition ‘aliquid est’ signifies esse principally, for it signifies ‘to be’ 
(esse), i.e., it signifies ‘something is’. Every proposition may in fact be said to principally 
signify esse. In In I Periher., lect. 6, Aquinas sugguests that what signifies according to 
affirmation or negation signifies esse uel non esse. Thus, every proposition signifies esse 
uel non esse (i.e. to be, to be such and such, or not to be).
52
 Now, no term signifies that 
something is or is not. Aquinas writes that “no verb signifies the being or not being of a 
thing (esse rei uel non esse), that is, that a thing is or is not.”53 And, he further remarks 
that “not even this term ‘ens’ signify a thing to be or not to be.”54 Surely, inasmuch as 
‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, it may be understood as signifying a thing and esse, but it 
cannot be said to signify the being of a thing (esse rei), for it does not signify the 
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 Note that a proposition of the form ‘Socrates runs’ may be reconstructed as ‘Socrates is 
running’ (See In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 893). In order to refer to the signification of a proposition, I 
prefer, however, the expression esse rei uel non esse, which Aquinas also uses, as in the 
following note, since every proposition signifies either ‘something is’ or ‘something is such and 
such’. The object of the intellect’s conception signified by a proposition is ultimately the being or 
not being of a thing. We shall examine the sense of the expression “esse rei,” when used in this 
context, in the next chapter. 
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 In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, pp. 29-30, lines 302-303: “nullum uerbum est 
signum esse rei uel non esse, id est quod res sit uel non sit.” See also, In I Periher., lect. 5, 
Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 30, lines 307-308: “[N]ullum uerbum significat hoc totum, rem esse uel 
non esse.” Similar remarks are made regarding the term the term ‘homo’. In I Periher., lect. 6, 
Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 34, lines 112-14: “[H]oc nomen ‘homo’ . . . significat aliquid, set not ut 
affirmatio aut negatio, quia non significat esse uel non esse.” 
54
 In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31 lines 359-60: “[S]et nec hoc ipsum ‘ens’ 
significat rem esse uel non esse.” 
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composition of a thing and esse. Rather, ‘ens’ signifies a thing having esse (habens esse) 
or the subject of being (subiectum essendi). Whereas the proposition ‘aliquid est’ 
signifies the esse of a thing (esse rei), the term ‘ens’ signifies the subject of being 
(subiectum essendi). Accordingly, the proposition ‘aliquid est’ signifies esse principally, 
whereas ‘ens’ signifies the subject of being principally. 
We are now in a better position to understand Aquinas’ remarks regarding ‘ens’ in 
the passage quoted at the beginning of section 3.2.1: 
Et tamen maxime uidebatur de hoc quod 
dico ‘ens’, quia ‘ens’ nichil aliud est quam 
‘quod est’, et sic uidetur <et> rem 
significare, per hoc quod dico <‘quod’, et 
esse, per hoc quod dico> ‘est’. Et si quidem 
hec dictio ‘ens’ significaret esse 
principaliter sicut significat rem que habet 
esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse; 
set ipsam compositionem, que importatur 
in hoc quod dico ‘est’, non principaliter 
significat, set consignificat eam in quantum 
significat rem habentem esse; unde talis 
consignificatio compositionis non sufficit 
ad ueritatem uel falsitatem, quia 
compositio in qua consistit ueritas et 
falsitas non potest intelligi nisi secundum 
quod innectit extrema compositionis.55 
Nevertheless, [that something is signified 
to exist] seemed [to Aristotle] especially 
[true] in the case of the expression ‘ens’, 
because ‘ens’ is nothing other than ‘what 
is’, and thus it appears to signify <both> a 
thing, by expressing <‘what’, and esse, by 
expressing> ‘is’. If the expression ‘ens’ 
were to signify esse principally just as it 
does signify a thing that has esse, without 
doubt it would signify that something is; 
but [‘ens’] does not principally signify the 
composition itself that is conveyed in 
saying ‘is’; rather, [‘ens’] consignifies 
[composition] inasmuch as it signifies a 
thing having esse. But such consignifying 
of composition is not sufficient for truth or 
falsity because the composition in which 
truth and falsity consist can be understood 
only according as it connects the extremes 
of a composition. 
 
The term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, but it does not signify that something is (‘est’ or 
‘aliquid est’) because it does not signify the composition of some subject and esse. The 
term ‘ens’ consignifies composition inasmuch as, given its concrete mode of 
signification, some composition is implied or contained ex consequenti in the conception 
‘ens’ signifies (henceforth, “composition1”). The kind of composition ‘ens’ consignifies 
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 In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 362-76. 
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is not, however, the kind of composition to which truth or falsity applies (henceforth, 
“composition2”), wherein a comparison of one thing to another is made, and which a 
proposition such as ‘aliquid est’ signifies. On the other hand, although ‘ens’ signifies 
esse, it does not signify esse principally. The term ‘ens’ signifies esse insofar as esse is 
the object of the intellect’s conception which ‘ens’ immediately signifies. The term ‘ens’ 
does not signify esse in the sense of esse rei vel non esse i.e., the “composition2” of some 
subject and esse; rather, ‘ens’ signifies habens esse or the subject of being. Therefore, the 
conceptio of esse that the term ‘ens’ signifies is not a complex conception (conceptio 
complexa). Like any other term, the term ‘ens’ signifies a simple conception (conceptio 
incomplexa), the intellect’s simple conception of its res, esse, in the concrete ‘as a subject 
(with attributes)’. 
The analysis from a semantic perspective of the intellect’s conceptio signified by 
‘ens’ as simple is in accordance with Aquinas’ remarks regarding ens as one of the 
primae conceptiones of the intellect.
56
 The primary conceptions of the intellect are 
described by Aquinas as either simple (incomplexa) or complex (complexa); and among 
the primary simple conceptions Aquinas lists ‘ens’: 
[P]raeexistunt in nobis quaedam 
scientiarum semina, scilicet primae 
conceptiones intellectus, quae statim 
lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per 
species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint 
complexa, sicut dignitates, sive 
incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unius, et 
huiusmodi, quae statim intellectus 
apprehendit.57 
There pre-exist in us certain seeds of the 
sciences, that is, the first conceptions of the 
intellect, which are known at once by the 
light of the agent intellect through species 
abstracted from sensible things, whether 
they are complex, as are axioms, or non-
complex, as is the ratio of being, of one, 
and so on, which the intellect at once 
apprehends. 
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 This line of argument is pursued in greater detail by McInerny (Being and Predication, 181-
84). McInerny discusses Aquinas’ doctrine in light of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas. 
57
 De ver., q. 11, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 22/2-1, p. 350, lines 266-72. See also Quodl. X, q. 4, a. 1 
where the prima principia naturaliter nota are described by Aquinas as either complexa or 
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Furthermore, elsewhere, once again discussing the primary conceptions of the intellect, 
Aquinas identifies the conception of ens as attained through the first operation: 
Ad huius autem evidentiam sciendum est, 
quod, cum duplex sit operatio intellectus: 
una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quae 
vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia: alia, 
qua componit et dividit: in utroque est 
aliquod primum: in prima quidem 
operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit 
in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod 
dico ens; nec aliquid hac operatione potest 
mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens.58 
 
To make this evident it should be 
understood that since the operation of the 
intellect is twofold: one by which it knows 
that which [a thing] is, which is called the 
understanding of indivisibles; the other by 
which it composes and divides. There is in 
both something first. In the first operation 
there is some first that falls into the 
conception of the intellect, namely, what I 
call being (ens); and in this operation 
nothing can be conceived by the mind 
unless being (ens) is understood. 
 
Aquinas, then, identifies ens not only as a simple conception attained through the 
intellect’s first operation, but also as what is analytically first and thus indispensable for 
understanding anything else in this operation.
59
 
Its character of prima conceptio as described above renders the conception of ens 
the most universal.
60
 Its universality is further revealed in the modus significandi of the 
term ‘ens’. Aquinas writes that ‘qui est’ or ‘ens’ is the most general and universal of all 
terms on account of its modus significandi, for whereas any other term determines some 
mode of the substance of a thing (modus substantiae rei), ‘ens’ does not determine any 
mode of being (modus essendi).
61
 Indeed, according to its mode of signification, the term 
                                                                                                                                                 
incomplexa. For Aquinas’ use of ‘conceptio’ in this context, see also Quodl. VIII, q. 2, a. 2; and 
De trin., q. 6, a. 4. 
58
 In IV Meta., lect. 6, n. 605, Marietti ed., p. 167-68. 
59
 Aquinas further states that understanding of the principle of non-contradiction, one of the 
primary complex conceptions (i.e. the first principles, also called ‘dignitates’), depends on the 
understanding of the conception of ‘ens’. See In IV Meta., lect. 6, n. 605; ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2; SCG 
II, c. 83. 
60
 See In I Meta., lect. 2, n. 46, Marietti ed., p. 13: “Sed dicendum, quod magis universalia 
secundum simplicem apprehensionem sunt primo nota, nam primo in intellectu cadit ens.” 
61
 See ST I, q. 13, a. 11 co and ad 1. On ‘qui est’ as equivalent to ‘ens’, see In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 
1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 195: “[H]oc nomen «qui est» vel «ens» imponitur ab actu essendi.” 
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‘ens’ signifies the conception of esse in the concrete mode as a subject, that is, ‘ens’ 
signifies the subject of being (subiectum essendi). Now, in different places, Aquinas 
remarks that ‘ens’ does not signify any form or nature but only esse.62 The reason ‘ens’ 
does not signify any essence is that it signifies the subiectum essendi without any 
determination as to its modus essendi.
63
 In other words, the conception signified by ‘ens’ 
leaves the subject of esse (quod est) undetermined as to its modus essendi. Further 
evidence of the indeterminate character of the conception of ‘ens’ with respect to any 
modus essendi is that what is denominated ‘ens’ is denominated solely ad actu essendi.64 
In fact, it is precisely the indeterminate character of the conception signified by ‘ens’ 
with respect to the modus essendi of the subiectum essendi that makes it possible for 
‘ens’ to be divided among its various analogous significations. 
We have seen that at different places Aquinas states that ‘ens’ does not signify 
essence. Yet, at the same time he declares that ‘ens’ “signifies the essence of a thing 
(essentia rei) and is divided by the ten genera.”65 In regards to this apparent 
contradiction, I point out that ‘ens’ is not said to signify essence as such as though it were 
the res significata. If we consider the subject of esse – i.e., the quod in ‘quod est’, then 
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 See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2 ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 223: “Ens autem non dicit 
quiditatem, sed solum actum essendi;” ST I, q. 13, a. 11, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 162: “Non enim 
significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse.”  
63
 I am in debt to Ralph McInerny for this inside. See McInerny, Being and Predication, 218-21. 
64
 See In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 553, Marietti ed., p. 155: “[H]oc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu 
essendi;” SCG I, c. 25, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 77b, lines 13-14: “[N]omen autem rei a quidditate 
imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse.” Also, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2. 
65
 See Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 25/2, p. 215, lines 66-72 (italics mark the citation of 
Averroes, In Meta. 5.7, made explicit by Aquinas): “[S]ed uerum est quod hoc nomen ‘ens’, 
secundum quod importat rem cui competit huiusmodi esse, sic significat essenciam rei, et 
diuiditur per decem genera. Non tamen uniuoce, quia non eadem ratione competit omnibus esse, 
set substancie quidem per se, aliis autem aliter.” See, also, SCG III, c. 8, Leonine ed., vol. 14, p. 
22, lines 14-17: “Ens enim dupliciter dicitur, ut Philosophus in Metaphysica docet. Uno modo, 
secundum quod significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem praedicamenta;” and In II Sent., d. 
37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3. 
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‘ens’ signifies essence (as opposed to esse), because ‘essence’ names the quod formally: 
the quod is a ‘what’, or, better, what has whatness. Thus considered, ‘ens’ is divided by 
the ten genera, that is, ‘ens’ is predicated of substance and accident alike. Notice that this 
is only possible because no kind of essence is included in the conception signified by 
‘ens’. A thing, substance or accident, is denominated ‘ens’ from esse alone, but is 
denominated ‘substance’ or ‘accident’ from its modus essendi.66 Similar remarks apply to 
the more general division of ‘ens’ between what is commonly referred to as the 
distinction between ‘ens reale’ and ‘ens rationis’. Aquinas writes that in the former sense 
(‘ens reale’, or what he elsewhere calls ens quod est extra animam or ens perfectum67), 
‘ens’ signifies essence and is divided by the ten genera, for ‘essence’ names something in 
reality (aliquid in natura existens). In the latter sense (‘ens rationis’), ‘ens’ signifies the 
truth of a proposition and the composition of the intellect, for something is or has being 
in this sense insofar as it is the subject of a proposition, that is, when reason affirms or 
denies something of it.
68
 Once again, the fact that ‘ens’ signifies the subject of being 
(essendi) without any determination as to its modus essendi, makes the division of ‘ens’ 
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 See also In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 885, Marietti ed., p. 237-38: “Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam 
et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem . . . Divisio vero entis in substantiam et 
accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens.” 
67
 In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 889, Marietti ed., p. 238. 
68
 See In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 873: “Uno enim modo dicitur ens 
quod per decem genera dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in natura existens; sive sit substantia, 
ut homo; sive accidens, ut color. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis; 
prout dicitur, quod affirmatio est vera, quando significat esse de eo quod est; et negatio, quando 
significat non esse de eo quod non est; et hoc ens compositionem significat, quam intellectus 
componens et dividens adinvenit. Quaecumque ergo dicuntur entia quantum ad primum modum, 
sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum: quia omne quod habet naturale esse in rebus, potest 
significari per propositionem affirmativam esse; ut cum dicitur: color est, vel homo est. Non 
autem omnia quae sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum, sunt entia quantum ad primum: quia 
de privatione, ut de caecitate, formatur una affirmativa propositio, cum dicitur, caecitas est; nec 
tamen caecitas aliquid est in rerum natura; sed est magis alicujus entis remotio: et ideo etiam 
privationes et negationes dicuntur esse entia quantum ad secundum modum, sed non quantum ad 
primum.” 
122 
 
into its particular analogous senses possible. Incidentally, note that the composition of the 
intellect is no more contained in the conception signified by ‘ens’ than essence is. 
Throughout its analogous significations, such as ens perfectum and even propositional 
ens, the conception of ‘ens’ remains a simple one. What is conceived by the intellect and 
signified by the term ‘ens’ is esse under the simple conception ‘quod est’ or ‘habens 
esse’. As we add or remove from it in analogous predication, the conception signified by 
‘ens’ remains a simple one. The conception of ‘ens rationis’ is equivalent to the 
conception ‘what is in the mind’ or ‘what has being in the mind’. At no point ‘ens’ does 
signify ‘something is’. 
 
3.2.2 The Signification of the Abstract ‘Esse’ 
 
 
Unlike what is the case with the concrete ‘ens’, Aquinas says very little about the 
signification of its abstract counterpart ‘esse’ beyond that it signifies in abstracto just as 
the terms ‘albedo’ and ‘currere’ do.69 There is no reference to the possibility of the 
abstract ‘esse’ signifying some complex conception, as it is the case with both ‘ens’ and 
‘est’. The omission is not surprising if one considers that the term ‘esse’, when taken not 
as a verb of the infinite mode but as the abstract counterpart of the concrete ‘ens’, does 
not appear to signify that some subject is. The abstract ‘esse’ is used to refer to the res 
significata of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ and to that by which something is denominated 
‘ens’.70 In none of these cases its use suggests that its signification involves the 
conception that something is. With so little information on ‘esse’, it seems nearly 
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 See In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 43-45: “Nam currere et esse 
significantur in abstracto sicut et albedo; sed quod est, id est ens et currens, significantur sicut in 
concreto, uelut album.” 
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 See Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2; In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 553; SCG I, c. 25. 
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impossible for us to decide on the nature of the conception it signifies, or what Aquinas 
might have taken it to be. However, although not much is said about ‘esse’ itself, plenty 
of evidence as to its nature can be drawn from Aquinas’ account of the modus 
significandi of abstract terms such as’albedo’ and ‘currere’.  
For Aquinas, we might recall, the mode in which the res is signified by a term 
follows upon the mode in which the res is conceived by the intellect.
71
 Accordingly, the 
modus significandi of a term is an indication of the sort of conceptio the term signifies. In 
the following pages, then, we shall examine the conception signified by the abstract term 
‘esse’ based on what its modus significandi reveals about it. Our objective is to determine 
whether the term ‘esse’, insofar as it signifies in the abstract mode, may be interpreted as 
signifying a complex conception of esse. If the term ‘esse’ is to signify a complex 
conception, it must signify composition. Specifically, it must signify the kind of 
composition to which truth or falsity applies. In other words, the conception signified by 
‘esse’ must consist in the composition of some subject and esse. 
The first thing that characterizes an abstract term, in contrast to its concrete 
counterpart, is that it signifies its res with precision. Aquinas explains that a concrete 
term and its abstract counterpart signify the same res, but whereas the former potentially 
includes in its signification the individuating principles of the res, as well as accidental 
attributes, the latter explicitly excludes them. For that reason, Aquinas describes abstract 
terms as signifying per modum partis whereas concrete terms signify per modum totius: 
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 De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 7, Marietti ed., p. 56: “[M]odus significandi in dictionibus quae a nobis 
rebus imponuntur sequitur modum intelligendi; dictiones enim significant intellectuum 
conceptiones, ut dicitur in principio Periher.” See, also, ST I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, 
p. 466: “[M]odus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi;” SCG I, c. 30, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 
92, lines 31-32: “Nam nomine res exprimimus eo modo quo intellectu concipimus;” De pot., q. 7, 
a. 5, ad 2; In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 1253-1254. 
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Nam humanitas significat principia 
essentialia speciei, tam formalia quam 
materialia, cum praecisione principiorum 
individualium: dicitur enim humanitas 
secundum quam aliquis est homo; homo 
autem non est aliquis ex hoc quod habet 
principia individualia, sed ex hoc solum 
quod habet principia essentialia speciei. 
Humanitas igitur significat sola principia 
essentialia speciei. Unde significatur per 
modum partis. Homo autem significat 
quidem principia essentialia speciei, sed 
non excludit principia individuantia a sui 
significatione: nam homo dicitur qui habet 
humanitatem, ex quo non excluditur quin 
alia habere possit. Et propter hoc homo 
significatur per modum totius: significat 
enim principia speciei essentialia in actu, 
individuantia vero in potentia.72 
 
‘Humanity’ signifies the essential 
principles of the species, both formal and 
material, by prescinding from the 
individuating principles. For, humanity is 
that in accord with which something is a 
human; but a human is not something 
[human] because it has individuating 
principles, but only because it has 
principles essential to [its] species. 
Therefore, humanity signifies only the 
essential principles of the species. Hence it 
is signified after the manner of a part (per 
modum partis). ‘Human’ even signifies the 
essential principles of the species, but 
without excluding the individuating 
principles from its signification. For, 
‘human’ is said to be one who has 
humanity, from whom the possibility of 
having other things is not excluded. Thus, 
‘human’ is signified after the manner of a 
whole (per modum totius), for it signifies 
the essential principles of the species 
actually, but the individuating principles 
potentially. 
 
The conception signified by an abstract term, then, includes only that which belongs to 
the res as such, excluding anything extraneous to it. Aquinas writes: 
[C]onsiderandum est quod circa 
quodcumque abstracte significatum hoc 
habet ueritatem quod non habet in se 
aliquid extraneum, quod scilicet sit preter 
essentiam suam, sicut humanitas, albedo et 
quecumque hoc modo dicuntur.73 
 
[A]s regards anything that is signified in 
the abstract, one should notice that this 
holds true: it does not have in itself 
anything extraneous, that is, something that 
is outside its essence, as [is the case with] 
humanity, whiteness, and whatever is said 
in this way. 
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 SCG IV, c. 81, Leonine ed., vol. 15, p. 253, lines 15-31. See also, In I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1; In 
VII Meta., lect. 5, n. 1379, Marietti ed., p. 339: “[H]omo significat ut totum, humanitas significat 
ut pars;” De ente, c. 2, lns. 292-304; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; Comp. Theol. I, c. 154; Super De 
causis, prop. 22 (Saffrey ed., p. 116, lines 25-27): “[O]mne nomen a nobis impositum, vel 
significat per modum completi participantis sicut nomina concreta, vel significat per modum 
diminuti et partis formalis sicut nomina abstracta.” 
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 In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 272, lines 117-21.  
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Accordingly, Aquinas points out elsewhere that when a form such as whiteness is 
considered in the abstract, its ratio contains no determination to something else but rather 
is in itself infinite.
74
 The result is that an abstract term signifies a simple thing, or better 
yet, it signifies its res as simple.
75
 Therefore, the conception signified by an abstract term 
is, if anything, simpler than that of a concrete term insofar as it excludes composition 
with other attributes. 
When discussing the signification of ‘ens’76 we mentioned that the conception 
signified by concrete terms includes composition on account of their mode of 
signification, for a concrete term signifies its res without precision and hence as 
composite. A sign of the consignification of composition by concrete terms is that some 
subject is always contained in the conception they signify, either principaliter when the 
res is conceived ‘as a subject (with attributes)’ (as in the case of ‘homo’) or ex 
consequenti when the res is conceived ‘as in a subject’ (as in the case of ‘album’). The 
conception signified by an abstract term, in contrast, prescinds from the notion of 
individual subject. We have seen that when contrasting the signification of ‘album’ and 
‘albedo’ Aquinas explains that whereas ‘album’ signifies some subject, albeit ex 
consequenti, ‘albedo’ does not. 
Hoc autem nomen album significat 
subiectum ex consequenti, inquantum 
significat albedinem per modum accidentis. 
Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat 
in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis 
esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet 
accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, 
This term ‘white’ signifies a subject ex 
consequenti, inasmuch as it signifies 
whiteness in the mode of accident. 
Therefore, its ratio includes some subject 
ex consequenti, for, ‘to be’ (esse) for an 
accident is ‘to be in’ (inesse). The term 
‘whiteness’ also signifies an accident, yet 
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 See In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 1003: “Omnis enim forma in propria 
ratione, si abstracte consideretur, infinitatem habet; sicut in albedine abstracte intellecta, ratio 
albedinis non est finita ad aliquid.” 
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 See SCG I, c. 30; ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2. 
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 See section 3.2.1 
126 
 
sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo 
modo consignificat subiectum.77 
 
not in the mode of accident, but in the 
mode of substance. Thus, in no way does it 
consignify a subject. 
 
Elsewhere, Aquinas further explains that ‘albedo’, although it signifies quality, does not 
signify its res “ut inherentem” in the way its counterpart ‘album’ does. He writes: 
Albedo enim significat qualitatem, sed 
significat eam per modum substantie, quia 
non significat eam ut inherentem; set 
album significat eam per modum qualis, 
quia significat eam ut inherentem.78 
‘Whiteness’ signifies quality but in the 
mode of substance, for it does not signify 
quality ut inherentem; but ‘white’ signifies 
quality in the mode of quality, for it 
signifies it ut inherentem. 
 
The term ‘albedo’, then, prescinds in its signification from the notion of an invidual 
subject, not including it even ex consequenti, for nothing but whiteness itself is conceived 
and signified by the term ‘albedo’. Therefore, the conception signified by the term 
‘albedo’, insofar as it has an abstract mode of signification, excludes composition. 
Similar remarks on the signification of some subject regard the terms ‘ens’ and 
‘esse’. After having identified ‘ens’ as signified in concreto and ‘esse’ as signified in 
abstracto, Aquinas writes that ‘esse’ is not signified ‘as the subject of being’ (sicut 
subiectum essendi), in the way ‘ens’ or ‘quod est’ is signified: 
[I]psum esse non significatur sicut ipsum 
subiectum essendi, sicut nec currere 
significatur sicut subiectum cursus. Vnde, 
sicut non possumus dicere quod ipsum 
currere currat, ita non possumus dicere 
quod ipsum esse sit; set id quod est 
significatur sicut subiectum essendi, uelud 
id quod currit significatur sicut subiectum 
currendi.79 
[B]eing (esse) itself is not signified as the 
subject of being (essendi), just as running 
(currere) is not signified as the subject of a 
run (cursus). Thus, just as we cannot say 
that running (currere) itself runs, we 
cannot say that being (esse) itself is. But 
‘that which is’ is signified as the subject of 
being, just as ‘that which runs’ is signified 
as the subject of running. 
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 In V Meta., lect. 5, n. 894, Marietti ed., p. 239. See also ST I-II, q. 53, a. 2, ad 3; De unione 
verbi, a. 3, ad 5. 
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 De fallaciis, c. 9, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 411, lines 55-58. 
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 In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 48-54. 
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Therefore, whereas the term ‘ens’ signifies the subject of esse, the term ‘esse’ signifies 
only esse or actus essendi.
80
 Nothing but the very actus essendi is conceived when the 
reality of esse is understood in the abstract. The abstract conception of esse excludes 
every individuating principle that determines it to something else. Thus, when considered 
in the abstract, esse is conceived as simple. It follows, then, that the conception of esse 
signified by the abstract ‘esse’ excludes composition. 
Another characteristic of the abstract counterpart of a concrete term is that it 
signifies its res ‘as that by which’ (ut quo est). Aquinas writes: 
Unde intellectus noster, quidquid significat 
ut subsistens, significat in concretione: 
quod vero ut simplex, significat non ut 
quod est, sed ut quo est.81 
When our intellect signifies something as 
subsistent, it signifies in the concrete; when 
it signifies something as simple, it signifies 
not as quod est, but as quo est. 
 
[O]mnia nomina a nobis imposita ad 
significandum aliquid completum 
subsistens, significant in concretione, prout 
competit compositis; quae autem 
imponuntur ad significandas formas 
simplices, significant aliquid non ut 
subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est.82 
 
[A]ll words imposed by us to signify a 
complete, subsistent thing signify in the 
concrete, as befits composite things. Words 
imposed to signify simple forms signify 
something not as subsistent, but as that 
whereby something is. 
Aquinas identifies both ‘whiteness’ and ‘humanity’ as signifying ut quo est; ‘whiteness’ 
signifies that by which something is white, ‘humanity’ signifies that by which something 
is a man.
83
 The reason abstract terms signify ut quo est is that they signify their res as 
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 See also De ver., q. 1, a. 1, ad s.c. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 22/1-2, p. 7, lines 281-83: “Ad tertium 
dicendum quod cum dicitur ‘diversum est esse et quod est’ distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui ille 
actus convenit.” 
81
 SCG I, c. 30, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 92, lines 8-11. 
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 ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 140. See, also, In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, 
Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 770: “[Q]uod significatur concretive, significatur ut per se existens, ut 
homo vel album . . . quod significatur in abstracto, significatur per modum formae, cujus non est 
operari vel subsistere in se, sed in alio.” 
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 See In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 272, lines 122-23: “[H]umanitas significatur 
ut quo aliquid est homo, et albedo quo aliquid est album;” ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 
4, p. 140: “[A]lbedo significat ut quo aliquid est album.”  
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simple, that is, with precision. The term ‘humanity’, for example, insofar as it signifies its 
res with precision, signifies only that which pertains to the nature of humanity. Now, 
humanity is that by which something is a man, for something is a man on account of 
having the nature of humanity, not on account of its accidents. It follows, then, that the 
abstract conception of humanity contains precisely what falls into the definition of a man, 
that is, what makes a man a man. In this sense, ‘humanity’ signifies that by which 
something is a man.
84
 
Once again we find that the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ are analyzed in the same 
manner as other pairs of concrete and abstract terms. Just as humanitas is that by which 
something is a man, and albedo is that by which something is white, Aquinas writes that 
esse or actus essendi is that by which something is a being (ens): 
Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in 
quantum est ens, id est quo denominatur 
aliquid ens actu in rerum natura.85 
 
In another way, esse is said to be the act of 
a being inasmuch as it is a being, that is, 
that by which something is denominated ‘a 
being’ in act in reality. 
 
Similarly, Aquinas tells us that esse is that by which something is, just as currere or 
cursus is that by which something runs.
86
 As the abstract counterpart of the concrete 
‘ens’, then, the abstract term ‘esse’ signifies the intellect’s conception of esse not only as 
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 See ST, I, q. 3, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 40: “[S]icut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae 
cadunt in definitione hominis: his enim homo est homo, et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet 
quo homo est homo;” De ente, c. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 373, lines 292-304: “Sed hoc nomen 
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 Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 25/1, p. 94,lines 41-43. Compare, SCG IV, c. 81, 
Leonine ed., vol. 15, p. 253, lines 18-19: “[D]icitur enim humanitas secundum quam aliquis est 
homo;” ST I-II, q. 53, a. 2, ad 3, Leonine ed., vol. 6, p. 338: “[A]lbedo dicitur qua aliquid est 
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 See ST I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3, Leonine ed, vol. 5, p. 6: “[I]psum autem esse est quo substantia est, 
sicut cursus est quo currens currit;” Q. D. de anima, a. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 44/1, p. 51, lines 254-
55: “Nam ipsum esse est quo aliquid est, sicut cursus est quo aliquis currit;” and In De hebdom., 
lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 55-59: “[S]icut possumus dicere de eo quod currit siue 
de currente quod currat inquantum subicitur cursui et participat ipsum, ita possumus dicere quod 
ens siue id quod est sit inquantum participat actum essendi.” 
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simple but as ‘that by which’ (‘quo est’). That is why we can say that esse is that by 
which something is denominated ‘ens’ in act.87 Regarding such as conception of esse, 
consider also the following passage where Aquinas speaks of the possibility of 
conceiving esse or actus essendi as ‘quo est’: 
In compositis autem ex materia et forma 
quo est potest dici tripliciter. Potest enim 
dici quo est ipsa forma partis, quae dat esse 
materiae. Potest etiam dici quo est ipse 
actus essendi, scilicet esse, sicut quo 
curritur, est actus currendi. Potest etiam 
dici quo est ipsa natura quae relinquitur ex 
conjunctione formae cum materia, ut 
humanitas.88 
In composites of matter and form, ‘that by 
which it is’ can be said in three ways. For, 
the forma partis, which gives being to 
matter, can be called ‘that by which it is’. 
Also, the act of being, that is, esse, can be 
called ‘that by which it is’, just as that by 
which something runs is the act of running. 
Also, the very nature that results from the 
conjunction of form and matter, such as 
humanity, can also be said ‘that by which it 
is’. 
 
It is hard to see how a conception of esse in the abstract may be constructed as a 
judgment or complex conception. In the first place, esse is conceived as simple. Thus, the 
conception of esse in the abstract mode excludes composition. Second, esse is conceived 
as ‘quo est’. Thus, nothing but that whereby something is, i.e., esse or actus essendi, is 
contained in the abstract conception of esse, which prescinds from all other attributes. I 
can find no reason to suppose that the conceptio signified by the abstract term ‘esse’ 
differs from the conceptio signified by any other abstract term except with regard to the 
res intellecta, i.e., esse v. currere, e.g. By introducing the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as an 
example of a concrete term and its abstract counterpart, identifying ‘esse’ as signifying in 
the same mode as ‘albedo’ and ‘currere’, Aquinas has shown us that it is possible for the 
human intellect to conceive the reality of esse in a simple or non-composite way. 
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 See Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2 quoted above; also, In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 553, Marietti ed., p. 155: 
“[H]oc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi;” SCG I, c. 25, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 77, 
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 In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, Mandonett ed., vol. 1, p. 229.  
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3.3 Aquinas on the Signification of the Verb ‘Est’ 
 
 
The term ‘est’ seems as likely to signify a complex conception as the term ‘ens’ 
does. They both signify in the concrete mode, thus they both signify composition insofar 
as they signify the conception of esse without precision. Given their concrete mode of 
signification, the conception that the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ signify includes not only esse 
but also the subject of esse. As a result, it appears as if they signify that something is. In 
fact, the case for ‘est’ as propositional is even clearer than in the case of ‘ens’. For, the 
linguistic expression ‘est’ may stand for the proposition ‘aliquid est’. To the question, 
“estne librum tuum?”, one may respond “est” (“it is”). When that is the case, the 
expression ‘est’ is not a term but a proposition; as such, it signifies a complex conception, 
the complex conception ‘something is’. But we are not concerned with the ‘est’ or 
‘aliquid est’. Our interest lies in the signification of the term ‘est’, i.e., the verb ‘esse’ or 
‘to be’, to the extent that, according to the theory of signification to which Aquinas 
subscribes, it signifies a simple conception of esse.  
In his commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias Aquinas discusses the 
possibility of both ‘ens’ and ‘est’ signifying that something is. Given that all verbs imply 
‘esse’ or ‘to be’, it might appear that they signify that something is. However, no verb 
signifies the being or not being of a thing, that is, that a thing is or is not:  
Nullum uerbum est signum esse rei uel non 
esse, id est quod res sit uel non sit; quamuis 
enim omne uerbum finitum implicet esse, 
quia ‘currere’ est ‘currentem esse’, et omne 
uerbum infinitum implicet non esse, quia 
‘non currere’ est ‘non currentem esse’, 
No verb signifies (est signum) the being or 
not being of a thing, that is, that a thing is 
or is not. For, although every finite verb 
implies being, since ‘to run’ is ‘to be 
running’, and every infinite verb implies 
non-being, for ‘to non-run’ is ‘to be non-
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tamen nullum uerbum significat hoc totum, 
rem esse uel non esse.89 
running’, no verb signifies this whole, that 
a thing is or is not. 
 
Indeed, not even the verb ‘est’ and its participle ‘ens’, which more than any other term 
appear to signify that something is, signify the being or not being of a thing. We have 
already discussed Aquinas’ take on the signification of the participial noun ‘ens’. His 
treatment of the verb ‘est’ is not much different from that of ‘ens’; the same arguments 
and considerations we discussed regarding ‘ens’ apply to ‘est’ as well. Specifically, if the 
verb ‘est’ is to signify the complex conception ‘something is’, then it must signify the 
conception of the application of esse to some subject, that is, it must signify the sort of 
composition to which truth or falsity applies. 
At the outset, Aquinas points out that the verb ‘est’ appears to signify that 
something is to the extent that ‘est’ signifies ‘esse’ (‘to be’) and remarks that ‘esse’ 
seems to signify the kind of composition to which truth or falsity applies.  
[Q]uod enim nullum uerbum significet rem 
esse vel non esse, probat per hoc uerbum 
‘est’, quod secundum se dictum non 
significat aliquid esse, licet significet esse. 
Et, quia hoc ipsum ‘esse’ uidetur 
compositio quedam, et ita hoc uerbum 
‘est’, quod significat esse, potest uideri 
significare compositionem in qua sit uerum 
uel falsum, ad hoc excludendum subdit 
quod ista compositio, quam significat hoc 
uerbum ‘est’, non potest intelligi sine 
componentibus, quia dependet eius 
intellectus ex extremis, que si non 
apponantur, non est perfectus intellectus 
compositionis, ut possit in ea esse uerum 
uel falsum.90 
That no verb signifies a thing to be or not 
to be, he [Aristotle] proves through this 
verb ‘est’, which said by itself does not 
signify that something is, although it 
signifies esse. And since this esse itself 
appears to be a certain composition, and 
thus this verb ‘est’, which signifies esse, 
can appear to signify the composition in 
which there is truth or falsity, to exclude 
this [Aristotle] adds that the composition 
which the verb ‘est’ signifies cannot be 
understood without [its] components. For, 
its [i.e., the composition’s] understanding 
depends on the extremes, without whose 
affirmation the understanding of the 
composition is not complete such that truth 
or falsity can be in it. 
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 In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 29-30, lines 302-308. As Aquinas explains in the 
same context, infinite verbs are not the same as negative verbs: the former are taken as one word, 
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 In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 378-91. 
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Immediately following the paragraph quoted above Aquinas explains that the verb ‘est’ 
consignifies composition, or signifies composition ex consequenti, because it signifies in 
the mode of a verb (per modum verbi). 
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ consignificat 
compositionem, quia non principaliter eam 
significat, set ex consequenti: significat 
enim id quod primo cadit in intellectu per 
modum actualitatis absolute; nam ‘est’ 
simpliciter dictum significat esse actu et 
ideo significat per modum uerbi.91 
 
The verb ‘est’ consignifies composition 
because it does not signify composition 
principally, but as a consequence. For, it 
signifies that which first falls into the 
intellect in the mode of actuality 
absolutely, for, ‘est’ simply said signifies 
being in act, and thus it signifies in the 
mode of a verb. 
 
We have mentioned before that the distinction between nouns and verbs does not 
correspond for Aquinas to a distinction in res significata, but rather to a distinction in 
modus significandi. It is true that all verbs signify action (or act), but it is not true that 
only verbs signify action. The same action may be signified by either a noun or a verb. 
Thus, when Aquinas speaks of a modus verbi, he is referring to the mode of signification 
that properly characterizes a verb. What the mode of signification of a verb entails we 
already know from our discussion on the equivocation of terms that have the form of 
verbs of the infinitive mode. The terms ‘esse’ and ‘currere’, for example, may be taken 
as signifying both in the abstract (in which case they function as nouns) and in the 
concrete (in which case they function as verbs). Now, Aquinas describes verbs as 
signifying action according to the following mode: “as proceeding from a substance and 
inhering in it as in a subject.”92 In other words, verbs signify their res, an action, ut 
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 In I Perher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 391-97. 
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 See In I Perher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 26, lines 55-66: “[P]otest autem actio 
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inherentem. Therefore, verbs consignify composition, or signify composition ex 
consequenti, insofar as they signify without precision and as proceeding from a 
substance. Indeed, actions are not found in the world as existing per se, but as existing in 
their subjects. The term ‘est’, then, insofar as it signifies in the mode of a verb, signifies 
composition ex consequenti. This is why it appears to signify a composition principally. 
Since verbs signify without precision, they signify in the concrete mode, but not 
in the same manner a term such as ‘homo’ signifies, that is, ‘as a subject (with 
attributes)’, in the mode of a noun. Rather, a verb signifies action ‘as in a subject’, that is, 
in much the same manner as a term such as ‘album’ signifies, in the mode of an adjective. 
A verb principally (principaliter) signifies action, but given that it signifies action ‘as in a 
subject’, the notion of some subject is included in its signification as a consequence (ex 
consequenti). Therefore, the sort of conception signified by verbs includes both 
composition and the notion of some subject. More to the point, the conception signified 
by verbs is the conception of an act ‘as inhering as in a subject’. That is why the term 
‘est’, insofar as it signifies esse or actus essendi in the mode of a verb, appears to signify 
that something is. Thus, the reason Aquinas holds that the ‘esse’ the verb ‘est’ signifies 
appears to be some composition, specifically the composition to which truth or falsity 
applies, is that the conception of esse signified by the verb ‘est’ is the conception of esse 
as inhering as in a subject. 
However, although inherence as in a subject is contained in the conception 
signified by verbs, a verb does not signify that a certain action inheres in a subject, nor 
does ‘inhering in a subject’ belong to the res significata of the verb. Rather, a verb 
signifies action as inhering as in a subject in its mode of signifying. Accordingly, 
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although the verb ‘est’ signifies esse as inhering as in a subject, it does not signify that 
some subject is. I mentioned before that the linguistic expression ‘est’, when taken as a 
proposition, signifies a complex conception. That is, when ‘est’ is taken to stand for the 
proposition ‘aliquid est’, ‘est’ signifies that something is. However, when taken as a verb, 
i.e., as a term, not as a composition, ‘est’ signifies a simple conception, the simple 
conception of esse in the mode of a verb. Indeed, Aquinas, following Aristotle, observes 
that since a verb has signification (est vox significatiua), it produces in the mind of the 
one who listens (generet aliquem intellectum in animo audientis) an understanding which 
is equivalent to the understanding produced by the utterance of a noun and not to the sort 
of understanding produced by the utterance of a proposition. He writes: 
Sed dicendum est quod duplex est operatio 
intellectus, ut supra habitum est; ille qui 
dicit nomen uel uerbum secundum se, 
constituit intellectum quantum ad primam 
operationem, que est conceptio alicuius . . . 
non autem constituit intellectum quantum 
ad secundam operationem, que est 
intellectus componentis et diuidentis.93 
 
It should be said that the operation of the 
intellect is twofold, as was said above; and 
he who speaks a noun or a verb by itself 
brings about an understanding with respect 
to the first operation, which is the 
conception of something . . . but [the verb 
or the noun said by itself] does not bring 
about an understanding with respect to the 
second operation, which belongs to the 
intellect composing and dividing. 
 
The intellect’s conceptio signified by a verb is as simple in nature as the conception 
signified by a noun: thus, the verb said by itself brings about an understanding in the first, 
incomplex operation of the intellect. And so, although the conceptio of esse signified by 
the term ‘est’ implies inherence as in a subject, it is not itself a conceptio complexa, for it 
lacks the extremes of the composition. The conceptio of esse signified by the verb ‘est’ 
might appear at first glance to be some composition, but on close examination it emerges 
                                                 
93
 In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 30, lines 277-86. See, also, In I Periher., lect. 6, 
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that, although inherence belongs to its mode, so that a subject is implied, there is in fact 
no application of esse to some subject and thus no composition to which truth or falsity 
applies. Therefore, the verb ‘est’ insofar as it is a term as opposed to a proposition does 
not signify the complex conception ‘something is’. 
Furthermore, so as to explain that the verb ‘est’ does not signify composition 
principally (principaliter) but rather as a consequence (ex consequenti), Aquinas writes: 
[S]ignificat enim id quod primo cadit in 
intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute; 
nam ‘est’ simpliciter dictum significat esse 
actu. 94 
 
For [‘est’] signifies that which first falls 
into the intellect in the mode of actuality 
absolutely, for ‘est’ simply said signifies 
being in act. 
 
Given that ‘to be’, simply speaking, is ‘to be in act’, the verb ‘est’ signifies not just ‘esse’ 
or ‘to be’ but ‘esse actu’ or ‘to be in act’. Thus, simply speaking, the verb ‘est’ signifies 
‘esse actu’ or, as Aquinas writes, “that which first fall into the mind in the mode of 
actuality.” Now, Aquinas further remarks that the verb ‘est’ signifies ‘esse actu’ 
absolutely (absolute). In other words, the verb ‘est’ signifies ‘esse actu’ principally 
(principaliter). Given its concrete mode of signification, the conception signified by a 
verb implies composition, but composition is not what a verb principally signifies. A verb 
principally signifies action, and to the extent that it signifies action as inhering as in a 
subject, it consignifies, or signifies only as a consequence, both the subject of that action 
and the inherence of that action. Accordingly, the verb ‘est’ principally signifies ‘esse’ 
and ‘esse’ alone. That is to say, the term ‘est’ signifies ‘esse’ (in the mode of a verb) 
absolutely or per se, according to its proper notion, and not according as it is realized in 
this or that individual. In sum, the verb ‘est’ does not signify ‘something is in act’. 
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 In I Perher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 394-96. 
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Aquinas has one more thing to say regarding the signification of the verb ‘est’. 
The fact that the verb ‘est’ principally signifies ‘esse actu’ or ‘actualitas’ explains why 
the verb ‘est’ is used as an intermediary between subject and predicate within a 
proposition. Aquinas writes:  
Quia uero actualitas, quam principaliter 
significat hoc uerbum ‘est’, est communiter 
actualitas omnis forme uel actus, 
substancialis uel accidentalis, inde est 
quod, cum uolumus significare 
quamcunque formam uel actum actualiter 
inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud 
per hoc uerbum ‘est’ . . . ; et ideo ex 
consequenti hoc uerbum ‘est’ significat 
compositionem.95 
Since the actuality that is principally 
signified by the verb ‘est’ is, in common, 
the actuality of every form or act, whether 
substantial or accidental, it follows that 
when we wish to signify that some form or 
act is actually in some subject, we signify 
this by means of the verb ‘est’. . . . And, for 
this reason this verb ‘est’ signifies 
composition ex consequenti. 
 
We have seen that ‘est’ can take on two different roles in a proposition, resulting in two 
different kinds of propositions. When we want to signify that some subject actually is in 
reality, ‘est’ is predicated per se as the principal predicate. That is the case of the 
proposition ‘aliquid est’ which signifies that something is. When we want to signify that 
some form is actually in some subject, as in ‘Sortes est homo’, ‘est’ is not predicated per 
se but as adjacent to the principal predicate.
96
 The reason ‘est’ is used as adjacent to the 
principal predicate is twofold. On the one hand, as Aquinas maintains, the actuality 
signified by the verb ‘est’ is the actuality of all forms.97 On the other hand, from a purely 
semantic perspective, there is the fact that the verb ‘est’ does not signify some 
determinate subject, for it signifies esse principally (principaliter) and the subject of esse 
only as a consequence (ex consequenti).  
                                                 
95
 In I Perher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 397-403. 
96
 See In II Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 35-48. 
97
 See, also, ST I, q. 3, a. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 42: “[Q]uia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel 
naturae: non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse.”  
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We have previously compared the mode of signification of a verb to the mode of 
signification of an adjective, to the extent that they both signify their res ‘as in a subject’. 
Regarding the signification of ‘album’, Aquinas writes: 
[I]n hoc nomine album intelligitur albedo, 
et subiectum albedinis; sed albedo 
determinate, subiectum autem albedinis 
indeterminate. Nam cum dicimus album, 
intelligimus aliquid albedine informatum; 
non autem determinatur quid sit illud, sicut 
determinatur forma.98 
In this name ‘white’ both whiteness and the 
subject of whiteness is understood; but, 
whiteness determinately, the subject of 
whiteness indeterminately. For when we 
say ‘white’, we understand something 
informed by whiteness; but what that is is 
not determined, just as the form is 
determined. 
 
Similarly, then, the verb ‘est’ signifies both esse and the subject of esse, but the subject of 
esse only indeterminately. Thus, since the verb ‘est’ signifies esse ‘as in a subject’ 
leaving the subject undetermined, and esse is in fact the act of every form or nature, when 
we wish to signify that this or that form is actually in this or that subject, the verb ‘est’ is 
used as adjacent to the principal predicate of the proposition in question. Generally 
speaking, a proposition signifies the composition of esse and some subject. The term 
‘est’, in contrast, principally signifies only ‘esse’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter we reviewed Aquinas’ semantic analysis of the terms that have 
esse as their res significata, namely, the nouns ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as well as the verb ‘est’. 
We concentrated on the modes of signification that Aquinas assigns to these terms, given 
that, for Aquinas, the modes of signification of terms follow from our intellect’s modes of 
understanding. Thus, by examining the modes of signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, 
and ‘est’, we were able to determine the manner in which the intellect conceives esse. We 
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 De unione verbi, a. 3, ad 5, Marietti ed., p. 431. 
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found that, for Aquinas, these terms signify, not a ‘judgment’ of esse, but a ‘concept’ of 
esse; that is to say, they signify a ‘simple conception’ of their res, which is esse.  
If any term appears to signify a judgment, it would be ‘ens’, since it signifies 
‘quod est’ (‘what is’). But the term ‘ens’ does not signify the composition signified when 
one says ‘aliquid est’ (‘something is’), i.e., the kind of composition to which truth or 
falsity applies. Rather, the term ‘ens’, insofar as it signifies esse in the concrete mode, 
“consignifies” composition; for, it signifies ‘a thing having esse’, that is to say, it 
signifies ‘the subject of esse’, and so the compositeness of subject plus being (and hence 
the term must, in this respect, be denied of God). Furthermore, as we have seen, the kind 
of composition ‘ens’ consignifies is not the kind of composition the judgment ‘something 
is’ signifies, wherein a comparison is made between a thing and esse. The nature of 
propositions as involving such a comparison we shall explore further in Chapter IV. 
In short, the term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, but unlike what is the case in the 
judgment ‘aliquid est’ (‘something is’), the ‘est’ in ‘quod est’ is not a predicate. By 
contrast, the abstract term ‘esse’ appears least to signify a judgment or ‘complex 
conception’. For, it signifies its res as ‘that by which’ and as simple; thus, it excludes in 
its signification all sorts of composition, from which it prescinds.  
The case of the verb ‘est’ is parallel to that of ‘ens’. Taken in itself, that is, as a 
verb and not as short-hand for the proposition ‘aliquid est’ (‘something is’), ‘est’ 
consignifies composition, for verbs signify their action as inherent in a subject. However, 
since no an actual inherence is asserted, the conception signified has no truth value. Thus, 
like the noun ‘ens’, the verb ‘est’ consignifies composition insofar as it includes in its 
mode of signification the subject of esse. Nevertheless, neither the noun ‘ens’ nor the 
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verb ‘est’ signify that some subject is or exists, that is to say, the fact that esse actually 
inheres in some subject. Hence, neither term signifies a judgment. 
Based on Aquinas’ analysis of the mode of signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, 
and ‘est’, all of which have esse as their res significata, we conclude that, for Aquinas, a 
simple conception of esse is possible. As discussed in chapter I, Aquinas’ recognition of a 
simple conception of esse, as signified by the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’, represents a 
problem for the traditional interpretation of the commentaries on the Sentences and on the 
De trinitate, namely, that Aquinas, by correlating the second operation of the intellect and 
a thing’s esse, apparently denies the possibility of a simple conception of esse. As we saw 
in Chapter I, Gilson’s answer to the difficulty is that Aquinas’ analysis of the terms ‘ens’ 
and ‘est’ as signifying a simple conception of esse belongs to the logic, not of Aquinas, 
but of Aristotle. However, as we have shown in this chapter, Aquinas’ semantic analysis 
of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ as signifying a simple conception of their res is consistent 
with the general semantic theory to which Aquinas himself personally subscribes, a 
theory we reviewed in Chapter II.  
We saw in that chapter that, for Aquinas, a term immediately signifies a ‘concept’ 
or ‘conception’ in the mind, but it ultimately signifies the res that is the object of the 
mental conception. Thus, the res significata (usually an extra mental reality) is signified 
through the mediation of the intellect’s conception the term immediately signifies. Most 
of our terms signify a form or nature, such as humanity; but, the res significata of a term 
need not be an extra-mental form; it need not be something existing in reality. For 
Aquinas, anything we are able to conceive, we are able to name.
99
 Regarding the 
                                                 
99
 See ST I, q. 13, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 139: “[A]liquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, 
sic a nobis potest nominari.” A mental concept may or may not have a foundation in reality, but 
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conception signified by terms, we saw that at different places throughout his works 
Aquinas characterizes the conception signified by terms, nouns and verbs alike as simple 
or non-composite (conceptio incomplexa); in contrast, the conception signified by 
propositions is characterized by Aquinas as complex or composite (conceptio complexa). 
We also saw that on more than one occasion Aquinas specifically links the kind of 
conception that nouns and verbs signify with the first operation of the intellect, and the 
kind of conception that propositions signify with the second operation of the intellect.
 100
 
According to the two operations of the intellect, two different kinds of conceptions are 
produced; each kind is signified by linguistic expressions of diverse nature. The 
complexity of the conception signified by propositions is associated by Aquinas with 
predication, and hence with its being the subject of truth value. Aquinas refers to the 
conception signified by terms as simple or non-composite because its content lacks the 
composition of a proposition. Thus, the conception signified by terms, insofar as it 
contains no predication, has no truth value per se. This is not to say that a simple 
conception lacks any sort of composition. As we saw in this chapter, terms signifying in 
the concrete mode consignify composition, for they signify a conception wherein the res 
is conceived ‘without precision’. The kind of conception concrete terms signify includes 
some composition, but not the the kind of composition to which truth or falsity applies. 
Such is the case, as we have seen in this chapter, of the concrete terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’, 
which, even as they consignify composition, do not signify the kind of composition to 
which truth or falsity applies. 
                                                                                                                                                 
in either case there surely is some identifiable res intellecta, i.e. the object of the mental concept 
the term signifies and which is the res significata of the term. 
100
 For reference, see the discussion on Chapter II, section 2.2.1. 
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Aquinas’ analysis of the signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’, as 
discussed above, shows that he regards these terms as having the same semantic structure 
as any other concrete or abstract term. Were this not the case, Aquinas would not have 
been able, as he does, to parallel the signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ with 
the signification of terms such as the nouns ‘albus’ and ‘albedo’, and the verb and verbal 
noun ‘currit’ and ‘currens’. The terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ signify a simple or non-
composite conception of their res, the sort of conception produced by the first operation 
of the intellect. Aquinas identifies these terms as having esse (as contrasted with essence) 
as their res significata. And, since, as we have said, corresponding to the simple, non-
composite content signified by these terms is a simple, non-composite conception, 
produced by a simple act of the mind, we conclude that, for Aquinas, the intellect is able 
to conceive esse as act in a simple conception through its first operation. 
In the next and final chapter, I return to the problem of the human intellect’s 
apprehension of esse in Aquinas. My answer to the difficulty consists on a 
reinterpretation of Aquinas’ remarks in the commentaries on the Sentences and on the De 
trinitate on the human intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s esse. According to my 
interpretation of the texts, in setting up the correlation, Aquinas does not rule out the 
possibility of a simple conception of esse. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 
REREADING IN I SENT., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: EXPLAINING DIVINE  
KNOWLEDGE WITH A DISTINCTIVE  
PROPOSITION THEORY 
 
 
In this final chapter, I return to the problem, laid out in Chapter I, of the apparent 
inconsistency between, on the one hand, the semantic theory of the commentary on the 
Peri hermeneias, where Aquinas recognizes a simple conception of esse, and, on the 
other hand, Aquinas’ association of the second operation of the intellect with a thing’s 
esse in the commentaries on the Sentences and on Boethius’ De trinitate. This association 
appears to exclude the possibility of a simple conception of esse.  
This chapter addresses the inconsistency created by the early texts on the 
judgment of esse by offering a reinterpretation of the key text, In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, 
in light of the theory of propositions and their objects that serves as its background 
(enuntiabile theory). In the process, I show that Aquinas’ association of the intellect’s 
second operation with a thing’s esse is a consequence of his distinctive view on the 
objects of propositions. Aquinas’ affirmations on the second operation of the intellect 
cannot be understood independently of the medieval problem of divine knowledge of 
enuntiabilia: can God with his simple understanding know propositions and their objects, 
which are complex, and if so, how? After presenting the theoretical background of 
Aquinas’ discussion, I show that Aquinas’s remarks on the second operation of the 
intellect and ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ are not directed at the intellect’s 
apprehension of esse as a simple, but rather at the intellect’s apprehension of the 
composite unit that is ‘the esse of a subject’, which composite enuntiabilia signify. Thus, 
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contrary to the standard reading of the passage, Aquinas’ correlation between the second 
operation of the intellect and ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ does not rule out the 
possibility of a simple conception of esse. The same association of the second operation 
of the intellect with the apprehension of a complex ‘esse rei’ can be found in Aquinas’ 
other early texts, and he refers to the same solution to the problem of God’s knowledge of 
enuntiabilia in the mature Summa theologiae. 
Before I introduce my solution to the difficulty (in 4.2), though, in the first part of 
the chapter, after restating the problem of the human intellect’s apprehension of esse in 
Aquinas in light of our findings in Chapters II and III on Aquinas’ semantic theory and 
the signification of the terms that signify esse (4.1.1), I examine two attempts to dissolve 
the apparent inconsistency between texts. First (4.1.2), I consider Régis’ interpretation of 
the texts from the Sentences and De trinitate commentaries as directed at the intellect’s 
apprehension, not of esse as act (which the intellect conceives in ‘simple apprehension’), 
but of esse as a mode of existing (which the intellect conceives in ‘judgment’). Such an 
interpretation, however, cannot be made consistent with the texts, and it fails properly to 
account for existential judgments. Second (4.1.3), I take up the possibility of a 
developmental solution: does the late date of the commentary on the Peri hermeneias 
allow for the possibility that Aquinas changed his mind on the subject of the intellect’s 
apprehension of esse, and so eventually admitting the possibility of a simple conception 
of esse? In response, the fourth section (4.1.4) shows that Aquinas recognizes a simple 
conception of esse in the early works precisely while he maintains the view that the esse 
of a thing is apprehended only through the second operation (as especially in In I Sent., d. 
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38, q. 1, a. 3). So, although objections need to be considered (4.1.5), a solution other than 
the developmental one will be required to explain this fact (4.1.6). 
 
4.1 Eliminating Two Solutions  
 
 
4.1.1 Restating the Problem: Two Conflicting Sets of Texts on the 
Intellect’s Apprehension of Esse 
 
 
In the preceding chapters we have seen that as part of his semantic theory Aquinas 
recognizes a simple or non-composite conception of esse. Chapter II shows that Aquinas 
subscribes to the standard semantic theory of the mid-thirteenth century Latin west, 
terminist logic, according to which the signification of terms, nouns and verbs alike, is 
constituted primarily by their “signing relation” with a simple or non-composite 
(incomplexa) conception of some res. We saw that at different places throughout his 
works Aquinas characterizes the conception signified by terms as simple (incomplexa), 
and on more than one occasion he specifically links the kind of conception that nouns and 
verbs signify to the first operation of the intellect.
1
 Under this semantic framework, the 
noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘est’, which have esse as their res significata, must signify a 
simple conception of esse. Indeed, Chapter III shows that in his commentary on 
Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias (c. 1270-71), Aquinas argues that, despite appearances to the 
contrary, the conception the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ signify is not the sort of conception 
produced by the second operation of the intellect, a complex conception, but rather the 
sort of conception that belongs to the first operation, a simple conception. 
                                                 
1
 See In III Sent., d. 23 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1; De pot., q. 9, a. 5; De ver. q. 4, a. 2 and q. 14, a. 1; SCG I, 
c. 59; Quodl. V, q. 5 a. 2; In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223-1224; In I Periher., lect. 5, lines 277-86 
and lect. 6, lines 20-23, 35-39. See also the discussion on Chapter II, section 2.2.1. 
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A review of Aquinas’ theory of signification and his account of the signification 
of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ reveals that, for Aquinas, the human intellect is able to form 
a simple conception of esse. We are faced, however, with the following difficulty. While 
in his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias Aquinas recognizes a simple 
conception of esse, elsewhere he appears to deny the very possibility of such a 
conception. In his early Scriptum on the Sentences (c. 1251-52) Aquinas makes the 
following remarks regarding the intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s essence and esse: 
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse 
ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio 
intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis 
formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates 
rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De 
anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. 
Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, 
componendo affirmationem, quia etiam 
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a 
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in 
quadam compositione formae ad materiam, 
vel accidentis ad subjectum.
2
  
 
 
Since there are two [components] in a 
thing, the quiddity of the thing and its esse, 
a twofold operation of the intellect 
corresponds to these two. One is called 
“formation” by philosophers, by which the 
intellect apprehends the quiddities of 
things, which is also called by the 
Philosopher, in De anima III, the 
“understanding of indivisibles.” But the 
other comprehends the esse of a thing by 
composing an affirmation, because also the 
esse of a thing composed of matter and 
form, from which the intellect receives 
cognition, consists in a certain composition 
of form with matter or of accident with 
subject. 
 
Later in the same article, in the response to the second objection, contrasting the divine 
and the human intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s esse, Aquinas writes:  
Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a 
rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, 
non apprehendit illud esse nisi 
componendo et dividendo.
3
 
 
But our intellect, whose cognition arises 
from things that have composite esse, 
apprehends this esse only by composing 
and dividing.  
According to the mainstream interpretation of these passages, in setting up a correlation 
between the two operations of the intellect and the two principles in a thing, essence and 
                                                 
2
 In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903. 
3
 In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 904. 
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esse, Aquinas establishes a radical separation in the way the human intellect apprehends 
each principle. Only of an essence is the human intellect able to form a simple 
conception, for only essence is the object of the first operation of the intellect. Esse, on 
the other hand, may be apprehended by the human intellect only through its second 
operation, that is, in a complex conception. In other words, a simple conception of esse is 
not possible. 
If the mainstream reading of Aquinas’ correlation in the commentary on the 
Sentences between the two operations of the intellect and a thing’s essence and esse is 
accurate, then we are faced with two conflicting sets of texts on the subject of the human 
intellect’s apprehension of esse. On the one hand, we have Aquinas’ discussion of the 
signification of the term ‘ens’ and ‘est’ in his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri 
hermeneias, where Aquinas, following on the semantic theory to which he subscribes, 
recognizes a simple conception of esse as signified by these terms. On the other hand, we 
have Aquinas’ early remarks on the human cognition of esse as contrasted with essence 
in his commentary on the Sentences, which remarks suggest the impossibility of a simple 
conception of esse.  
Should Aquinas’ early remarks on the human cognition of esse in the commentary 
on the Sentences be dismissed as inconsistent with his finished semantics of the Peri 
hermeneias?  
Before addressing the issue myself, in the following pages, I examine two 
alternative ways to dissolve the apparent inconsistency between texts. The first one, 
exposed by Louis-Marie Régis, interprets the expression “esse rei” in the commentaries 
on the Sentences and De trinitate to refer, not to a thing’s act of existing, but to a thing’s 
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mode of existing.
 4
 The second resolution argues that in between the writing of the 
commentaries on the Sentences and on the Peri hermeneias, Aquinas changed his mind 
on the subject of the intellect’s apprehension of esse, eventually allowing for the 
possibility of a simple conception of esse. In short, do the texts on esse as grasped only in 
judgment report an eccentric, early view? We shall see that neither alternative offers a 
suitable solution to the difficulty. 
 
4.1.2 Solution I: Judgment Regards Esse, not as Act of Existing, but 
as Mode of Existing 
 
 
According to Régis, the texts on the judgment of esse in the Sentences and De 
trinitate commentaries speak of “esse rei” or “the esse of a thing” as the ultimate object 
of judgment, not in the sense of a thing’s act of existing, but in the sense of a thing’s 
mode of existing. Régis begins by arguing that the first object of judgment is not the 
existence of things, but rather “the composition or synthesis of concepts with which 
simple apprehension has already enriched the intellect.”5 Régis denies that esse as act 
plays for judgment the role quiddity plays for simple apprehension. Esse is the first object 
of judgment only when taken to signify the composition of the intellect, that is to say, the 
synthesis of simple concepts in an enuntiation or proposition. This is not to say, Régis 
cautions, that judgment has no contact with extra-mental reality. The first function of 
judgment, he explains, is “to reassemble concepts so that they may more faithfully 
reproduce the thing’s extra-mental mode of existing.”6 It is true that judgment regards the 
esse of things, but it does not regard the act of existing of things, which is grasped instead 
                                                 
4
 Louis-Marie Régis, Epistemology, trans. Imelda Byrne (New York: Macmillan, 1959), 322-31. 
5
 Régis, Epistemology, 323. 
6
 Ibid., 328. 
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through simple apprehension. “Judgment,” Régis writes, “is modeled after the mode of 
existing of things, and not after that act of existing perceived as the perfection of 
quiddity.”7  
In support of his interpretation of “esse rei” as apprehended in judgment, Régis 
highlights the one remark by Aquinas at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, where the esse of a 
thing is described as consisting in a certain composition of form with matter or of 
accident with subject: 
Alia autem [operatio] comprehendit esse 
rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam 
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a 
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in 
quadam compositione formae ad materiam, 
vel accidentis ad subjectum.
8
 
 
But the other [operation] comprehends the 
esse of a thing by composing an 
affirmation, because also the esse of a thing 
composed of matter and form, from which 
the intellect receives cognition, consists in 
a certain composition of form with matter 
or of accident with subject. 
 
How can Aquinas say that esse consists in a certain composition of form with matter or of 
accident with subject, if esse here is taken to stand for the act of existence? It must rather 
be the case, Régis concludes, that “the esse in question is the whole being of the thing, its 
essence and its existence, and not only the substantial but also the accidental mode of 
existence.”9 Régis’ interpretation of “esse rei” finds further support in a parallel text from 
the commentary on De trinitate, where a thing’s esse, which the intellect apprehends in 
judgment, is said to result from the congregation of the principles of the thing: 
Secunda uero operatio respicit ipsum esse 
rei; quod quidem resultat ex congregatione 
principiorum rei in compositis, uel ipsam 
simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in 
substantiis simplicibus.
10
 
 
The second operation regards the esse itself 
of a thing, which results from the 
congregation of the principles of a thing in 
composite substances, or accompanies the 
simple nature of a thing, as in simple 
substances. 
                                                 
7
 Régis, Epistemology, 331. 
8
 In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903. 
9
 Régis, Epistemology, 330. 
10
 De trin., q. 5, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 147, lines 101-105. 
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In following paragraphs, I raise three difficulties with Régis’ solution. Notice first 
that the final part of this passage (“. . . uel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut 
in substantiis simplicibus”) is translated by Régis as: “. . . or coincides with the simplicity 
of nature in spiritual substances.”11 Régis’ rendering of ‘concomitatur’ as “coincides” is 
misleading, though. A more adequate translation of ‘concomitatur’ is “accompanies”, for 
it better conveys the literal sense of the Latin verb. The rendering of ‘concomitatur’ for 
“accompanies” makes it evident that ‘esse’ here is taken to stand for something other than 
the simple nature, and hence, as the act of existence.
12
 Furthermore, Régis’ appeal to 
Aquinas’ characterization of a thing’s esse, in the texts from the commentaries on the 
Sentences and De trinitate, as consisting in or resulting from the principles of the things, 
is easily answered by appealing to other texts where Aquinas has esse in the sense of 
actus essendi as resulting from the principles of a thing.
13
 
 The text from In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 also offers some difficulties for Régis’ 
interpretation of “esse rei” as standing exclusively for a thing’s mode of existing. There, 
Aquinas introduces the claim of a correlation between the two operations of the intellect 
and a thing’s essence and esse, by remarking on the real composition (and thus 
distinction) between the essence or quiddity of a thing and its esse: 
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse 
ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio 
intellectus.
14
 
 
Since there are two [components] in a 
thing, the quiddity of the thing and its esse, 
a twofold operation of the intellect 
corresponds to these two. 
 
                                                 
11
 Régis, Epistemology, 328; my italics. 
12
 See, John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to 
Uncreated Being (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 29n23. 
13
 See In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 559. 
14
 In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903. 
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Furthermore, immediately following the passage in question, Aquinas observes that one 
may also consider in God his nature and his esse. God’s essence is cause and exemplar of 
all nature, just as his esse is cause and exemplar of the esse of each thing; thus, knowing 
his essence God knows every other thing, and knowing his esse God knows the esse of 
each thing. But, Aquinas further observes, since God’s esse is not other than his esse, nor 
is the result a composite, God knows the esse of each thing simply, without diversity or 
composition.
15
 Thus, since Aquinas contrasts the nature and the esse of created things 
with that of God, he must have in mind a thing’s esse in the sense of a thing’s act of 
existing.
16
 
A final problem for Régis’ reading of the texts is that it fails to provide a 
sufficient account of existential judgments. According to Régis, the judgment ‘Socrates 
is’ expresses, not the act of existing of a thing, but a substantial mode of existing, for ‘is’ 
is a substantial predicate expressing the ipsum esse of Socrates.
17
 In support of his 
interpretation, Régis refers us to a passage from the commentary on the Metaphysics, 
where Aquinas says that ‘is’ in ‘Socrates is’ is a substantial predicate (de praedicato 
substantiali), if understood in its first sense, i.e., as signifying something existing in 
rerum natura.
18
 When commenting earlier on this passage, Régis has acknowledged that 
‘is’, when taken in its first sense, “expresses the act of the substance it perfects and from 
                                                 
15
 See, In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903-904: “. Similiter etiam in ipso 
Deo est considerare naturam ipsius, et esse ejus; et sicut natura sua est causa et exemplar omnis 
naturae, ita etiam esse suum est causa et exemplar omnis esse. Unde sicut cognoscendo essentiam 
suam, cognoscit omnem rem; ita cognoscendo esse suum, cognoscit esse cujuslibet rei; et sic 
cognoscit omnia enuntiabilia, quibus esse significatur; non tamen diversa operatione nec 
compositione, sed simpliciter; quia esse suum non est aliud ab essentia, nec est compositum 
consequens.” 
16
 See, Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 29-30. 
17
 Régis, Epistemology, 331: “. . . in the judgment ‘Socrates is,’ the is is a substantial predicate; 
i.e., it expresses the ipsum esse of Socrates and therefore a substantial mode of existing.”  
18
 See In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 896. 
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which it is distinguished.”19 But, he denies that the act of judgment regards a thing’s esse 
in this sense. Rather, judgment regards a thing’s esse taken in its second sense, that is, as 
signifying the composition of a proposition; such composition, Régis later adds, even in 
the case of the existential proposition ‘Socrates is’, expresses, not the act of existing of a 
thing, but its mode of existing. However, as Aquinas notes in the passage from the 
commentary on the Metaphysics referred to by Régis, when taken as a substantial 
predicate, the verb ‘is’ in the proposition ‘Socrates is’, is predicated of Socrates 
according to the first sense of esse. As a result, as Aquinas observes elsewhere, ‘Socrates 
is’ signifies that Socrates exists in rerum natura: 
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in 
enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut 
cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil 
aliud intendimus significare quam quod 
Sortes sit in rerum natura.
20
 
 
The verb ‘is’ in a proposition is sometimes 
predicated in itself, as when one says 
‘Socrates is’, by which we intend to signify 
nothing else than that Socrates exists in the 
nature of things. 
Thus, in the judgment ‘Socrates is’ (whenever the verb ‘is’ is taken to signify esse as act, 
i.e., as the actus essendi by which something is or exists in rerum natura), the intellect 
asserts the act of existing of Socrates. 
In sum, Régis’ position fails to be compelling for two reasons: (i) it offers no 
convincing alternative account of the early texts on judgment of esse; and (ii) the account 
of these texts it offered focuses on a proposition as predicating form of a subject, ignoring 
non-quidditative esse as act or reducing it to esse in the sense of the truth of a 
proposition, or ‘propositional esse’. 
In the next section, I examine an alternative approach to the apparent 
inconsistency between, on the one hand, Aquinas’ correlation of the second operation of 
                                                 
19
 Régis, Epistemology, 324. 
20
 In II Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 36-40. 
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the intellect with a thing’s esse in the commentary on the Sentences and, on the other 
hand, the semantics of the commentary on the Peri hermeneias. This alternative approach 
seeks to preserve the traditional interpretation of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, as ruling out a 
simple conception of esse, while at the same time acknowledging a simple conception of 
esse in the Peri hermeneias. 
 
4.1.3 Solution II: Only in the Later Writings Does Aquinas Recognize 
a Simple Conception of Esse 
 
 
It may be argued, as a way to solve the apparent inconsistency between texts, that 
Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias is dated late enough (c. 1270-71) to 
allow for the possibility that at some point during the years after his writing of the 
commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas changed his mind on the subject of the human 
intellect’s apprehension of esse. Such a scenario may find support in the fact that it is 
only in his early writings, namely, the commentaries on the Sentences and on Boethius’ 
De trinitate (1257-59), that Aquinas correlates the two operations of the intellect with a 
thing’s essence and esse.21 In later writings, the correlation has disappeared. Thus, 
Aquinas’ remarks in his late commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias regarding the 
signification of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ as signifying a simple conception of esse would 
attest only to the fact that in later years Aquinas reassessed his initial position on the 
matter, eventually allowing for the possibility of a simple conception of esse. One might 
even conjecture, with considerable plausibility, that all Aquinas had in mind in the early 
                                                 
21
 Other than In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, there is another passage in the Sentences commentary 
where the correlation is mentioned. See In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 
489: “[P]rima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius.” In the commentary 
on Boethius’ De trinitate the correlation is mentioned only once, see De trin., q. 5, a. 3, Leonine 
ed., vol. 50, p. 147, lines 96-101: “Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam natura rei . . . Secunda 
vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei.” 
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works, in fact, is “being in the sense of what is signified by the truth of propositions,” as 
Régis suggests; so, when Thomas comes to realize that he had confused this being with 
being as actus essendi, that is, had confused propositional with ontological being, he 
drops the correlation of judgment and esse as actus essendi in the mature works. 
The main problem with the proposed solution to the difficulty is that Aquinas 
recognizes a simple conception of esse precisely while maintaining that the esse of a 
thing is apprehended only through the second operation of the intellect. Aquinas 
considers the semantic structure of terms that signify esse at different times in his 
commentary on the Sentences as well as in two other works dated around the same period 
as his commentary on Boethius’ De trinitate, namely, in his De veritate and in his 
commentary on Boethius’ De hebdomadibus (assuming it is an early work).22 As we are 
about to see, Aquinas’ analysis of the signification of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ in these 
early works remains in line with the tradition of terminist logic, giving no indication that, 
for Aquinas, the semantic structure of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ differs from that of any 
other term. Moreover, there is every indication that, for Aquinas, the terms ‘ens’ and 
‘esse’ signify a simple conception of their res. In both the commentary on the Sentences 
                                                 
22 Aquinas’ Quaestiones disputatae De veritate is dated from 1256 to 1259. See Jean-Pierre 
Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 334. There is disagreement on the dating of 
Aquinas’ commentary on Boethius’ De hebdomadibus. James Weisheipl dates it around the same 
time as the commentary on the De trinitate (i.e. between 1256 and 1259). See, James Weisheipl, 
Friar Thomas d’ Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Washington, DC: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1983), 382. Torrell does not provide a specific date for the commentary on 
Boethius’ De hebdomadibus, but he thinks it was composed at a later date than Weisheipl 
suggests (Aquinas, 345). On the subject, see also Louis Bataillon and Carlo Grassi, preface to 
Santi Thomae de Aquino, Expositio libri Boetii de ebdomadibus, Leonine ed., vol. 50 (Rome, 
1992), 264. I follow Weisheipl here and assume that Aquinas worked on the commentary on the 
De hebdomadibus around the same time he worked on the commentary on the De trinitate. 
However, a later date for Aquinas’ commentary on Boethius’ De hebdomadibus does not affect 
the conclusion of the present argumentation. 
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and the De veritate, Aquinas explicitly associates the conception signified by ‘ens’ with 
the first operation of the intellect and refers to such a conception as simple. 
In the next section, then, I review Aquinas’ analysis of the signification of the 
terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ in the commentary on the Sentences, the De veritate, and in the 
commentary De hebdomadibus. As we shall see, Aquinas recognizes a simple conception 
of esse precisely while (presumably) maintaining the view that esse is apprehended only 
through the intellect’s second operation. 
 
4.1.4 The Simple Conception of Esse in the Early Writings 
 
 
A. Aquinas’ Early Account of the Semantic Structure of 
‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’ 
 
 
In the Sentences commentary and in De veritate Aquinas associates the term ‘ens’ 
with esse as opposed to essence.
23
 In addition, as he contrasts the terms ‘ens’ and ‘res’ in 
the same texts, Aquinas points out at different occasions that each term is imposed from 
one of the two components in a thing: whereas ‘res’ is imposed from essence, ‘ens’ is 
imposed from esse or actus essendi. This tells us that, for Aquinas, the res significata of 
‘ens’ is esse, not essence.24 In the commentary on the Sentences, for instance, Aquinas 
writes: 
 
                                                 
23
 See, e.g., In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 223: “Ens autem non dicit 
quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi;” De ver., q. 1, a. 1 ad s.c. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 22, 1/2, p. 7, 
lines 282-85: “Ad tertium dicendum quod cum dicitur ‘diversum est esse et quod est’ distinguitur 
actus essendi ab eo cui ille actus convenit; nomen autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo 
cui convenit actus essendi.” 
24
 The res significata of a term is that from which, as from a “form” in a thing, a term is imposed 
for the sake of signification. See e.g. In III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 232: “Et 
nomen, proprie loquendo, dicitur significare formam sive qualitatem, a qua imponitur nomen.” 
On this issue, see the discussion in Chapter II, section 2.2.1. 
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[H]oc nomen «ens» et «res» differunt 
secundum quod est duo considerare in re, 
scilicet quidditatem et rationem ejus, et 
esse ipsius; et a quidditate sumitur hoc 
nomen «res». . . . Sed nomen entis sumitur 
ab esse rei.
25
 
The terms ‘ens’ and ‘res’ differ according 
as two principles can be considered in a 
thing, namely its ratio or quiddity and its 
esse. And, the term ‘res’ is taken from 
quiddity. . . . But the term ‘ens’ is taken 
from the esse of the thing. 
 
The parallel texts make explicit that Aquinas takes this Avicennian doctrine to involve 
esse in the sense of act or the actus essendi. 
[C]um in omni quod est sit considerare 
quidditatem suam, per quam subsistit in 
natura determinata, et esse suum, per quod 
dicitur de eo quod est in actu, hoc nomen 
«res» imponitur rei a quidditate sua, 
secundum Avicennam, tract. II Metaph., 
cap. I, hoc nomen «qui est» vel «ens» 
imponitur ab ipso actu essendi. Cum autem 
ita sit quod in qualibet re creata essentia 
sua differat a suo esse, res illa proprie 
denominatur a quidditate sua, et non ab 
actu essendi, sicut homo ab humanitate.
26
 
 
Since in everything that is it is possible to 
consider its quiddity, by which it subsists 
in a determinate nature, and its esse, by 
which it is said about it that it exists in act, 
this term ‘res’ is imposed upon a thing 
from its quiddity, according to Avicenna in 
Metaph., 2.1, and this term ‘qui est’ or 
‘ens’ is imposed [upon a thing] from its 
actus essendi. Thus, since in each created 
thing its essence differs from its esse, that 
is properly denominated a ‘thing’ from its 
quiddity, and not from its actus essendi, 
just as a human [is denominated] from 
humanity. 
 
[E]ns sumitur ab actu essendi sed nomen 
rei exprimit quiditatem vel essentiam 
entis.
27
 
 
‘Ens’ is taken from the actus essendi, but 
the noun ‘res’ expresses the quiddity or 
essence of a being (ens). 
If at this time Aquinas presumably holds the view that esse is apprehended only through 
the second operation of the intellect, one would expect some indication that, for Aquinas, 
given that ‘ens’ signifies esse and ‘res’ signifies essence, the term ‘ens’ signifies a 
complex conception whereas the term ‘res’ signifies a simple conception. Yet, in none of 
the occasions in which ‘ens’ is contrasted with ‘res’ in the commentary on the Sentences 
                                                 
25
 In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 611-12. 
26
 In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 195. See also In II Sent., d. 37 q. 1, a. 1. 
27
 De ver., q. 1, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 22, 1/2, p. 5, lines 137-39. For the same doctrine in later 
texts, see In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 553, Marietti ed., p. 155: “Sciendum est enim quod hoc nomen 
Homo, imponitur a quidditate, sive a natura hominis; et hoc nomen Res imponitur a quidditate 
tantum; hoc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi;” also SCG, I, c. 25, Leonine ed., vol. 13, 
p. 77, lines 13-14: “[N]omen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse.” 
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and De veritate does Aquinas provide any indication that he considers the terms ‘ens’ and 
‘res’ to differ in anything other than their res significata. 
In his commentary on Boethius’ De hebdomadibus, Aquinas addresses the mode 
of signification of the terms ‘esse’ and ‘ens’. In a passage we have encountered before, 
Aquinas identifies the terms ‘esse’ and ‘ens’ as signifying in the abstract and concrete 
mode respectively, paralleling the modes of signification of the pair ‘esse’ and ‘ens’ to 
that of the pair ‘albedo’ and ‘albus’ as well as the pair ‘currere’ and ‘currens’: 
Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod 
dicimus esse et aliud per id quod dicimus id 
quod est, sicut et aliud significamus cum 
dicimus currere et aliud per hoc quod 
dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse 
significantur in abstracto sicut et albedo; 
sed quod est, id est ens et currens, 
significantur sicut in concreto, uelut 
album.
28
  
 
We signify one thing by saying ‘esse’ and 
another by saying ‘id quod est’, just as also 
we signify one thing when we say ‘currere’ 
and another when ‘currens’ is said. For, 
‘currere’ and ‘esse’ are signified in the 
abstract, as is ‘whiteness’; but ‘quod est’, 
namely ‘ens’, and ‘currens’ are signified in 
the concrete, as is ‘white’. 
 
There is nothing in Aquinas’ subsequent analysis of the modes of signification of the pair 
‘esse’ and ‘ens’ and the pair ‘currere’ and ‘currens’ that would indicate that they differ 
from one another in any other way than with respect to their res significata. Nothing 
would indicate, in other words, that, unlike ‘currere’ and ‘currens’, the terms ‘ens’ and 
‘esse’ signify a complex conception. Aquinas writes: 
[I]psum esse non significatur sicut ipsum 
subiectum essendi, sicut nec currere 
significatur sicut subiectum cursus. Vnde, 
sicut non possumus dicere quod ipsum 
currere currat, ita non possumus dicere 
quod ipsum esse sit; set id quod est 
significatur sicut subiectum essendi, uelud 
id quod currit significatur sicut subiectum 
currendi; et ideo sicut possumus dicere de 
eo quod currit siue de currente quod currat 
in quantum subicitur cursui et participat 
‘Esse’ itself is not signified as the subject 
of being, just as ‘currere’ is not signified as 
the subject of running. Thus, just as we 
cannot say that running (currere) itself 
runs, we cannot say that being (esse) itself 
is. But ‘id quod est’ is signified as the 
subject of being, just as ‘that which runs’ is 
signified as the subject of running. Thus, 
just as we can say of ‘that which runs’ or of 
‘a runner’ that it runs inasmuch as it is the 
subject of running and participates in it, we 
                                                 
28
 In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 270-71, lines 39-45. 
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ipsum; ita possumus dicere quod ens siue 
id quod est sit in quantum participat actum 
essendi.
29
 
 
can say that ‘ens’ or ‘id quod est’ is 
inasmuch as it participates in the act of 
being. 
 
Undoubtedly, a discussion on the modes of signification of two terms that signify esse 
would have been the perfect occasion for Aquinas to take note of the fact that if esse is 
apprehended only through the second operation of the intellect, then the terms that have 
esse as their res significata cannot signify the same sort of conception that other terms 
signify; for, they would have to signify a complex conception of their res, i.e., of esse. 
The fact, however, that Aquinas parallels the modes of signification of the terms ‘esse’ 
and ‘ens’ with those of the terms ‘currere’ and ‘currens’ implies that, for Aquinas, the 
terms ‘esse’ and ‘ens’ signify a simple conception of their res, that is, of esse. 
Aquinas’ handling of the signification of the terms that signify esse in his early 
writings indicates the same simple conception of esse found in the mature works. That 
this conception corresponds to a simple product of the mind (the concept or verbum) and 
to a simple act of the intellect follows from the same reasoning that we saw at the end of 
Chapter III: the content signified by simple terms is the same as the content of the non-
composite concept through which, as through a form, the simple act of intellection takes 
place.   In the following section, I build a further argument for the claim that the 
conception of ‘ens’ is simple in nature, appealing to two major texts. If Aquinas had 
meant literally that there is no apprehension of esse as the actus essendi prior to or 
outside of the act of judgment, then the simple conception of ‘ens’ could not include in 
any way esse as the actus essendi.  
 
                                                 
29
 In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 48-59. 
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B. The Simple Conception of ‘Ens’ in the Commentary on the 
Sentences and in the De veritate 
 
 
Text 1: The Commentary on the Sentences 
 
 
Addressing the issue of why ‘qui est’ or ‘ens’ is the most proper name of God, 
Aquinas explains that the term ‘ens’ is prior to the terms ‘bonum’, ‘unum’, and ‘verum’. 
The reason is the following: 
[E]ns includitur in intellectu eorum, et non 
e converso. Primum enim quod cadit in 
imaginatione intellectus, est ens, sine quod 
nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu; sicut 
primum quod cadit in credulitate 
intellectus, sunt dignitates.
30
 
 
Ens is included in the understanding of the 
other [concepts], and not the opposite. For 
that which first falls into the intellect’s 
imaginatio is ens, without which nothing 
can be apprehended by the intellect; just as 
that which first falls into the intellect’s 
credulitas are the first principles. 
 
Since in the passage above Aquinas is speaking of that which first falls into the intellect, 
“ens” must stand not for the linguistic expression (i.e., for the term ‘ens’), but for the 
understanding or conception that the linguistic expression signifies (i.e. the conception 
‘ens’).31 Given that in both the commentary on the Sentences and De veritate Aquinas 
identifies esse, as opposed to essence, as the res significata of the term ‘ens’, we are 
confident that, for Aquinas, the object of the conception ‘ens’ is esse.32 Thus, in the 
passage quoted above Aquinas is speaking of a conception of esse. What is quite 
remarkable about this passage is that Aquinas associates the intellect’s conception of esse 
signified by the term ‘ens’ with what he calls in the intellect ‘imaginatio’, which is 
                                                 
30
 In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 200. 
31
 Although he does not do so in the passage just quoted, elsewhere Aquinas refers to both the 
first principles (dignitates) and the intellect’s primary notions (‘ens’, ‘unum’, etc.) as conceptions. 
See, De ver., q. 11, a .1; De trin., q. 6, a. 4; and Quodl. VIII, q. 2, a. 2 (disputed probably during 
the Advent of 1257). 
32
 The res significata of a term is the object of the conception signified by the term. See ST I, q. 
13, a. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 144: “Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus 
de re significata per nomen.” 
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another expression for Aristotle’s ‘understanding of indivisibles’, that is, for the first 
operation of the intellect. 
The use of ‘imaginatio’ to refer to the first operation of the intellect has its origins 
on twelfth-century Latin translations of the logical works of Avicenna and Al-Ghazali 
(especially by Gundissalinus), where the Arabic terms ‘tasawwur’ and ‘tasdiq’, used in 
reference to the Aristotelian distinction in De Anima between ‘understanding of 
indivisibles’ and ‘composition and division,’ are translated as ‘imaginatio’ and 
‘credulitas’ respectively.33 The Latin translation of Averroes’ commentary on De Anima 
adopts the terms ‘formatio’ and ‘fides’ for the Arabic expressions ‘tasawwur’ and 
‘tasdiq’. In the commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas uses both sets of “Arabic” terms.34 
A good example of such use is found in the following passage where, incidentally, the 
correlation between the two operations of the intellect and a thing’s essence and esse is 
mentioned: 
[C]um sit duplex operatio intellectus: una 
quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio 
intellectus, quam Philosophus, III De 
anima, text. 21, nominat intelligentiam 
indivisibilium, quae consistit in 
apprehensione quidditatis simplicis, quae 
alio etiam nomine formatio dicitur; alia est 
quam dicunt fidem, quae consistit in 
compositione vel divisione propositionis: 
The intellect has two operations: one called 
‘imaginatio intellectus’ by some, and 
‘understanding of indivisibles’ by the 
Philosopher in De anima III, which 
consists in the apprehension of a simple 
quiddity, and which is also called 
‘formatio’ by another name; the other 
operation is called ‘fides’, which consists in 
the composition and division of 
                                                 
33
 See Benoît Garceau, Judicium: vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: 
Vrin, 1968), 104-12. On the terms ‘tasawwur’ and ‘tasdiq’ and their Latin equivalents, see also 
Harry A. Wolfson, “The Terms tasawwur and tasdiq in Arabic Philosophy and their Greek, Latin 
and Hebrew Equivalents,” The Moslem World 33 (1943). For the Arabic, and Greek, origins of 
the terms ‘formatio’ and ‘imaginatio’, see also Joseph Owens, “Judgment and Truth in Aquinas,” 
in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John R. 
Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 242n21. 
34
 See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, 
qa 1; d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, qa 2. 
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prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; 
secunda respicit esse ipsius.
35
 
propositions. The first operation regards 
the quiddity of a thing; the second regards 
its esse. 
 
If in this passage Aquinas means literally that quiddity alone, not esse, may be conceived 
in “imaginatio intellectus,” then, contrary to what Aquinas explicitly says early in the 
same commentary, the conception of ‘ens’ cannot be the first thing that falls into the 
mind (whether this is a first in time or in nature): “primum quod cadit in imaginatione 
intellectus.”36 
 
Text 2: The De veritate 
 
 
In addition to the passage from the Sentences commentary where Aquinas 
associates the conception signified by the term ‘ens’ with the first operation of the 
intellect, there is a passage from the De veritate where Aquinas refers to the sort of 
conception signified by the term ‘ens’ as simple. Aquinas writes: 
[P]raeexistunt in nobis quaedam 
scientiarum semina, scilicet primae 
conceptiones intellectus quae statim lumine 
intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per species 
a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint 
complexa sicut dignitates, sive incomplexa 
sicut ratio entis et unius, et huiusmodi quae 
statim intellectus apprehendit.
37
 
 
There pre-exist in us certain seeds of the 
‘sciences’, namely the first conceptions of 
the intellect, which are known immediately 
by the light of the agent intellect through 
the species abstracted from sensible things, 
and these [first conceptions] are either 
complex as are axioms, or simple as are the 
notions of ‘ens’, ‘unum’, and the like, 
which the intellect apprehends 
immediately. 
 
In this passage, speaking again of the primary conceptions of the intellect, Aquinas 
distinguishes between those conceptions that are complex (complexa), like the principle 
                                                 
35
 In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 489. See also De ver., q. 14, a. 1, 
Leonine ed., vol. 22, 2/2, p. 430, lines 78-82: “[U]nde etiam et apud Arabes prima intellectus 
operatio vocatur imaginatio intellectus, secunda autem vocatur fides, ut patet ex verbis 
Commentatoris in III De anima.”  
36
 See text from note 30. 
37
 De ver., q. 11, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 22, 2/1, p. 350, lines 264-72. 
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of non-contradiction, and those conceptions that are simple or non-composite 
(incomplexa), like the conceptions of ‘ens’ and ‘unum’. We have, then, in this passage an 
explicit reference on the part of Aquinas to the intellect’s conception of ‘ens’ as simple 
(incomplexa), which should be in no way surprising given Aquinas’ association in the 
commentary on the Sentences of the conception signified by the term ‘ens’ with the first 
operation of the intellect. 
 
4.1.5 Response to an Objection to a Simple Conception of ‘Ens’ in the 
Early Writings 
 
 
Against the evidence presented above for Aquinas’ early recognition of the simple 
conception of esse, it might be argued that the conception of ‘ens’ Aquinas refers to in 
the passages from the commentary on the Sentences and from the De veritate quoted 
above is not a conception of esse but a conception of essence. After all, for Aquinas, the 
term ‘ens’ also signifies essence: 
[E]sse dicitur dupliciter: uno modo 
secundum quod ens significat essentiam 
rerum prout dividitur per decem genera; 
alio modo secundum quod esse significat 
compositionem quam anima facit; et istud 
ens Philosophus [. . .] appellat verum.
38
 
 
Esse is said in two ways. In one way 
according as ens signifies the essence of 
things as divided by the ten genera. In 
another way according as esse signifies the 
composition formed by the soul; and this 
ens the Philosopher calls the true. 
I answer that ‘ens’ is said to signify essence inasmuch as it signifies esse. The term ‘ens’ 
signifies its res significata, i.e., esse, in the concrete mode; as such, it signifies the 
conception ‘what has esse’ or ‘the subject of esse’ (subiectum essendi). Thus, inasmuch 
                                                 
38
 In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 488 [the ellipses are for the reference 
to Aristotle, added by the editors]. Aquinas somewhat obscurely refers here to “being” in the 
sense of the truth of a proposition, Aristotle’s third sense in Metaphysics 5.7. See also In II Sent., 
d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; SCG II, c. 8; De pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 1. 
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as ‘the subject of esse’ is essence, ‘ens’ signifies essence.39 As Aquinas notes in the 
following parallel text, the conception of ‘ens’ is first and foremost that of “something 
existing in nature” (aliquid in natura existens): 
[E]ns multipliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo 
dicitur ens quod per decem genera 
dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in 
natura existens; sive sit substantia, ut 
homo; sive accidens, ut color. Alio modo 
dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem 
propositionis; prout dicitur quod affirmatio 
est vera, quando significat esse de eo quod 
est; et negatio, quando significat non esse 
de eo quod non est; et hoc ens 
compositionem significat, quam intellectus 
componens et dividens adinvenit. 
Quaecumque ergo dicuntur entia quantum 
ad primum modum, sunt entia quantum ad 
secundum modum: quia omne quod habet 
naturale esse in rebus, potest significari per 
propositionem affirmativam esse, ut cum 
dicitur: color est vel homo est.
40
 
 
Ens is said in many ways. For in one way 
ens is said as it is divided by the ten genera. 
And in this way ens signifies something 
existing in nature, whether it is a substance, 
like a man, or an accident, like a color. Ens 
is said in another way [to be] what signifies 
the truth of a proposition; as when it is said 
that an affirmation is true when it signifies 
‘to be’ of what is, and a negation [is true] 
when it signifies ‘not to be’ of what is not; 
and this ens signifies the composition that 
the intellect forms when it composes and 
divides. Thus, whatever is said to be ‘a 
being’ (ens) according to the first way, is 
also ‘a being’ in the second way because 
everything that has ‘physical’ being (esse) 
in things can be signified to be by an 
affirmative proposition, as when we say ‘a 
color is’ or ‘a man is’. 
 
When Aquinas says that ‘ens’ signifies essence, he does not mean that essence is the res 
significata of ‘ens’. The res significata of ‘ens’ is esse, not essence. ‘Ens’ signifies 
essence because it signifies esse in the concrete mode and thus it signifies the conception 
‘what has esse’ or ‘habens esse’. Since essence is ‘what has esse’, Aquinas says that ‘ens’ 
signifies essence. Therefore, the conception of ‘ens’ Aquinas associates in the Sentences 
with the first operation of the intellect or imaginatio and later in De veritate describes as 
simple or incomplexa is indeed a conception of esse as actus essendi. 
 
                                                 
39
 See, e.g., Quodl. II, q. 1, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 25/2, p. 214: “Set uerum est quod hoc nomen 
ens, secundum quod importat rem cui competit huiusmodi esse, sic significat essenciam rei, et 
diuiditur per decem genera.” 
40
 In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 872. ‘Physical’ being here means, not 
corporeal, but extra-mental, unlike privations. 
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4.1.6 Two Corollaries 
 
 
From the discussion above we conclude that Aquinas recognizes the simple 
conception of esse even when he maintains a correlation between the two operations of 
the intellect and the two principles of reality, essence and the esse of a thing. Two things 
may be deduced from this finding. 
 First, the apparent inconsistency between Aquinas’ commentary on the Sentences 
and his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias on the possibility of a simple 
conception of esse may not be resolved by attending to the dating of the texts in question. 
The fact that in the Sentences commentary and in De veritate Aquinas recognizes that the 
term ‘ens’ signifies a simple conception of esse rules out the possibility that in between 
the writing of his commentaries on the Sentences and on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias, 
Aquinas changed his mind on the subject of the human intellect’s apprehension of esse. 
Aquinas’ remarks of the signification of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ in the Peri hermeneias 
do not represent a new doctrine, they are in fact consistent with Aquinas’ early remarks 
on the matter.  
We are back where we started, then, with a set of conflicting texts on the subject 
of the human intellect’s apprehension of esse. On the one hand, we have Aquinas’ 
correlation between the two operations of the intellect and a thing’s essence and esse in 
the commentaries on the Sentences and on the De trinitate, which suggests the 
impossibility of a simple conception of esse. On the other hand, we have Aquinas’ 
remarks on the intellect’s conception of esse signified by the term ‘ens’ in the Sentences 
commentary and the De veritate, which reveal that Aquinas acknowledges a simple 
conception of esse. 
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Second, the fact that Aquinas recognizes a simple conception of esse while 
maintaining a correlation between the two operations of the intellect and a thing’s 
essence and esse opens up the possibility that in setting up the correlation Aquinas did 
not intend to restrict the apprehension of each principle, i.e., of essence and esse, to one 
operation alone.  
With the latter idea in mind, and in order to address the apparent inconsistency 
between texts, in the next part of the chapter I propose an alternative interpretation to In I 
Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that leaves open the possibility of a simple conception of 
esse.
41
 The alternative reading explains Aquinas’ correlation between the second 
operation of the intellect and a thing’s esse in light of the immediate textual and 
theoretical context of the passage. In the following pages, it will be shown that despite 
the affirmation in the commentary on the Sentences of a real distinction between a thing’s 
esse and its essence, together with different ways the human intellect apprehends each, it 
does not follow that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives 
essences, in a simple conception. 
 
4.2 In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: Utrum scientia Dei sit enuntiabilium 
 
 
We begin by identifying and examining the theoretical context of the discussion at 
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: the propositional theory that supplies the topic of the article. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 I have elected to concentrate on the text from In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 since this is where, to 
my estimation, Aquinas works out the correlation to the greatest extent. This is not to say, 
however, that we will not consider as well the other two texts where the correlation is mentioned, 
namely, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; and De trin., q. 5, a. 3. 
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4.2.1 Theoretical Context: Enuntiabile Theory 
 
 
The issue Aquinas addresses at I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 is whether God knows 
enuntiabilia (Utrum scientia Dei sit enuntiabilium). Now, the term ‘enuntiabile’ is a 
technical term used from the mid-twelfth century forward to designate the propositional 
complex that is the immediate object of the intellect’s act of composition and division.42 
The theory of the enuntiabile developed originally as a theory of signification for 
propositions, but as is often the case in medieval semantics, we find that the logical 
notion of the enuntiabile carried important implications in the areas of epistemology and 
ontology.
43
 
In treatises of logic from the mid-twelfth to mid-thirteenth century the term 
‘enuntiabile’ is used to designate that which is signified by a propositio or enuntiatio. It 
should be noted that in this particular context, the terms ‘enuntiatio’ and ‘propositio’ 
stand only derivatively for the written or spoken proposition and primarily for their 
mental counterpart, that is, for the “mental proposition” which the written or spoken 
                                                 
42
 For the theory of the enuntiabile I rely especially on Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the 
Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1973), 165-94. Also, Gabriel Nuchelmans, “The Semantics of Propositions,” in 
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, 
and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 195-203; Yukio Iwakuma, 
“Enuntiabilia in Twelfth-Century Logic and Theology,” in Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semiotics 
and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts, ed. Constantino Marmo et al. (Belgium: Brepols, 
1997); and Norman Kretzmann, “Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Propositio,” Journal 
of Philosophy 67 (1970). 
43
 The introduction of the term ‘enuntiabilie’ in the context of discussions regarding the 
signification of propositions is attributed to Adam of Balsham, in his Ars Disserendi, a logical 
tract written around 1132. See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 169; Iwakuma, 
“Enuntiabilia,” 19. Treatises of logic dating from the end of the twelfth century (1180-1200) 
contain a full-fledged theory of enuntiabilia. Logicians of the thirteenth century uphold the 
theory, but added very little to it. It was to be the theologians who in the thirteenth century 
continued the theoretical discussion of enuntiabilia, particularly in connection to questions 
regarding God’s knowledge and the object of faith. See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 
177; Kretzmann, “Meaning of the Propositio,” 782-83.  
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proposition signifies.
44
 The enuntiabile, then, is that which is immediately signified by a 
mental proposition. Now, although medieval logicians were aware of a distinction 
between the acts of mere predication and assertion, for many purposes the term 
‘enuntiatio’, in all its senses, was used in such a way that it holds both predicative value 
and assertoric force.
45
 Thus, a mental proposition consists not only of an act of combining 
the predicate with the subject in an affirmative or negative way, but also of an act of 
judging that what is thereby conceived is so in reality.
46
 The term ‘enuntiabile’, then, 
designates the significate of a mental proposition in the sense of that which is asserted or 
judged to be the case by a mental proposition. But, there is one more precision to make. 
The term ‘enuntiabile’, by its very form, contains a nuance of potentiality which was not 
lost on medieval logicians. In accordance with its form, then, the term ‘enuntiabile’ 
designates not only what is in fact asserted, but what is capable of being asserted.
47
 Thus, 
the enuntiabile is that which is asserted or judged to be the case by a mental proposition 
in the sense of that which “can be” asserted or judged to be the case by a mental 
proposition. 
Setting aside the semantic terminology, we may identify the enuntiabile with the 
immediate object of the intellect’s act of composition and division, that is to say, with the 
propositional complex or complexum effected in and by the intellect when it composes an 
affirmation or negation. On the other hand, given that the intellect’s act of composition 
and division is understood as carrying not only predicative value but also assertoric force, 
                                                 
44
 Nuchelmans, “Semantics of Propositions,” 198. 
45
 Ibid., 197-98. For Aquinas’ distinction between predication and assertion, see In I Sent., d. 19, 
q. 5, a. 3, ad 5 and d. 41, q. 1, a. 5; De ver., q. 1, a. 6, a. 2; q. 10, a. 10, ad 8; and q. 10, a. 12, ad 7; 
also ST I, q. 16, a. 8, ad 3. 
46
 Nuchelmans, “Semantics of Propositions,” 199. 
47
 Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 169. 
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perhaps a better characterization of the enuntiabile would be that of the immediate object 
of our individual judgments, wherein the term ‘judgment’ denotes an act of both 
predication and assertion. 
In order to differentiate the enuntiatio (judgment or mental proposition) from its 
object, the enuntiabile, logicians often phrased enuntiabilia using accusative-plus-
infinitive constructions in Latin (‘that-clauses’ in English); for instance, the enuntiatio 
‘Socrates currit’ is said to assert the enuntiabile ‘Socratem currere’ (‘that Socrates 
runs’).48 But, the distinction between the enuntiatio and the enuntiabile was not always as 
straightforward as that. In the first place, given that the enuntiabile is a propositional 
complex, consisting of the composition of subject and predicate, it has predicative value. 
To that extent, the enuntiabile is itself also an enuntiatio (although it lacks assertoric 
force). To further complicate matters, the enuntiabile is a significant expression, for it 
signs or signifies a state of affairs in reality. The perceived similarities between the 
enuntiabile and the enuntiatio led to a tendency among scholars, including Aquinas, to 
use the term ‘enuntiatio’ for the term ‘enuntiabile’.49 Under such circumstances, it would 
not be difficult for contemporary readers unfamiliar with the theory to mistake the 
enuntiabile with the mental act of which it is an object. The observation is of particular 
importance in the face of some interpretations regarding what the issue under discussion 
is at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3. The subject under discussion is not, as it has been 
                                                 
48
 Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 174-76.  
49
 On this issue, see Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 188. Nuchelmans refers to 
Bonaventure, Albert, and Aquinas for instances of the practice. Robert Schmidt has noted that in 
Aquinas whenever the term ‘enuntiatio’ is used for the term ‘enuntiabile’ the objective meaning 
of ‘enuntiatio’ is emphasized. See, Robert Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint 
Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), 223n84.  
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suggested, “whether God knows our individual judgments,”50 but rather whether God 
knows enuntiabilia, that is, whether God knows that which the human intellect knows in 
judgment. Aquinas’ remarks at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 regarding the second operation 
of the intellect and its object are thus directly framed by the theory of the enuntiabile, a 
fact that has not infrequently been overlooked by contemporary commentators. 
There are several other things we need to know about enuntiabilia before we are 
ready to approach the discussion at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: (A) the ontological status 
of enuntiabilia; (B) the doctrine of enuntiabilia as bearers of truth value; and (C) the role 
of enuntiabilia as immediate objects of knowledge and belief. 
 
A. The Ontological Status of Enuntiabilia 
 
 
Logicians thought of enuntiabilia as having their own category of being, one that 
is set apart from the ten categories distinguished by Aristotle.
51
 Not much, however, is 
said positively about their particular ontological status. For the most part, enuntiabilia are 
described more in terms of what they are not than in terms of what they are. A passage 
from the anonymous Ars Meliduna, a logical tract written around 1180, lists and rejects 
three basic opinions on the nature of enuntiabilia: (i) they are acts of human thought and 
as such properties or accidents of the intellect; (ii) they are compositions or divisions of 
things outside the mind; and (iii) they are nothing properly speaking, just manners of 
speaking.
52
 Among the positive characterizations of enuntiabilia found in the Ars 
                                                 
50
 John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 29. 
51
 Nuchelmans, “The Semantics of Propositions,” 201. 
52
 For a close study on this section of the Ars Meliduna, see Nuchelmans, Theories of the 
Proposition, 170-72; and Iwakuma, “Enuntiabilia,” 19-22. On the dating of the Ars Meliduna, see 
De Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic (Assen: 
Van Gordum, 1967) 2:280-81. 
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Meliduna and similar logical tracts, we may include the idea that enuntiabilia are 
something in between the acts of the intellect and the outside world, accessible only to 
the intellect and not to the senses.
53
 Gyula Klima is on the right track, I believe, when he 
identifies the mode of being of enuntiabilia as described by logicians with Aquinas’ 
conception of entia rationis. According to Klima, enuntiabilia should be understood as 
objects of thought formed in and by the activity of the intellect although having a 
foundation in reality; as such, enuntiabilia exist objectively in the intellect as a sort of 
complex ens rationis or mental entity.
54
 
Given the conception of enuntiabilia as entities having their own category of 
being, logicians further identified the enuntiabile as the ‘thing’ (‘res’) referred to by 
Aristotle in his formula: ‘it is because the thing is or is not that a proposition is said to be 
true or false’ (Categories 4b8, 14b21). Accordingly, enuntiabilia are taken to be the 
primary bearers of truth values.
55
 The anonymous author of the Ars Burana, dated to 
around 1200, summarizes the doctrine as follows: 
Note that whether we speak about the dictum of a proposition or of the significate 
of a proposition or of an enuntiabile it is the same. For an enuntiabile is what is 
signified by a proposition. For example: ‘a man is an animal’, this proposition is 
true, because what it signifies is true; and that true thing that you in this way 
understand is the enuntiabile, whatever it is. Similarly, when I say: ‘Socrates is an 
ass’, this proposition is false, because what it signifies is false, and the false thing 
that you conceive in this way is the enuntiabile. And this cannot be seen, nor 
heard or sensed, but it is only perceivable by the intellect. If you ask in which 
category of things it belongs, whether it is a substance or an accident, of the 
enuntiabile we have to say that it is neither a substance nor an accident nor does it 
belong to any of the categories. For it has its own peculiar mode of existence. And 
it is said to be extrapredicamental, not because it does not belong to any category, 
but because it does not belong to any of the categories distinguished by Aristotle. 
                                                 
53
 Nuchelmans, “The Semantics of Propositions,” 201. 
54
 Gyula Klima, “The Changing Role of Entia Rationis in Mediaeval Semantics and Ontology: A 
Comparative Study with a Reconstruction,” Synthese 96 no.1 (1993): 31-34.  
55
 See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 172-173 and “The Semantics of Propositions,” 
199. Also, Klima, “Entia Rationis,” 34.  
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Therefore it belongs to some category that can be called the category of 
enuntiabilia.
56
 
 
 
B. Enuntiabilia as Bearers of Truth Value 
 
 
The doctrine of enuntiabilia as bearers of truth values is vast and complex, and far 
exceeds our present concerns. This much, however, is important for us to understand in 
view of our subsequent discussion: A judgment or mental proposition has truth value 
only in a derivative sense; it has truth value insofar as it is a sign of truth, that is, insofar 
as it asserts the truth of an enuntiabile.
57
 Now, the truth value of an enuntiabile in the 
case of extra-mental objects depends on whether the state of affairs it signifies actually 
obtains in reality. In this case, according to the inherence theory of predication upheld 
among others also by Aquinas, an enuntiabile would obtain in reality if and only if the 
property signified by the predicate actually inheres (or not) in the thing denoted by the 
subject.
58
 Thus, the truth value of a judgment or mental proposition depends immediately 
on the truth value of the enuntiabile it signifies, but ultimately also on the way real things 
are. 
                                                 
56
 Quoted in the above English translation in Klima, “Entia Rationis,” 31. On the origin and 
dating of the Ars Burana, see De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, 2:397-98. 
57
 The doctrine is expressed in the formula: “Truth and falsity are in the enuntiabile as in their 
subject and in the propositio as in a sign.” See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 172. 
Aquinas need not propose a new category of being for the enuntiabilia, since they fall under one 
of the analogous senses of being, being in the sense of the truth of a proposition; all such beings 
are entia rationis. 
58
 In other words: ‘that a man is white’ is verified if and only if whiteness (the property signified 
by the predicate-term) actually inheres in the individual man who is denoted by the subject-term. 
On the inherence theory of predication, see De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, 1:37-38; also John 
Malcolm, “A Reconsideration of the Identity and Inherence Theories of the Copula,” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 17 (1979). For Aquinas, see Herman Weidemann, “The Logic of Being 
in Thomas Aquinas,” in The Logic of Being, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986). 
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According to Klima, the above would be the sense of the definition of truth as 
consisting in what Aquinas calls adaequatio intellectus et rei.
59
 The point is important for 
our purposes. The doctrine of enuntiabilia as primary bearers of truth values is an integral 
part of the theoretical background on which Aquinas’ conception of truth rests. 
According to Aquinas, the notion of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei requires, not 
that the act of judging be equated to the thing known, but that what the intellect says or 
knows in judgment be equated to the thing.
60
 Hence, the primary bearer of truth value is 
the immediate object of the intellect’s act of judging or asserting, that is to say, an 
enuntiabile. Truth is found primarily in the enuntiabile or propositional composition 
effected by the intellect, for this alone conforms immediately to reality.
61
 But, truth is 
found also in a derivative sense in the act of judging, for a judgment or mental 
proposition says or asserts truth – i.e., the truth of its immediate object, the enuntiabile.62 
This is what Aquinas has in mind when he distinguishes between “being true” and 
“saying or knowing truth.”63 Hence, when Aquinas says that the intellect judges when it 
says ‘to be’ of the thing that ‘is’ or ‘not to be’ of the thing that ‘is not’, the thing that is or 
                                                 
59
 Klima, “Entia Rationis,” 35-36. 
60
 See SCG I, c. 59, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 167: “Cum enim veritas intellectus sit adaequatio 
intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est, ad illud 
in intellectu veritas pertinet quod intellectus dicit, non ad operationem qua illud dicit. Non enim 
ad veritatem intellectus exigitur ut ipsum intelligere rei aequetur, cum res interdum sit materialis, 
intelligere vero immateriale: sed illud quod intellectus intelligendo dicit et cognoscit, oportet esse 
rei aequatum, ut scilicet ita sit in re sicut intellectus dicit.” 
61
 How this is so will become clearer once we discuss in more detail Aquinas’ inherence theory of 
predication later in this section. 
62
 Truth is found in the external thing as well in so far as it is the cause of truth in the intellect. 
See, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 486: “[V]erum per prius dicitur de 
veritate intellectus, et de enuntiatione dicitur inquantum est signum illus veritatis: de re autem 
dicitur, inquantum est causa;” and In I Periher., lect. 7, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 36, lines: 
“Dicitur autem in enunciatione esse uerum uel falsum sicut in signo intellectus ueri uel falsi; set 
sicut in subiecto est uerum uel falsum in mente . . . in re autem sicut in causa.” 
63
 In I Periher., lect. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 15, lines 99-102: “[U]eritas in aliquo inuenitur 
dupliciter: uno modo sicut in eo quod est uerum; alio modo sicut in dicente uel cognoscente 
uerum;” also In I Periher., lect. 3, lines 149-80; ST I, q. 16, a. 2; and De ver., q. 1, a. 9.  
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is not is not a real thing but an enuntiabile and the sense of ‘to be’ or ‘is’ is not that of 
real being but of truth.
64
  
We should also notice that although the enuntiabile is what immediately conforms 
to reality and what is true in a primary sense, the notion or ratio of truth as adaequatio 
intellectus et rei is fully realized not in the enuntiabile as such but in the act of judging, 
that is, in judgment (the judgment that ‘that x is’ is true). The reason is that equation 
implies comparison of two items and it is only when the intellect says or knows its 
conformity to reality that the equation between intellect and thing is completed.
65
 Perhaps 
the best way to make sense of these last remarks is to remember that the intellect’s act of 
judging is both an act of predication and assertion. It is through one and the same act that 
the enuntiabile is effected in and asserted to be the case by the intellect. Thus, through 
one and the same act of composition and assertion (i.e. through judgment) the intellect 
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 See, In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 872: “Alio modo dicitur ens, quod 
significat veritatem propositionis; prout dicitur quod affirmatio est vera, quando significat esse de 
eo quod est; et negatio, quando significat non esse de eo quod non est; et hoc ens compositionem 
significat, quam intellectus componens et dividens adinvenit;” and In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 895, 
Marietti ed., p. 239: “Ponit [Aristotle] alium modum entis, secundum quod esse et est, significant 
compositionem propositionis, quam facit intellectus componens et dividens. Unde dicit, quod esse 
significat veritatem rei. Velut sicut alia translatio melius habet «quod esse significat» quia aliquod 
dictum est verum. Unde veritas propositionis potest dici veritas rei per causam. Nam ex eo quod 
res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, significamus 
propositionem esse veram. Et cum dicimus non esse, significamus non esse veram.” Notice that 
this doctrine could give rise to the objection that all that Aquinas ever means by ‘esse rei’ in his 
theory of the proposition is “propositional being”, as Régis suggests; see also the texts at notes 
38, 40 and 90. The inadequacy of this (initially compelling) objection will emerge in Aquinas’ 
texts throughout the rest of this chapter. 
65
 At different places, Aquinas notes that under the definition of truth in terms of conformity to 
reality, truth is present in both sense perception and the first operation of the intellect, for there is 
a likeness to reality in both the sense and the intellect in its first operation. But neither sense nor 
the intellect in its first operation knows its conformity to reality. The latter is possible only in 
judgment; it is something that belongs only to the second operation of the intellect and its act. See 
De ver. q. 1, a. 2 and a. 9; ST I, q. 16, a. 2; and In I Periher., lect. 3, lines 149-80. 
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both brings about and knows its own conformity to reality in the completed judgment of 
truth.
66
 
 
C. Enuntiabilia as Objects of Knowledge and Belief 
 
 
The last thing we need to know about the theory of the enuntiabile concerns the 
role of enuntiabilia as immediate objects of knowledge and belief. It was generally 
recognized in medieval logic and grammar that epistemic verbs, such as ‘to know’ (scire) 
and ‘to believe’ (credere), could not have as their immediate objects single terms but 
require an oratio infinitiva (i.e. a ‘that-clause’ in English) as their complement. The 
reason behind such requirement was thought to be the fact that acts of knowing and 
believing are accompanied by assent. We know and believe something to be true or false. 
To that extent, acts of knowing and believing were identified as acts of judgment. From 
there it was only a small step to identify the immediate object of acts of believing and 
knowing, i.e. what is known or believed (the creditum or the scitum), with an 
enuntiabile.
67
  
Throughout the twelfth and thirteenth century, theologians made ample use of the 
notion of enuntiabilia (also referred to as complexa) as objects of acts of believing and 
knowing, particularly in the context of certain difficulties regarding God’s knowledge 
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 See, In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1236, Marietti ed., p. 311: “[I]n hac sola secunda operatione 
intellectus est veritas et falsitas, secundum quam non solum intellectus habet similitudinem rei 
intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam similitudinem reflectitur, cognoscendo et diiudicando ipsam.” 
That only one act is involved is suggested also in the following text, In I Periher., lect. 3, Leonine 
ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 17, lines 170-72: “[I]ntellectus non cognoscit ueritatem nisi componendo uel 
diuidendo per suum iudicium.” 
67
 See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 179, 184. Also, Kretzmann, “Meaning of the 
Propositio,” 779-80. 
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and the articles of faith.
68
 Aquinas, for example, when dealing with the specific issue of 
the identity or unity of the object faith in the third book of the commentary on the 
Sentences, identifies the object of faith with an enuntiabile or complexum.
69
 Following on 
Augustine’s definition of faith as thinking with assent (credere est cum assensione 
cognitare), Aquinas concludes that the object of faith is a verum complexum.
70
 He 
remarks that such is the case is further evidenced by the fact that “some philosophers” 
called the act of the intellect by which it composes and divides ‘fides’.71 As we 
mentioned before, in Latin translations of Avicenna and Averroes, the terms ‘credulitas’ 
and ‘fides’ were used to translate the Arabic ‘tasdiq’, which was the term used by Arabic 
philosophers to refer to the intellect’s act of composition and division as distinguished by 
Aristotle in De Anima. Aquinas’ association between enuntiabilia and ‘fides’ provides 
evidence that Aquinas adheres to the standard notion of enuntiabilia as immediate objects 
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 For a summary of the difficulties and a survey of the main positions held by twelfth and 
thirteenth-century theologians on the issues, see Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 177-
89. 
69
 See the discussion at In III Sent., d. 24, a. 1, qc. 1 and qc. 2. The issue Aquinas addresses here 
relates to the problem of how to maintain the identity of the object of faith in the face of the 
different ways in which the same event (e.g. the nativity of Christ) is linguistically expressed by 
believers through the passing of time. Abraham, who believed ‘that Christ will be born’, and later 
Christians who believe ‘that Christ was born’ do not appear to share the same object of faith. 
Aquinas’ answer to the difficulty in the Sentence is that although Abraham and later Christians 
believe diverse enuntiabilia, they nonetheless share the same object of faith for they believe the 
same truth. The proper object of faith, Aquinas argues, concerns not the “matter” of the 
enuntiabile but the “form” of the enuntiabile which is truth (In III Sent., d. 24, a. 1, qc. 1, sol. and 
ad 3). 
70
 See In III Sent., d. 24, a. 1, qc. 2, sol., Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 763: “[S]icut Augustinus dicit, 
(De Praedest. Sanctor., c. 2, n. 5; L. 44, 963) credere est cum assentione cognitare. Assentire 
autem non potest aliquid nisi ei quod verum est. Veritas autem non consistit nisi in complexione 
vel intellectuum vel vocum. Et ideo fidei objectum oportet quod sit verum complexum;” also the 
ad 3 (Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 764): “Objectum autem fidei est verum, quod completur per 
operationem anime. Et quia compositio et divisio quae est in enuntiabilibus, non est nisi per 
animam; ideo complexum est objectum fidei.” For the twelfth-century background, see William 
Courtenay, Ockham and Ockhamism: Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought 
(Brill, 2008) 24-26, 39-80. 
71
 See In III Sent., d. 24, a. 1, qc. 2, sol., Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 763: “Et hoc patet per hoc quod 
quidam philosophi illam operationem intellectum qua componit et dividi, appellaverunt fidem.” 
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of the intellect’s act of composition and division, that is, as immediate objects of 
judgments. In addition, we should observe that Aquinas refers to the enuntiabile as 
‘complexum’ and as ‘verum complexum’, a practice that is consistent with the traditional 
interpretation of enuntiabilia. 
We are ready now to turn our attention to the discussion at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 
3. As we indicated earlier, the issue Aquinas addresses here is whether God knows 
enuntiabilia, or, better yet, whether enuntiabilia are objects of God’s knowledge. I begin 
by reviewing Aquinas’ answer to the question of the article, that is, God’s knowledge of 
enuntiabilia. Next, I consider what the discussion at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 tells us 
about human being’s knowledge of enuntiabilia. 
 
4.2.2 God’s Knowledge of Enuntiabilia: An Exegesis of In I Sent., d. 38, 
q. 1, a. 3 
 
 
The problem with making enuntiabilia objects of God’s knowledge rests on the 
fact that the notion of enuntiabilia seems to entail a manner of cognition that does not 
belong to God. Enuntiabilia are the complex objects of the human intellect’s act of 
composition and division; as such, they entail a manner of cognition that is essentially 
complex. Unlike the human intellect, the divine intellect is ontologically simple and does 
not admit any sort of extra-mental composition. It would appear, then, that enuntiabilia 
cannot be objects of God’s knowledge. Yet, as Aquinas notes in the sed contra, one 
cannot deny God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia without admitting to an impossible 
deficiency in God’s knowledge with respect to ours: God would not know what we know. 
The challenge, then, is how to maintain God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia without at the 
same time compromising God’s simple manner of cognition.  
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Let’s see, then, how Aquinas answers the challenge of explaining how it is 
possible for God to know enuntiabilia in a simple understanding. In the corpus of the 
article, Aquinas writes: 
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse 
ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio 
intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis 
formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates 
rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De 
anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. 
Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, 
componendo affirmationem, quia etiam 
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a 
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in 
quadam compositione formae ad materiam, 
vel accidentis ad subjectum. Similiter etiam 
in ipso Deo est considerare naturam ipsius, 
et esse ejus; et sicut natura sua est causa et 
exemplar omnis naturae, ita etiam esse 
suum est causa et exemplar omnis esse. 
Unde sicut cognoscendo essentiam suam, 
cognoscit omnem rem; ita cognoscendo 
esse suum, cognoscit esse cujuslibet rei; et 
sic cognoscit omnia enuntiabilia, quibus 
esse significatur; non tamen diversa 
operatione nec compositione, sed 
simpliciter; quia esse suum non est aliud ab 
essentia, nec est compositum consequens.
72
 
 
Since there are two [components] in a 
thing, the quiddity of the thing and its esse, 
a twofold operation of the intellect 
corresponds to these two. One is called 
“formation” by philosophers, by which the 
intellect apprehends the quiddities of 
things, which is also called by the 
Philosopher, in De anima III, the 
“understanding of indivisibles.” But the 
other comprehends the esse of a thing by 
composing an affirmation, because also the 
esse of a thing composed of matter and 
form, from which the intellect receives 
cognition, subsists (consistit)
73
 in a certain 
composition of form with matter or of 
accident with subject. Similarly, in God 
himself it is possible to consider his nature 
and his esse; and just as his nature is cause 
and exemplar of every nature, so also his 
esse is cause and exemplar of every esse. 
Thus, just as by knowing his own essence 
God knows each thing (res), so also by 
knowing his own esse, he knows the esse 
of each thing; and thus he knows all 
enuntiabilia by which esse is signified; 
although without diversity of operation or 
composition, but simply, because his esse 
is not other than his essence, nor is it the 
result a composite. 
 
As we examine this passage, I want to call attention to the theme of simplicity and 
complexity running through it.  
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 In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903-904. 
73
 In presenting Régis, I translated ‘consistit’ as ‘consists’, as fits his position, and as is frequently 
a suitable translation, including in the Sentences commentary (see at notes 35 and 84). 
Nevertheless, as Lewis and Short amply attests, ‘consistit’ commonly is synonymous with 
‘subsists’, which I prefer to ‘stands together in’. That this must be the case here is clear if esse 
signifies, as it does, the actus essendi. We shall find confirmation for this in parallel texts 
throughout Section 4.2. 
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Aquinas begins by appealing to the ontological composition of essence and esse 
within a thing.
74
 He then observes that a twofold operation of the intellect corresponds to 
these two components. In a first operation, which Aquinas observes is called by Aristotle 
in De Anima III “understanding of indivisibles” (indivisibilium intelligentia), the intellect 
“apprehends (apprehendit) the quiddities of things (quidditates rerum).” The first 
operation of the intellect, then, regards something “indivisible,” that is, something simple 
or non-composite, as the quiddities of things are. Now, in a second operation, the intellect 
“comprehends (comprehendit) the esse of a thing (esse rei, not the indivisible term ‘esse’) 
by composing an affirmation.” There are two things to observe here. First, the use of 
“comprehendit” for the second operation of the intellect, in contrast to the use of 
“apprehendit” for the first operation, conveys the complexity of understanding of the 
second operation, which is not to be found in the first operation. Second, the complexity 
of the second operation is propositional: the intellect comprehends the esse of a thing 
(esse rei) by composing an affirmation. In the subsequent lines, Aquinas remarks on the 
composite character of the object of the second operation of the intellect. He observes 
that the thing whose esse the intellect comprehends by composing an affirmation is 
“composed of matter and form” (ex materia et forma compositae), and that the esse itself 
of the composite thing “subsists (consistit) in a certain composition of form with matter 
or of accident with subject.” Again, the verbs with the ‘con-’ prefix highlight 
composition, which is found ontologically in creatures, epistemologically in humans’ 
composite comprehension of creature, and semantically in the composite expression of 
truth. 
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 For an earlier affirmation of the essence-esse composition, see In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 1 and a. 
2. 
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 The above remarks on human cognition are preparatory for Aquinas’ final answer 
to the question of the article: whether enuntiabilia are objects of God’s knowledge.  
Aquinas begins by remarking that in God, too, one may consider his nature and 
his esse. He observes that, God’s nature is “cause and exemplar” of every nature; thus, 
knowing his essence, God knows each thing or res (just as we know essences in our 
simple ‘understanding of indivisibles’). Likewise, God’s esse is “cause and exemplar” of 
every esse; thus, knowing his esse, God knows “the esse of each thing” (esse cujuslibet 
rei). In this manner, then, Aquinas concludes, God knows “all enuntiabilia by which esse 
is signified” although not by means of composition, but simply, because God’s esse, 
which is not other than his essence, is simple. Notice that the implication here is that 
enuntiabilia signify “esse cujuslibet rei,” and that earlier in the text Aquinas has 
identified “esse rei” as that which the human intellect apprehends in its second operation 
by means of composition, i.e., by composing an affirmation. Hence, whereas God knows 
“esse rei” simply, the human intellect knows “esse rei” by means of composition. 
The response to the second objection, which explicitly remarks on the composite 
understanding implied in the conception of enuntiabilia,
75
 contains a condensed version 
of the argument in the corpus. Aquinas writes: 
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ipsum esse 
divinum quod est simplex, est exemplar 
omnis esse compositi quod in creatura est; 
et ideo per esse suum simplex cognoscit 
sine compositione intellectuum vel 
divisione omne esse vel non esse quod rei 
convenit. Sed intellectus noster, cujus 
cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse 
[T]he divine esse itself, which is simple, is 
the exemplar of every composite esse that 
is in the creature; and for this reason 
through his own simple esse [God] knows 
without composition or division of 
intellections every esse or non esse that 
belongs to a thing. But our intellect, whose 
cognition arises from things that have 
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 See In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 902: “Praeterea ut dicitur in III 
De anima, text. 21, quando intellectus intelligit affirmationem et negationem, fit quaedam 
compositio intellectuum. Sed in divino intellectus nulla est compositio. Ergo enuntiabilia non 
cognoscit.” 
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compositum habent, non apprehendit illud 
esse nisi componendo et dividendo.
76
 
 
composite esse, apprehends this esse only 
by composing and dividing.  
Once again, I call attention to the recurrent theme of simplicity and complexity. 
God’s esse is simple (simplex), and since God’s esse is exemplar of “all composite esse 
(omnis esse compositi) that is in the creature,” it follows that knowing his simple esse, 
God knows without composition or division “every esse or non esse that belongs to a 
thing.”77 As we may see, up to now Aquinas used esse rei to refer to the object of 
affirmative enunciations (compositions) known by God. But now, in case we had any 
doubt, he includes as well enunciations about non-esse (negations or ‘divisions’). God, no 
less than humans through an ontologically complex judgment (the second act of the 
intellect), knows also negative complexa or enuntiabilia, through God’s esse as their 
exemplar cause.
78
  
Finally, Aquinas ends the response with some remarks on the human cognition, 
which are a reminiscent of what he said in the corpus of the article. He observes that, 
unlike what is the case in God, who is simple, our cognition arises from things that have 
“composite esse” (esse compositum), and thus we can only apprehend such composite 
esse by composing and dividing. Notice the theme: our composite mode of knowing 
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 In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 904. 
77
 Here, “esse” and “non esse” is not real being and non-being. Aquinas has in mind either 
composition and division, or truth and falsity. See In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 
2, p. 873: “Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis; prout dicitur, quod 
affirmatio est vera, quando significat esse de eo quod est; et negatio, quando significat non esse 
de eo quod non est; et hoc ens compositionem significat, quam intellectus componens et dividens 
adinvenit.” Given the context of the discussion, though, I would argue that Aquinas has in mind, 
not truth, but the propositional composition of the intellect, hence, enuntiabilia in general. Thus, 
when Aquinas says that God knows “every esse or non esse that belongs to a thing,” he means 
that God knows “every enuntiabilia.” Negative enuntiabilia are verified through affirmative, and 
hence through esse rei. 
78
 Note that the use of non esse might make one think that Aquinas has in mind esse rei as a being 
of reason or as signifying the ‘truth of a proposition’; but ‘esse’ both in creatures and God refers 
to the actus essendi as opposed to their essence. 
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composite esse rei corresponds to the composite, creaturely mode of being, whereas 
God’s simple mode of knowing composite esse rei corresponds to his simple mode of 
being. Modes of signifying or predicating composites correspond to modes of knowing 
and being, which latter modes are diverse in God and creatures. Aquinas’ answer to the 
question of the possibility of God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia in the two passages quoted 
above may be summarized as follows: God’s esse, which is simple, is cause and exemplar 
of all composite esse. Therefore, knowing his own simple esse, God knows without 
composition or division, but simply, “the esse of each thing;” thus, God knows “all 
enuntiabilia by which esse is signified” in a simple understanding.79 God knows 
enuntiabilia, and that which enuntiabilia signify (esse rei), in a simple act, by knowing 
his simple esse that is their cause. For a full understanding of the doctrine, we would have 
to recall that just as all creaturely essences are limited participations in God’s essence, so 
the complex enuntiabilia (and the complex esse rei) that concern those essences are 
effects and likenesses of the divine esse.
80
 Notice, however, that although the divine 
essence accounts for God’s knowledge of simple essence, Aquinas does not regard the 
divine essence as sufficient to account for the God’s knowledge of complexes. To 
account for the latter, he appeals to the divine esse (although it is identical in reality to, 
even if conceptually distinct from, the divine essence). The esse Dei, as the (conceptually 
distinct) act by which the divine essence exists, is the exemplar cause of the esse rei, the 
object of enuntiabilia. This account would not be necessary if esse were taken as simple 
(versus the composite esse rei) and therefore as explained in the same way as God knows 
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 See In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903: “[. . .] cognoscendo esse suum, 
cognoscit esse cujuslibet rei; et sic cognoscit omnia enuntiabilia, quibus esse significatur.” 
80
 On divine ideas, see, for example, Vivian Boland, Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas 
Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Gregory Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine 
Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008). 
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all simples, through his simple essence. And, the account of complex enuntiabilia would 
not succeed were Aquinas affirming that only simple esse is known in judgment, not esse 
rei.  
In sum, we can draw some initial conclusions for how to read In I Sent., d. 38, q. 
1, a. 3, given Aquinas’ theory of enuntiabilia. Whatever “esse rei” means in the crucial 
text, it cannot be the simple esse or actus essendi, as if that by itself is only grasped in the 
second operation of the intellect. It must mean something at least as complex as a 
proposition and its immediate object, the enuntiabile, is complex. Notice, however, that 
we cannot yet rule out the possibility that what Aquinas has in mind, though he 
misexpresses himself (and so, later drops the doctrine), is merely propositional being, as 
Régis suggests. Let us explore what positively Aquinas may mean by examining human 
knowledge of enuntiabilia. 
 
4.2.3 Human Knowledge of Enuntiabilia 
 
 
As we indicated earlier, Aquinas identifies that which enuntiabilia signify as the 
esse of each thing or esse rei. This is consistent with Aquinas’ correlation in the 
commentary on the Sentences between esse rei and the second operation of the intellect.
81
 
Now, we have seen that enuntiabilia are identified as the immediate objects of the 
intellect’s act of composition and division.82 Since, according to Aquinas, enuntiabilia 
signify the esse of a thing, it follows that by means of enuntiabilia the human intellect 
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 See In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903: “Alia [i.e. operatio secunda] 
autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem;” In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Mandonnet 
ed., vol. 1, p. 486: “[E]t in ipsa operatione intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per quamdam 
similationem ad ipsum;” and the ad 7 (Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 489): “[P]rima operatio respicit 
quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius.” 
82
 See the discussion in section 4.2.1 above. 
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knows in its second operation the esse of a thing or esse rei. We should also notice that 
later in the commentary on the Sentences Aquinas identifies the esse of a thing or esse rei 
as the cause of truth of enuntiabilia: “[V]eritas enuntiabilis causetur ab esse rei.”83 
Furthermore, twice in the Sentences commentary Aquinas identifies esse rei as the 
foundation and cause of truth in the intellect: 
Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum 
esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis 
quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab 
esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione 
intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per 
quamdam similationem ad ipsum, 
completur relatio adaequationis, in qua 
consistit ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod 
ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum 
quod est in cognitione intellectus.
84
 
 
Since in a thing there is its essence and its 
esse, truth is founded on the esse of a thing 
more than on its essence, just as the term 
‘ens’ is imposed from esse [more than 
essence]. And in the operation of the 
intellect that receives the esse of a thing 
just as it is through a certain likeness to 
itself, the relation of adequation is 
completed, in which relation the notion of 
truth consists. Thus I say that the esse of a 
thing is the cause of truth according as it is 
in the cognition of the intellect. 
 
Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae; 
sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est 
animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est 
operatio, sed actus primus. Tertio modo 
dicitur esse quod significat veritatem 
compositionis in propositionibus, 
secundum quod «est» dicitur copula: et 
secundum hoc est in intellectu componente 
et dividente quantum ad sui 
complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, 
quod est actus essentiae, sicut supra de 
veritate dictum est.
85
 
 
In another way, esse is said to be the very 
act of an essence; as ‘to live’, which is ‘to 
be alive’, is the act of the soul, not its 
second act or operation, but its first act. In 
a third way, esse is said to signify the truth 
of the composition in propositions, 
according to which ‘est’ is said the copula. 
And in this sense, [esse] is in the intellect 
composing and dividing as its complement, 
but it is founded in the esse of a thing, 
which is the act of an essence, just as truth 
was said to be earlier. 
How are we to understand the expression “esse rei” as Aquinas uses it in this context? 
What does the expression “esse rei” stand for in reality when used to designate that 
which enuntiabilia signify? 
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 In I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 976. 
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 In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 486. 
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 In I Sent., d. 33, q.1, a.1 ad 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 766. 
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The Standard Interpretation. The mainstream interpretation of the expression 
“esse rei” focuses on esse alone. The reference to a thing (“rei”) would be incidental: in 
reality all esse is found as received and limited by the essence it actualizes and, in this 
sense, as pertaining to ‘a thing’. But the real composition of esse and essence within a 
thing would not be what Aquinas has in mind as the ultimate object of the second 
operation. That which we know in a composite understanding by means of enuntiabilia is 
esse taken by itself and, as it were, as “abstracted” or “separated” from the essence it 
actualizes and with which it enters into composition. Aquinas’ reference to the real 
distinction between essence and esse within creatures coupled with the subsequent 
correlation of essence with the first operation of the intellect, arguably give credit to the 
claim in the standard interpretation that the expression “esse rei” as signified by 
enuntiabilia stands for esse taken apart from any composition in reality, notably, apart 
from the composition with essence. In other words, according to the standard 
interpretation of “esse rei” in In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, nothing but esse is grasped in the 
second operation of the intellect. Since esse considered in itself constitutes one absolute 
object, it follows that that which enuntiabilia signify in reality is a simple or non-
composite object, i.e. an incomplexum. 
Response to the Standard Interpretation. The problem with the interpretation of 
the expression “esse rei” as referring to esse considered in itself is that it disregards the 
relevant theoretical context of the discussion, namely, the theory of enuntiabilia. As we 
are about to see, although that which the human intellect knows in its second operation by 
means of enuntiabilia constitutes one single object, such single object is by no means 
simple (unum simplex). For, how could something which is intrinsically composed, i.e., 
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an enuntiabile, be ‘equated to’ something which lacks composition, the simple actus 
essendi? Enuntiabilia, we might recall, are the primary bearers of truth values. If 
Aquinas’ conception of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei is to be legitimate, that 
which corresponds ex parte rei to the composition of enuntiabilia must be something 
equally complex or composed (unum complexum). Thus, if “esse rei” is that which 
enuntiabilia signify in reality, then the expression “esse rei” cannot stand for simple or 
non-composite esse by itself, that is, esse considered apart from any subject in reality, of 
which it is affirmed in a way that yields a truth value. What is it, then, that enuntiabilia 
signify in reality? What does the human intellect know by means of enuntiabilia in its 
second operation? 
An Alternative Interpretation. Notice that Régis raises for us an alternative to 
what has become the standard interpretation: ‘esse rei’ signifies propositional being, 
being in the sense of the truth of the proposition. But in the texts I have translated 
immediately above,
86
 one can already see the inadequacy of this alternative 
interpretation: there, propositional being is clearly said to be other than and founded on 
esse rei. Still, this is a puzzling doctrine: are all propositions about the existence of 
things, that is to say, are all propositions existential? Existential propositions, if anything, 
seem to be less paradigmatic than propositions that affirm accident of subject, or form of 
matter, which latter are mentioned in In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 itself and in other 
parallels in the early works and throughout the corpus. What, then, can Aquinas mean by 
this doctrine of esse rei and what, if any, is its justification?  
The answer to these questions rests on Aquinas’ theory of predication. Before we 
can determine what the expression “esse rei” stands for when used to designate that 
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which enuntiabilia signify, we need to determine first what it is that, for Aquinas, the 
intellect conceives in the composition of enuntiabilia, that is to say, in the composition of 
subject and predicate. In the following sections, then, I review the main tenants of 
Aquinas’ theory of predication. Next, I answer the question, what does “esse rei” as 
signified by enuntiabilia stand for in reality? Finally, I return to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 
and address the apparent inconsistency between, on the one hand, the semantics of the 
commentary on the Peri hermeneias, where Aquinas explicitly recognizes a simple 
conception of esse, and, on the other hand, the correlation in the commentaries on the 
Sentences and on Boethius’ De trinitate between the second operation of the intellect and 
‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’, which correlation has traditionally suggested the 
impossibility of a simple conception of esse. 
 
4.2.4 The Inherence Theory of Predication in Aquinas 
 
 
A. Copulative Propositions 
 
 
According to the inherence theory of predication upheld by Aquinas,
87
 the 
composition of subject and predicate produced in and by the intellect is a sign of the 
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 See In III Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 3 expositio, Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 210: “Et dicendum, quod 
differentia est inter nomina substantiva et adjectiva. Substantiva enim significant non tantum 
formam, sed etiam suppositum formae, unde possunt praedicari ratione utriusque. Et quando 
praedicantur ratione suppositi, dicitur praedicatio per identitatem. Quando autem ratione formae, 
dicitur per denominationem, sive informationem. Et haec est magis propria praedicatio, quia 
termini in praedicato tenentur formaliter. Adjectiva autem tantum significant formam. Et ideo non 
possunt praedicari, nisi per informationem;” and ST I, q. 13, a. 12, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 164: 
“[I]n qualibet propositione affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent 
idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et hoc patet tam in 
propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato 
substantiali. Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et differunt ratione, 
alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi. Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim 
ipsum quod est homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura sensibilis, a qua 
dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt 
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inherence (inesse) of the predicate in the subject.
88
 More precisely, at least in the 
paradigm case,
89
 an enuntiabile signifies or is a sign of the inherence in reality of the 
“form” signified by the predicate-term in the “thing” denoted by the subject-term.90 As 
Aquinas writes: 
[I]n omni propositione [intellectus noster] 
aliquam formam significatam per 
praedicatum, vel applicat [intellectus] 
alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel 
removet ab ea.
91
 
[I]n every proposition [our intellect] either 
applies a form signified by the predicate to 
a thing signified by the subject, or it 
removes it from it. 
                                                                                                                                                 
idem supposito, sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem praedicatur de 
seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad 
partem suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam formae in supposito 
existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. 
Huic vero diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas praedicati et subiecti, 
identitatem vero rei significat intellectus per ipsam compositionem.” 
88
 See e.g. In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223, Marietti ed., p. 309: “Dicitur autem hic affirmatio 
compositio, quia significat praedicatum inesse subiecto;” and In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., 
vol. 1*/1, p. 27, lines 108-13): [Q]uia subiectum enunciationis significatur ut cui inheret aliquid, 
cum uerbum significet actionem per modum actionis, de cuius ratione est ut inhereat, semper 
ponitur ex parte predicati, nunquam autem ex parte subiecti, nisi sumatur in ui nominis.”  
89
 Medieval scholars make use of “paradigm cases” to convey a general doctrine; secondary cases 
do not fit the paradigm perfectly, but may be understood in light of it. One does not find in logical 
treatises, for instance, a set of “semantic rules” that apply absolutely and unequivocally to all 
cases, as in Carnap, although such rules can be formulated. See Gyula Klima, “The Semantic 
Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Being,” Medieval Philosophy and 
Theology 5 (1996): 87-88. 
90
 Since for Aquinas “negatio reducitur ad genus affirmationis” (In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3; ST I, 
q. 33, a. 4, ad 3), in the following pages I will concentrate on Aquinas’ analysis of affirmative 
propositions. Negations or affirmations of privation can be understood mutatis mutandis against 
affirmative paradigm cases. See also, in addition to the text at note 40, In II Sent., d. 37, q.1, a. 2, 
ad 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 947: “[D]icendum, quod, ut supra dictum est, ens dicitur 
dupliciter. Uno modo quod significat essentiam rei extra animam existentis; et hoc modo non 
potest dici ens deformitas peccati, quae privatio quaedam est: privationes enim essentiam non 
habent in rerum natura. Alio modo secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis; et sic 
deformitas dicitur esse, non propter hoc quod in re esse habeat, sed quia intellectus componit 
privationem cum subjecto, sicut formam quamdam. Unde sicut ex compositione formae ad 
subjectum vel ad materiam, relinquitur quoddam esse substantiale vel accidentale; ita etiam 
intellectus compositionem privationis cum subjecto per quoddam esse significat. Sed hoc esse 
non est nisi esse rationis, cum in re potius sit non esse; et secundum hoc quod in ratione esse 
habet, constat quod a Deo est.” Notice that according to this text, God, as cause of all esse, is also 
the cause of esse rationis of privations. 
91
 ST I, q. 16, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 208. See also SCG II, c. 96, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 572, 
lines 31-37B), where Aquinas writes of the intellect: “Intelligit enim quod quid est abstrahendo 
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For Aquinas, the logical composition of subject and predicate does not consist of the 
synthesis of two concepts, as if the proposition ‘a man is white’ were to be equal to the 
phrase ‘a white man’.92 The intellect’s composition of subject and predicate must be 
interpreted instead as consisting of the application or attribution of a “concept” to an 
individual thing, that is to say, of the attribution of the intelligible content signified by the 
predicate-term to the thing denoted by the subject-term. Accordingly, under the 
framework of the inherence theory of predication, the subject and predicate terms have 
very different roles. A term placed in the subject position represents what it “stands for,” 
that is, the subject it supposits for. Properly speaking, then, the subject-term does not 
signify (significat) but supposits (supposit). A term placed in the predicate position, on 
the other hand, represents what it signifies, that is, a form or act as conceived by the 
intellect in a concept or simple conception.
93
 This is what Aquinas has in mind when he 
states that, in a proposition, the subject-term is taken “materially” whereas the predicate-
term is taken “formally.”94 
From above, it follows that in the composition of enuntiabilia the intellect 
conceives and asserts to be the case the inherence (inesse) of some form or act in a 
subject or supposit. Now, the inherence of a form or act in a subject or supposit is nothing 
                                                                                                                                                 
intelligibilia a sensibilium . . . Componit autem aut dividit applicando intelligibilia prius abstracta 
ad res.” 
92
 For an example of an interpretation of the immediate object of judgment as a composition or 
synthesis of concepts, see Louis-Marie Régis, Epistemology, 312-313, 322-331. 
93
 See e.g. ST III, q. 16, a. 9, ad 3, Leonine ed., vol. 11, p. 213: “[N]omen . . . secundum quod 
ponitur in subiecto, tenetur pro supposito, secundum autem quod ponitur in praedicato refertur ad 
naturam.” On the role of the subject and predicate terms in Aquinas, see Ambrose McNicholl, 
“On Judging Existence,” The Thomist 43 (1979): 530-42. For a more general discussion, see Peter 
Geach, Reference and Generality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), 22-44. 
94
 See In I Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 2; In III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 5, ad 5; d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3 and q. 2, a. 1, 
ad 7; d. 11, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; ST I, q. 13, a. 12; q. 31, a. 3, ad 2; ST III, q. 16, a. 7, ad 4; q. 16, a. 9 
co. and ad 3, q. 17, a. 1, ad 3; In IX Meta., lect. 11, n. 1898.  
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but the actuality or actual existence of that form or act in the subject. This is why Aquinas 
remarks that when we wish to signify the inherence of some form or act, whether 
substantial or accidental, in a subject, we do so by means of the verb ‘is’ which signifies 
‘being in act’ (esse actu): 
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ . . . significat enim id 
quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum 
actualitatis absolute; nam ‘est’ simpliciter 
dictum significat esse actu, et ideo 
significat per modum uerbi. Quia uero 
actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc 
uerbum ‘est’, est communiter actualitas 
omnis forme uel actus, substancialis uel 
accidentalis, inde est quod, cum uolumus 
significare quamcumque formam uel actum 
actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, 
significamus illud per hoc uerbum ‘est’.95 
 
[T]he verb ‘is’ . . . signifies that which first 
falls into the intellect in the mode of 
actuality absolutely; for ‘is’ simply said 
signifies being in act, and thus it signifies 
in the mode of a verb. But because the 
actuality that is principally signified by the 
verb ‘is’ is, in common, the actuality of 
every form or act, whether substantial or 
accidental, it follows that when we wish to 
signify that some form or act is actually in 
some subject, we signify this by means of 
the verb ‘is’. 
 
For Aquinas, then, the role of the verb ‘is’ as copula is not merely that of joining together 
the subject and predicate terms. The verbal copula is adjacent to the predicate-term, so 
that it is in fact part of the predicate.
96
 The copulative role of the verb ‘is’ as adjacent to 
the predicate-term is to signify the actuality of the form or act signified by the predicate-
term, so that by means of the verb ‘is’ the form or act signified by the predicate-term is 
attributed to the subject as inherent. This is why, properly speaking, in a proposition such 
as ‘a man is white’, what is attributed on the side of the predicate to the individual man 
the subject-term ‘a man’ supposits for is not whiteness as such, i.e. the form signified by 
the predicate-term ‘white’, but ‘the actuality of whiteness’, ‘the inherence of whiteness’ 
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 In I Periher., lect. 5, lns. 391-403, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31. See also ST I, q. 3, a. 4, 
Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 42: “Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae: non enim 
bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse;” De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 
9, Pession ed., p. 192: “Qualibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod 
esse ponitur . . . Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc 
est perfectio omnium perfectionum.” 
96
 See In II Periher., lect. 2, lines 36-52. 
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or, simply said, ‘being white’. Therefore, that which the intellect conceives and asserts to 
be the case in the enuntiabile ‘that a man is white’ is the actuality (or inherence) of the 
accidental form whiteness in an individual man. In other words, the enuntiabile ‘that a 
man is white’ signifies ‘the being white of a man’. Aquinas writes: 
[O]mne esse a forma aliqua inhaerente est, 
sicut esse album ab albedine . . . . [N]on 
potest intelligi quod paries sit albus sine 
albedine inhaerente.
97
 
 
[A]ll esse comes from some inhering form, 
as being white comes from whiteness . . . . 
It cannot be understood that a wall is white 
without the inherence of whiteness. 
 
“[. . .] ut esse album attribuitur Sorti cum 
dicimus: Sortes est albus.
98
 
[. . .] as being white is attributed to 
Socrates when we say: Socrates is white. 
 
Likewise, we would say that the enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is a man’ signifies ‘the being 
human of Socrates’, for that which is attributed to Socrates on the side of the predicate in 
the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’ is ‘being human’, that is to say, ‘the actuality of 
humanity’ or ‘the inherence of humanity’. Hence, that which the intellect conceives and 
asserts to be the case in the enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is a man’ is the actuality (or 
inherence) of the essence humanity in Socrates or, better yet, as we shall see later, the 
actuality of the essence humanity in the individual matter by which Socrates is this man. 
One of the consequences of the theory of predication depicted above (at least for 
the type of propositions we have been discussing thus far where the verb ‘is’ functions as 
copula) is that neither the existence of the thing denoted by the subject-term nor its 
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 In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 393.  
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 Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 25/1, p. 95, lines 65-66. Note in the last two texts the use 
of the term ‘white’ (albus) not ‘whiteness’ (albedo) in the predicate position. We do not say ‘a 
man is whiteness’ (ST I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3); only a concrete term (noun or verb) may be placed in 
the predicate position (see e.g. In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; and In I Periher., lect. 5, lines 
108-13). The reason is that the conception signified by a concrete term does not abstract or 
prescind from the quality’s inherence in a subject, which is signified therefore by the term in the 
predicate position: ‘white’ signifies the form of whiteness as in a subject; ‘runs’ signifies the act 
of running as in a subject. On the signification of concrete terms see De ente, c. 2; In I Sent., d. 
23, q. 1, a. 1; Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 2 in contr.; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; SCG IV, c. 81; ST I, q. 3, a. 
3; q. 13, a. 1, ad 2; In De hebdom., lect. 2; In VII Meta., lect. 5, n. 1378-1380. 
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identity with the thing denoted by the predicate-term matters for verification, for none of 
the above is asserted to be the case by the intellect in this type of judgment.
99
 
Accordingly, explaining Aristotle’s formula ‘it is because the thing is or is not that a 
proposition is said to be true or false’, Aquinas remarks that the thing that is or is not (i.e. 
the enuntiabile) should not be understood as referring 
[. . .] ad solam existenciam vel non 
existenciam subiecti, set ad hoc quod res 
significata per predicatum insit vel non 
insit rei significate per subiectum.
100
 
 
[. . .] to the existence or not existence of the 
subject alone, but to the fact that the thing 
signified by the predicate does or does not 
inhere in the thing signified by the subject. 
 
What truly matters for verification, that which must obtain in reality for a judgment to be 
true, is the actuality (or inherence) of the form or act signified by the predicate-term in 
the individual subject or supposit denoted by the subject-term.  
On the issue of verification we mentioned earlier that Aquinas’ conception of 
truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei requires that that which correspond ex parte rei to 
the composition of enuntiabilia, as both the foundation and cause of truth, must be 
something equally complex or composed. On the matter, Aquinas writes: 
Oportet enim veritatem et falsitatem quae 
est in oratione vel opinione, reduci ad 
dispositionem rei sicut ad causam. Cum 
autem intellectus compositionem format, 
accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut 
Truth and falsity that is in speech or 
opinion must be reduced to the disposition 
of the thing as to their cause. When the 
intellect forms a composition, it regards 
two [components], one of which stands as 
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 The actual existence of the thing denoted by the subject-term as well as its identity with the 
thing denoted by the predicate-term is implied but not asserted. The identity of reference implied 
in affirmative predication is what Aquinas has in mind when he states that the predicate and 
subject terms signify the same in reality, or that they are the same in supposit, but differ 
conceptually (See ST I, q. 13, a. 12; q. 85, a. 5, ad 3; In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1241). Indeed, if 
whiteness actually inheres in an individual man, then the term ‘a man’ and the term ‘white’ in the 
proposition ‘a man is white’ must denote the same thing. Weidemann, “The Logic of Being,” 
188, 196n16. 
100
 In I Periher., lect. 9, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 47, lines 63-70. See also In II Periher., lect. 2, 
Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 43-46: “[C]um dicitur: «Sortes est albus»: non enim est 
intentio loquentis ut asserat Sortem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante 
hoc uerbo ‘est’.”  
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formale respectu alterius: unde accipit id ut 
in alio existens, propter quod praedicata 
tenentur formaliter. Et ideo, si talis operatio 
intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad 
causam, oportet quod in compositis 
substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad 
materiam, aut eius quod se habet per 
modum formae et materiae, vel etiam 
compositio accidentis ad subiectum, 
respondeat quasi fundamentum et causa 
veritatis, compositioni, quam intellectus 
interius format et exprimit voce. Sicut cum 
dico, Socrates est homo, veritas huius 
enunciationis causatur ex compositione 
formae humanae ad materiam 
individualem, per quam Socrates est hic 
homo: et cum dico, homo est albus, causa 
veritatis est compositio albedinis ad 
subiectum: et similiter est in aliis. Et idem 
patet in divisione.
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formal in relation to the other; hence [the 
intellect] takes it as existent in the other, 
because predicates are taken formally. 
Therefore, if such an operation of the 
intellect must be reduced to a thing as to its 
cause, then in composite substances the 
very composition of form with matter, or of 
what is related in the way of form and 
matter, and also the composition of 
accident with subject, must correspond, as 
the quasi-foundation and cause of truth, to 
the composition which the intellect forms 
interiorly and expresses in words. For 
example, when I say, ‘Socrates is a man’, 
the truth of this enunciation is caused by 
the composition of the form humanity with 
the individual matter by which Socrates is 
this man; and when I say, ‘a man is white’, 
the cause of truth is the composition of 
whiteness with a subject; and similarly in 
other cases. And the same is clear in 
division [i.e., negation]. 
 
According to Aquinas in the passage above, the real composition found within composite 
substances is “quasi fundamentum et causa veritatis” of the logical composition effected 
by the intellect in its second operation. This means that, in the paradigm case, what 
corresponds in reality to the logical composition of enuntiabilia, that is to say, what 
verifies an enuntiabile, is the real composition of composite substances.
102
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 In IX Meta., lect. 11, n. 1898, Marietti ed., p. 456. See also ST I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3, Leonine ed., 
vol. 5, p. 341: “Unde compositioni et divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex parte rei . . 
. Invenitur autem duplex compositio in re materiali. Prima quidem, formae ad materiam, et huic 
respondet compositio intellectus qua totum universale de sua parte praedicatur; nam genus 
sumitur a materia communi, differentia vero completiva speciei a forma, particulare vero a 
materia individuali. Secunda vero compositio est accidentis ad subiectum, et huic reali 
compositioni respondet compositio intellectus secundum quam praedicatur accidens de subiecto, 
ut cum dicitur, homo est albus.” 
102
 In the passage we just quoted, Aquinas speaks of a third composition apart from the one of 
form with matter and of accident with subject, namely the composition “of what is related in the 
way of form and matter.” There are different opinions concerning what Aquinas has in mind here. 
Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff suggests the composition of esse and essence. Joseph Owens identifies it 
as the composition of genus and species. See Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff, “Die Methoden der 
Metaphysik im Mittelalter,” in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung, 
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How does the inherence theory of predication relate to Aquinas’ correlation 
between logical and real composition above? Let us consider the two paradigm cases we 
have been studying. According to the inherence theory of predication, what needs to 
obtain in reality paradigmatically for the proposition ‘a man is white’ to be true is the 
actuality (or inherence) of whiteness in a man. It is not difficult to see how the real 
composition of the accidental form whiteness and an individual man accounts for the 
actuality of the accidental form whiteness in the latter; so that the real composition of the 
accidental form whiteness and an individual man is identified as the cause of truth of the 
enuntiabile ‘that a man is white’ which is signified by the proposition ‘a man is white’. 
The case of the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’, which according to Aquinas has as the 
cause of its truth the composition of the essence humanity and the individual matter by 
which Socrates is this man, is perhaps not as obvious. What we need to keep in mind, 
though, is that in the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’, the intellect conceives and asserts 
the actuality (or inherence) of humanity in an individual subject (a subject that happens to 
be named ‘Socrates’). What is at stake is the inherence of humanity in this rather than 
that individual subject. Now, in the case of a material entity, whose essence is composed 
of common matter and form, its essence accounts for the fact that it belongs to a given 
species, but it is the composition of its essence and the individual matter by which the 
material entity is this individual rather than another that accounts for the fact that this 
individual entity enjoys the mode of being proper to the species. The reason is that 
                                                                                                                                                 
ed. Paul Wilpert (Berlin: Gruyter, 1963), 87; and Joseph Owens, “Judgment and Truth in 
Aquinas,” 45. I am inclined to agree with Oeing-Hanhoff, for Aquinas is speaking of the 
composition found in composite substances and the composition of genus and species is regarded 
by Aquinas as a logical composition – although certainly dependent on the real composition of 
form with matter. See De ente, c. 2; In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; De ver., q. 3, a. 2, ad 3; and 
ST I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3. 
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individual matter limits the essence it receives to an individual subject.
103
 Hence, what 
accounts for the actuality of humanity in an individual subject is the real composition 
within the subject of the essence humanity and the individual matter by which the subject 
is this individual human rather than another. 
 
B. Existential Propositions 
 
 
 Up to this point, we have considered only one type of proposition, the type where 
the verb ‘is’ functions as copula. But Aquinas recognizes another type of proposition, one 
where the verb ‘is’ is predicated not as adjacent to some term but in itself. Aquinas 
writes: 
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in 
enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut 
cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil 
aliud intendimus significare quam quod 
Sortes sit in rerum natura; quandoque uero 
non predicatur per se, quasi principale 
predicatum, set quasi coniunctum principali 
predicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto, 
sicut cum dicitur : «Sortes est albus» : non 
enim est intentio loquentis ut asserat 
Sortem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat 
ei albedinem mediante hoc uerbo ‘est’; et 
ideo in talibus ‘est’ predicatur ut adiacens 
principali predicato, et dicitur esse tercium 
non quia sit tercium predicatum, set quia 
est tercia dictio posita in enunciatione, que 
simul cum nomine predicato facit unum 
predicatum, ut sic enunciatio diuidatur in 
duas partes, non in tres.
104
 
 
The verb ‘is’ is sometimes predicated in a 
proposition in itself, as when one says 
‘Socrates is’, by which we do not intend to 
signify anything other than that Socrates 
exists in reality. But sometimes the verb 
‘is’ is not predicated in itself, as if [it were] 
the principal predicate, but, as it were, 
conjoined to the principal predicate in order 
to connect it to the subject, as when one 
says ‘Socrates is white’. For, it is not the 
intention of the speaker to assert that 
Socrates exists in reality, but to attribute to 
him whiteness by means of the verb ‘is’; 
and for this reason, ‘is’ in such cases is 
predicated as adjacent to the principal 
predicate, and it is said to be ‘third’, not 
because it is a third predicate, but because 
it is a third expression placed in the 
proposition, which together with the noun 
predicated makes one predicate, and thus 
the proposition has two parts, not three. 
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 See De spirt. creat., a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 24/2, p. 14, lines 431-33: “[F]orma speciei 
limitatur ad indiuiduum: et talis limitatio forme est per materiam;” also In De hebdom., lect. 2, 
lines 77-80. 
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 In II Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 36-52. 
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One thing to take note regarding the two types of propositions Aquinas mentions above is 
that the structure of a proposition of the form ‘Socrates is’ does not differ greatly from 
the structure of a proposition of the form ‘Socrates is white’. They both contain two 
components, namely, a subject and a predicate. The difference between them is that in the 
proposition ‘Socrates is white’, the predicate is composed of the verb ‘is’ and the term 
‘white’, whereas in the proposition ‘Socrates is’ the verb ‘is’ alone constitutes the 
predicate. Aquinas’ distinction between the two types of propositions is thus based on the 
content of the predicate. Such a discerning principle is consistent with Aquinas’ view of 
the predicate as the principal part of a proposition.
105
  
Let us now turn our attention to Aquinas’ analysis of those propositions where the 
verb ‘is’ alone constitutes the predicate. What is it that the intellect conceives and asserts 
to be the case when it judges, for instance, ‘Socrates is’? As we indicated above, in the 
case of the proposition ‘Socrates is’ the verb ‘is’ is predicated in itself and not as adjacent 
to some term signifying a form or act. Now, the verb ‘is’, when taken in itself, signifies 
actuality (actualitas) or being (esse) in the mode of a verb, that is, it signifies ‘being in 
act’ (esse actu).106 In the words of Aquinas:  
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ . . . significat enim id 
quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum 
actualitatis absolute; nam ‘est’ simpliciter 
dictum significat esse actu, et ideo 
significat per modum uerbi.
107
 
[The] verb ‘is’ . . . signifies that which first 
falls into the intellect in the mode of 
actuality absolutely; for, ‘is’ simply said 
signifies being in act, and thus it signifies 
in the mode of a verb.  
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Accordingly, that which is attributed to Socrates in the proposition ‘Socrates is’ is ‘being 
in act’ or ‘to be in act’ (esse actu). Now, elsewhere, Aquinas states that the proposition 
‘Socrates is’ signifies that Socrates is or exists in the nature of things: 
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in 
enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut 
cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil 
aliud intendimus significare quam quod 
Sortes sit in rerum natura.
108
 
 
The verb ‘is’ in a proposition is sometimes 
predicated in itself, as when one says 
‘Socrates is’, by which we intend to signify 
nothing else than that Socrates exists in the 
nature of things. 
Aquinas often explains that a thing (res) or a being (ens) is or exists because it has esse, it 
is in act, or it participates in the act of being (actus essendi).
109
 Thus, what is attributed to 
Socrates in the proposition ‘Socrates is’ is esse as signifying existence or the act of being, 
that is, esse taken in its primary sense. 
According to Aquinas, when taken in its primary sense, esse may be attributed to 
anything which is or exists in the nature of things, whether a substance or an accident, so 
that we may say both ‘a man is’ and ‘a color is’.110 However, in its primary sense, esse is 
attributed most properly and truly only to that which subsists in itself, that is to say, only 
to a substance: 
Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in 
quantum est ens, idest quo denominatur 
aliquid ens actu in rerum natura; et sic esse 
non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis quae in 
decem generibus continentur, unde ens a 
tali esse dictum per decem genera dividitur. 
In another way, esse is said to be the act of 
a being insofar as it is a being, that is, that 
by which something is denominated ‘a 
being’ in act in the nature of things; and in 
this sense esse is attributed only to those 
things that are counted in the ten genera, so 
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Sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui rei dupliciter. 
Uno modo, sicut ei quod proprie et vere 
habet esse vel est; et sic attribuitur soli 
substantiae per se subsistenti.
111
 
 
that ‘a being’ said from this esse is divided 
by the ten genera. But this esse is attributed 
to a thing in two ways. In one way, as to 
that which properly and truly has esse or is; 
and in this way esse is attributed only to a 
substance that subsists per se. 
 
Thus, only a substance may properly and truly be said ‘to be in act’ in an affirmative 
proposition, as when we say ‘Socrates is’, by which we signify that the substance for 
which the subject-term ‘Socrates’ supposits is or exists in the nature of things. 
Given that what is attributed to Socrates in the proposition ‘Socrates is’ is esse as 
signifying existence or the act of being (actus essendi), it follows that that which the 
intellect conceives and asserts to be the case in the enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is’ is ‘the 
existence of Socrates’ or ‘the act of being of Socrates’. Now, for a substance to exist, its 
essence must be actualized by its corresponding esse. This means that the real 
composition of essence and esse within a substance accounts for the existence of the 
substance. Accordingly, that which verifies the paradigmatic enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is’ 
is the real composition of esse and supposit within Socrates. Therefore, that which ex 
parte rei corresponds to the logical composition effected in and by the intellect when it 
composes an affirmation such as ‘Socrates is’ is the real composition of esse and 
supposit. 
 
4.2.5 The Esse of Things as Signified by Enuntiabilia 
 
 
We are ready to offer an answer to our previous question regarding enuntiabilia 
and the esse of a thing. We wanted to know what the expression “esse rei,” when used to 
designate that which enuntiabilia signify, stands for in reality. As the preceding 
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discussion has shown, both existential and copulative propositions involve the 
predication of esse, that is to say, the attribution to a subject of esse taken either in the 
sense of existence or in the sense of a particular mode of being (as in ‘being white’ or 
‘esse album’).112 In fact, even in those cases where the verb ‘is’ is not explicitly 
contained in the predicate, as in the proposition ‘Socrates runs’, esse is attributed to some 
subject, for every verb can be restated with ‘is’.113 Therefore, enuntiabilia are said by 
Aquinas to signify “the esse of a thing” or “esse rei” because enuntiabilia involve the 
conception of ‘the esse of a subject’. But enuntiabilia signify ‘the esse of a subject’ in 
two ways. An enuntiabile may signify ‘the existence of a subject’, as in the enuntiabile 
‘that Socrates is’, or it may signify ‘the being-so-and-so of a subject’, as in the 
enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is human’ or ‘that Socrates is white’ or ‘that human is risible’. 
We conclude, then, that the expression “esse rei,” when used by Aquinas to indicate that 
which enuntiabilia signify, stands for the composed unit in the nature of things that is, as 
is especially clear in the paradigm case, a subject or supposit and its esse. In other words, 
that which the human intellect knows by means of enuntiabilia in its second operation is, 
paradigmatically, esse taken as “inherent” in a subject or supposit. This means that the 
ultimate object of the intellect’s act of composition and division is not esse considered in 
itself apart from any composition in reality, but rather ‘the esse of a thing’, that is, the 
esse which belongs to an individual subject. 
The interpretation of the expression “esse rei” as signified by enuntiabilia in 
terms of the notion of esse as “inherent” in a subject is consistent with Aquinas’ 
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conception of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei. As we indicated earlier, enuntiabilia 
are the primary bearers of truth value. Thus, given the complex or composed character of 
enuntiabilia, that which ex parte rei corresponds to the composition of enuntiabilia must 
be something equally complex or composed (unum complexum). In other words, if 
Aquinas conception of truth is to be valid, that which enuntiabilia signify cannot be 
something simple.
114
 It is true that enuntiabilia signify one thing, that is to say, it is true 
that only one thing is understood in the conception of an enuntiabile. But, enuntiabilia 
signify one thing by means of composition, the composition of subject and predicate. 
Hence, that which enuntiabilia signify in reality, and which serves as the cause and 
foundation of its truth, is a composed unit wherein some form or act inheres in a subject. 
Again, notice that esse rei, which all enuntiabilia can be said to signify, cannot be 
something simple, such as the simple actus essendi. ‘That actus essendi’ or ‘that actually 
exists’ are not enuntiabilia: they are too simple. At the same time, although in the 
paradigm case, ‘that Socrates exists’, the esse rei is composite, not only notionally, but 
also in reality, not all enuntiabilia signify an esse rei that is ontologically composite, as is 
clear in the enuntiabile ‘that God exists’. 
The reference to inherence in relation to esse might seem problematic from an 
ontological standpoint, since the notion of inherence brings to mind the inherence of an 
accident, and esse is not an accident of the subject it actualizes and perfects. It would thus 
be a mistake to consider it as such. However, the notion of esse as inherent in a subject in 
the paradigm case should be understood in the same way Aquinas concedes that esse, 
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insofar as it is the actuality of some substance, is a quasi-accident.
115
 Hence, taken as the 
actuality of a substance, or as the actuality of some form or act, we may speak of esse as 
“inherent” in order to convey the understanding of esse as it belongs to a subject. 
Accordingly, Aquinas himself speaks of the human intellect’s understanding of esse in 
this way:  
Intellectus autem noster hoc modo intelligit 
esse quo modo invenitur in rebus 
inferioribus a quibus scientiam capit, in 
quibus esse non est subsistens, sed 
inhaerens.
116
 
 
Our intellect understands esse in the way it 
is found in things herebelow, from which it 
receives knowledge, in which esse is not 
subsistent but inherent. 
Thus, since esse is found in things as inherent, if the intellect is to comprehend ‘the esse 
of a thing’ with truth, it must do so by means of the composition of subject and predicate, 
that is, by means of enuntiabilia.  
In the next and final section of the chapter, I examine, in light of our findings on 
enuntiabilia and the esse of things, Aquinas’ correlation at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 
between the second operation of the intellect and ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’. I show 
that, in setting up the correlation, Aquinas does not restrict the apprehension of esse to 
the second operation of the intellect; thus, all remaining appearence of inconsistency 
between the commentaries on the Sentences and the Peri hermeneias on the subject of the 
human intellect’s apprehension of esse is removed. 
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4.2.6 Returning to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: Esse Rei as the Correlate 
of Human Judgment 
 
 
At In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Aquinas observes that, in an operation other than the 
one in which it apprehends “the quiddities of things,” the human intellect comprehends 
“the esse of a thing” or “esse rei” by composing an affirmation:  
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse 
ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio 
intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis 
formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates 
rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De 
anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. 
Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, 
componendo affirmationem, quia etiam 
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a 
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in 
quadam compositione formae ad materiam, 
vel accidentis ad subjectum.
117
  
 
 
Since there are two [components] in a 
thing, the quiddity of the thing and its esse, 
a twofold operation of the intellect 
corresponds to these two. One is called 
“formation” by philosophers, by which the 
intellect apprehends the quiddities of 
things, which is also called by the 
Philosopher, in De anima III, the 
“understanding of indivisibles.” But the 
other comprehends the esse of a thing by 
composing an affirmation, because also the 
esse of a thing composed of matter and 
form, from which the intellect receives 
cognition, subsists (consistit) in a certain 
composition of form with matter or of 
accident with subject. 
 
Given that Aquinas’ remarks on the second operation of the intellect and ‘the esse of a 
thing’ or ‘esse rei’ are preparatory to his final answer to the question of the article, i.e., 
whether enuntiabilia are objects of God’s knowledge, they cannot be understood 
independently of the theory of enuntiabilia.  
We have seen that enuntiabilia are the direct objects of the intellect’s act of 
composition and division, that which the intellect conceives when it composes and 
divides. We also saw that, according to the theory of propositions to which Aquinas 
subscribes, in the composition of subject and predicate, the intellect attributes esse to 
some subject. In the composition of enuntiabilia, then, the intellect comprehends ‘the 
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esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’. This is why Aquinas affirms at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 
that the human intellect comprehends ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ by composing an 
affirmation. For instance, in the proposition ‘Socrates is’, the intellect comprehends ‘the 
existence (esse or actus essendi) of Socrates’; and, in the proposition ‘Socrates is white’, 
the intellect comprehends ‘the being-white (esse album) of Socrates’.  
We also saw that Aquinas identifies ‘esse rei’ or ‘the esse of a thing’ as that 
which enuntiabilia signify, that is to say, as that which the intellect knows by means of 
enuntiabilia. Now, the expression ‘esse rei’, as signified by enuntiabilia, stands for, not 
something simple, but for something composite. Indeed, as we have seen, the expression 
‘esse rei’ stands for, in the paradigm case, the composed unit in the nature of things that 
is a subject or supposit and its esse. In the composition of enuntiabilia, the intellect 
comprehends, not ‘esse’ as a simple, but ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’. At In I Sent., d. 
38, q. 1, a. 3, Aquinas consistently characterizes ‘esse rei’ in terms of composition. In the 
corpus of the article, Aquinas observes that the thing in question is a matter-form 
composite, and that its esse subsists (consistit) in a certain composition of form with 
matter or of accident with subject: 
Alia [operatio] autem comprehendit esse 
rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam 
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a 
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in 
quadam compositione formae ad materiam, 
vel accidentis ad subjectum.
118
 
 
But the other [operation] comprehends the 
esse of a thing by composing an 
affirmation, because also the esse of a thing 
composed of matter and form, from which 
the intellect receives cognition, subsists 
(consistit) in a certain composition of form 
with matter or of accident with subject. 
 
Later, in the response to the second objection, Aquinas further refers to the esse of a 
thing, which the intellect apprehends in its second operation, as composite: 
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Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a 
rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, 
non apprehendit illud esse nisi 
componendo et dividendo.
119
 
 
But our intellect, whose cognition arises 
from things that have composite esse, 
apprehends this esse only by composing 
and dividing.  
Aquinas’ characterization of the esse of a thing, not only as composite, but also as 
subsisting (consistit) in a certain composition of form with matter or of accident with 
subject might appear rather puzzling at first glance. How is it possible that a thing’s esse, 
as contrasted with essence, be described in terms of the composition of form with matter 
and accident with subject? A similar characterization of esse rei, as apprehended by the 
second operation of the intellect, is made by Aquinas in his commentary on Boethius’ De 
trinitate: 
Secunda uero operatio respicit ipsum esse 
rei; quod quidem resultat ex congregatione 
principiorum rei in compositis, uel ipsam 
simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in 
substantiis simplicibus.
120
 
 
The second operation regards the esse itself 
of a thing, which results from the 
congregation of the principles of a thing in 
composite substances, or accompanies the 
simple nature of a thing, as in simple 
substances. 
 
Here, Aquinas describes the esse of a composite substance, i.e., of a thing composed of 
matter and form, as resulting from the congregation or composition of the principles of 
the thing. In addition, there are two other occasions where Aquinas refers to the esse of a 
thing or esse rei, as contrasted with its essence, as resulting from the essential principles 
of the thing:  
Alio modo dicitur esse, quod pertinet ad 
naturam rei, secundum quod dividitur 
secundum decem genera; et hoc quidem 
esse est in re, et est actus entis resultans ex 
principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus 
lucentis.
121
 
 
In another way, esse is said to be that 
which pertains to the nature of a thing, 
according to which it is divided by the ten 
genera; and this esse is in a thing, and it is 
the act of a being resulting from the 
principles of the thing, as to shine is the act 
of a shining thing. 
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Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius 
essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod 
sit aliquod superadditum ad modum 
accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per 
principia essentiae.
122
 
 
Although the esse of a thing is different 
from its essence, it should not be 
understood to be something added in the 
mode of an accident, but rather as quasi-
constituted by the principles of the essence.  
  Such remarks by Aquinas are often explained by appealing to a characteristic of 
the relation between essence and esse within things to which we made allusion earlier, 
namely, the fact that the esse or actus essendi by which something is or exists in the 
nature of things is limited and specified by the very essence it actualizes and enters into 
composition with. Thus, considered as limited and specified by its essence, the esse or 
actus essendi of a thing may be said to subsist (consistit) in, or to result from, the 
congregation of the essential principles of a thing, that is, from the union or composition 
of form and matter.
123
  
This does not explain, however, Aquinas’ characterization at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, 
a. 3 of a thing’s esse in terms of the composition of accident with subject. Especially 
when considered as specified by its essence, that is to say, as resulting from the 
composition of matter and form, the esse or actus essendi of a thing is identified by 
Aquinas as the thing’s substantial esse. Such esse is in turn distinguished by Aquinas as 
really distinct from a thing’s accidental esse, which results from the composition of 
accident with subject.
124
 Now, the composition of accident with subject does not result in 
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any way in the existence of the latter, for the subject of an accident already pre-exists in 
act.
125
 How is it possible, then, that a thing’s esse be described by Aquinas as ‘consisting’ 
in a certain composition of accident with subject? 
 We can make sense of Aquinas’ remarks by considering them in their proper 
theoretical context, namely, the enuntiabile theory. Let us examine the passage in 
question in more detail. Aquinas writes: 
Alia [operatio] autem comprehendit esse 
rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam 
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a 
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in 
quadam compositione formae ad materiam, 
vel accidentis ad subjectum.
126
 
 
But the other [operation] comprehends the 
esse of a thing by composing an 
affirmation, because also the esse of a thing 
composed of matter and form, from which 
the intellect receives cognition, subsists 
(consistit) in a certain composition of form 
with matter or of accident with subject. 
 
Clearly, Aquinas is offering an explanation, but its purpose is not as clear as it might 
seem. The ‘etiam’ after ‘quia’ indicates that something new will be added to that which 
has already been said. Unfortunately, it is easily missed or, alternatively, misinterpreted 
so that Aquinas’ remarks on the esse of a thing composed of matter and form as 
subsisting (consistit) in the composition of form with matter or of accident with subject 
are taken as an explanation, or as an additional explanation, for why the intellect 
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comprehends the esse or existence of a thing by composing an affirmation. However, as 
we shall see next, they are intended to explain something slightly different. 
When discussing the interpretation of the expression “esse rei” as signified by 
enuntiabilia, we saw that the intellect composes an affirmation to comprehend ‘the esse 
of a thing’ in more than one sense. Although every proposition signifies ‘the esse of a 
thing’, not every proposition signifies or asserts the existence of the thing denoted by its 
subject-term. Such is the case of the propositions ‘Socrates is a man’ and ‘Socrates is 
white’, by which the intellect comprehends, not ‘the existence of Socrates’, but ‘the being 
human of Socrates’ and ‘the being white of Socrates’ respectively. Given that, for 
Aquinas, the truth of the intellect arises from its conformity to reality, in order to 
comprehend truthfully ‘the esse of a thing’, taken in the sense of ‘the being so-and-so of a 
thing’, the intellect composes an affirmation, because a thing’s esse, taken in this sense, 
involves some composition or, as Aquinas has written earlier in the Sentences, is from the 
inherence of some form in a subject: 
[O]mne esse a forma aliqua inhaerente est, 
sicut esse album ab albedine. . . . [N]on 
potest intelligi quod paries sit albus sine 
albedine inhaerente.
127
 
 
All being (esse) is from some inhering 
form, as being white is from whiteness. . . . 
It cannot be understood that a wall is white 
without an inhering whiteness. 
 
Hence, in keeping with the current paradigmatic examples, in order to comprehend ‘the 
being white of Socrates’, the intellect composes the affirmation ‘Socrates is white’, in 
which whiteness is attributed to ‘Socrates’ as inherent, because ‘the being white of 
Socrates’ results from (relinquitur; cf. note 124) or subsists (consistit) in (to use the 
language of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3) the real composition of the accidental form 
whiteness with the subject ‘Socrates’, that is to say, results from the inherence of 
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whiteness in Socrates. Likewise, in order to comprehend ‘the being human of Socrates’, 
the intellect composes the affirmation ‘Socrates is a man’, because ‘the being human of 
Socrates’ results from (or subsists in) the real composition of the essence humanity with 
the individual matter by which ‘Socrates’ is this man, that is to say, from the inherence of 
humanity in Socrates.  
Aquinas’ remarks at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 on ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ 
as subsisting (consistit) in the composition of form with matter and of accident with 
subject are thus not an explanation for why the intellect composes an affirmation to 
comprehend ‘the esse of a thing’ in the sense of ‘the existence of a thing’. Rather, they 
are an explanation for why the intellect composes an affirmation to comprehend ‘the esse 
of a thing’ in the sense of ‘the being-so-and-so of a thing’. In sum, when Aquinas 
characterizes the esse of a thing or esse rei in terms of the composition of form with 
matter or of accident with subject, the expression “esse rei” should not be taken in the 
sense of ‘the existence of a thing’, but rather in the sense of ‘the being-so-and-so of a 
thing’. Notice, however, that Aquinas’ reference at In I Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 to ‘the esse 
of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ as the ultimate object of the second operation of the intellect 
encompasses all of the senses in which the expression ‘esse rei’ may be taken under the 
paradigmatic case of the ‘existential enuntiabile’ ‘that Socrates exists’. Aquinas has 
introduced the discussion by remarking on the real distinction (and hence composition) of 
essence and esse within things. Thus, when Aquinas writes that the human intellect, in its 
second operation, comprehends ‘the esse of a thing’ by composing an affirmation, he has 
in mind first and foremost ‘the existence of a thing’ (which, too, may be said to subsist 
(consistit) in a certain composition, the composition of essence and esse within the thing). 
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On the other hand, once again, ‘esse rei’ cannot signify the act of being in ‘existential 
enuntiabilia’ alone; otherwise, such enuntiabilia would exclude compositions of “form 
and matter” and “subject and accident” in which “being-so-and-so” is predicated, and the 
corpus of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 would defend only the claim that God knows 
‘existential enuntiabilia’. 
For Aquinas to use ‘esse rei’ to capture the object of propositions that are both 
existential and predicamental fits his theory of truth as a reflection of the composite 
human mode of knowing creaturely composites according to their mode of being. As 
Aquinas writes in the response to the second objection In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, our 
cognition arises from things that have a “composite esse” (esse compositum):  
Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a 
rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, 
non apprehendit illud esse nisi 
componendo et dividendo.
128
 
 
But our intellect, whose cognition arises 
from things that have composite esse, 
apprehends this esse only by composing 
and dividing.  
Given the composite character of creatures (which are the proper object of our cognition), 
the human intellect cannot apprehended ‘the esse of a thing’ unless by means of 
composition; for, truth in the intellect arises from the intellect’s conformity to reality in 
seeing and affirming that form or esse belongs to some subject. This doctrine is reflected 
in Aquinas’ remarks earlier in the Sentences on ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ as the 
cause of truth in the intellect: 
Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum 
esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis 
quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab 
esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione 
intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per 
quamdam similationem ad ipsum, 
completur relatio adaequationis, in qua 
consistit ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod 
Since in a thing there is its essence and its 
esse, truth is founded on the esse of a thing 
more than on its essence, just as the term 
‘ens’ is imposed from esse [more than from 
essence]. And the relation of adequation, in 
which [relation] the notion of truth 
consists, is completed in the operation of 
the intellect that, through a certain likeness 
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ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum 
quod est in cognitione intellectus.
129
 
 
to [the esse of a thing] takes the esse of a 
thing just as it is. Hence, I say that the esse 
of a thing is the cause of truth according as 
it is in the cognition of the [human] 
intellect. 
 
The text fits Aquinas’ doctrine in the later Summa theologiae I, q. 16, a. 2 that knowing 
truth involves seeing the form (or esse) in some subject (res), and in predicating that 
“likeness” of the thing to which it belongs. Thus, the conception of truth as adaequatio 
intellectus et rei matchesAquinas’ distinctive theory of the proposition and its object 
according to which the intellect comprehends ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ only 
through its second operation, by composing an affirmation in which truth is known. 
 Before we continue, let us summarize the discussion up to this point. I have 
argued that, given the theoretical context of the discussion, Aquinas’ correlation at In I 
Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 between the second operation of the intellect and ‘the esse of a 
thing’ or ‘esse rei’ should be understood as addressing, not the intellect’s apprehension of 
esse as a simple (actus essendi by itself), but rather the intellect’s apprehension of esse as 
it belongs to a subject or supposit. The reason the intellect comprehends ‘the esse of a 
thing’ or ‘esse rei’ in its second operation by composing an affirmation (i.e., by means of 
enuntiabilia) is that ‘the esse of a thing’ is a composed unit subsisting (consistit) in, most 
notably, the composition of essence and esse, but also in the composition of form with 
matter and of accident with subject.  
 The notion that enuntiabilia signify in reality a composite object is a central 
element of Aquinas’ answer to the question of the article, namely, whether enuntiabilia 
are objects of God’s knowledge. God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia is problematic not only 
because of the composite character of enuntiabilia, but also because of the composite 
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character of that which the human intellect knows by means of enuntiabilia. For Aquinas, 
God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia is not guaranteed merely by claiming that God knows 
that which enuntiabilia signify, i.e., ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’, rather than 
enuntiabilia themselves.  Instead, Aquinas adds two other steps to the argument, 
declaring that God knows ‘the esse of each thing’ (esse cujuslibet rei), and therefore, 
enuntiabilia, by knowing his own esse, which is simple and not other than his essence: 
Similiter etiam in ipso Deo est considerare 
naturam ipsius, et esse ejus; et sicut natura 
sua est causa et exemplar omnis naturae, ita 
etiam esse suum est causa et exemplar 
omnis esse. Unde sicut cognoscendo 
essentiam suam, cognoscit omnem rem; ita 
cognoscendo esse suum, cognoscit esse 
cujuslibet rei; et sic cognoscit omnia 
enuntiabilia, quibus esse significatur; non 
tamen diversa operatione nec 
compositione, sed simpliciter; quia esse 
suum non est aliud ab essentia, nec est 
compositum consequens.
130
 
 
Similarly, in God himself it is possible to 
consider his nature and his esse; and just as 
his nature is cause and exemplar of every 
nature, so also his esse is cause and 
exemplar of every esse. Thus, just as by 
knowing his own essence God knows each 
thing (res), so also by knowing his own 
esse, he knows the esse of each thing; and 
thus he knows all enuntiabilia by which 
esse is signified; although without diversity 
of operation or composition, but simply, 
because his esse is not other than his 
essence, nor it is the result a composite. 
 
The same argument is found in the response to the second objection, where once again 
Aquinas remarks on the composite character of ‘the esse of a thing’:  
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ipsum esse 
divinum quod est simplex, est exemplar 
omnis esse compositi quod in creatura est; 
et ideo per esse suum simplex cognoscit 
sine compositione intellectuum vel 
divisione omne esse vel non esse quod rei 
convenit.
131
 
 
[T]he divine esse itself, which is simple, is 
the exemplar of every composite esse that 
is in the creature; and for this reason 
through his own simple esse [God] knows 
without composition or division of 
concepts every esse or non esse that 
belongs to a thing.  
God’s esse, which is simple, is cause and exemplar of “every composite esse that is in the 
creature.” Thus, knowing his esse, God knows the esse of all things (esse rei), and 
therefore what signifies it. But this knowledge introduces no ontological composition or 
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division in God, whether in God’s act of intellection, as if in a judgment, or in a complex 
verbum produced within God; for, all esse rei is a reflection of God’s esse, which is 
conceptually distinct from, though really identical to his simple essence, of which it is the 
act (esse Dei). The human intellect, on the other hand, comprehends the esse of things by 
means of composition in act of understanding (judgment) and in verbum (the complex 
verbum in the mind that affirms ‘esse’ as true of a ‘res’). In answering the question of 
God’s simple knowledge of the composite enuntiabilia, then, Aquinas develops a 
distinctive theory of propositions and their objects which allows him to capture the 
“complexity” of all propositions under the unity of the esse Dei, not of the divine 
essence, as their exemplar. The paradigm case for propositions is that of the predication 
of esse or actuality or form of a supposit or subject. Thus, Aquinas reinterprets the 
paradigm in the standard “inherence theory” of the proposition in terminist logic: the 
predication of a form of matter or of some subject. Existential propositions such as 
‘Socrates is’ can also be taken as predicating a form. But rather than reducing being to 
form, Aquinas moves in the opposite direction: all propositions can be related to 
existential propositions as the primary instance, so that all propositions can be seen as 
predicating the act of being of a thing; hence, all propositions signify esse rei, the act of 
existence of a thing. And, since propositions are the object of the second act of the mind, 
this esse rei is comprehended only in the act that targets propositions. 
 In later writings, the second operation of the intellect is no longer associated with 
esse rei. Aquinas rather associates the composition of the intellect, paradigmatically, with 
real composition, most notably, the composition of form with matter and accident with 
subject. The logical composition of subject and predicate is said to be rooted in the real 
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composition of form with matter or accident with subject. It is real composition, not esse 
rei, that Aquinas identifies as the foundation and cause of truth in the intellect.
 132
 By now 
we have seen how such association is perfectly compatible with Aquinas’ understanding 
of propositions as signifying esse rei, that is, as signifying the inherence of esse in a 
subject.
133
 Nevertheless, it must be observed, although in later writing Aquinas no longer 
associates the second operation of the intellect with esse rei, he continues to associate 
enuntiabilia with esse rei in the context of the discussion of divine knowledge. 
In the Summa contra Gentiles (1261-63), for example, having previously showed 
that God does not know by composing and dividing, Aquinas remarks: 
Non autem propter hoc oportet nos dicere 
quod enuntiabilia ignorat. Nam essentia 
sua, cum sit una et simplex, exemplar est 
omnium multiplicium et compositorum. Et 
sic per ipsam Deus omnem multitudinem et 
compositionem tam naturae quam rationis 
cognoscit.
134
 
But we must not for this reason say that 
God does not know enuntiabilia. For his 
essence, since it is one and simple, is 
exemplar of all multiple and composite 
things. Thus, through it [his essence], God 
knows every multiplicity and composition 
both of nature and of reason. 
 
Notice especially in this passage the reference to multiplicity and composition, both of 
reason and of nature, in relation to enuntiabilia. As we have seen, enuntiabilia are 
complexa, and they signify something multiple and composite. Still, this passage invites 
the familiar objection: if we were right to say that In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 explains 
God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia by appealing, not to the divine essence (alone), but to 
the divine esse, then it could again appear that Aquinas has changed his mind. If we had 
no further evidence, it might be hard to accept the obvious resolution of the apparently 
contradictory answers between 1251 and 1259: the ‘esse Dei’, which is identical to 
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deitas, is invoked precisely to explain how God through the exemplarity of his simple 
essence can know composite esse rei. But we do have further evidence. 
In the Summa theologiae (1265-73), Aquinas addresses once again the question of 
God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia. His answer to the question is as follows: 
[C]um formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate 
intellectus nostri; Deus autem scit quidquid 
est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut supra 
dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat 
omnia enuntiabilia quae formari possunt. 
Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et 
composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia 
non per modum enuntiabilium, quasi 
scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel 
divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque 
cognoscit per simplicem intelligentiam, 
intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut 
si nos in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid 
est homo, intelligeremus omnia quae de 
homine praedicari possunt.
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[S]ince to form enuntiabilia is in the power 
of our intellect, and God knows whatever is 
in his own power or in [the power] of a 
creature, as was said above, it is necessary 
that God knows all enuntiabilia that can be 
formed. But, just as God knows material 
things immaterially, and composite things 
simply, so he knows enuntiabilia, not in the 
manner of enuntiabilia, namely, as if in his 
intellect there were composition or division 
of enuntiabilia. Rather, God knows each 
thing through a simple understanding 
(intelligentiam) by understanding the 
essence of each. It is as if we, by 
understanding what man is, were to 
understand all that can be predicated of 
man. 
 
The response is intriguing because it sounds some notes that resemble the solutions of 
both 1251 and 1259. As in the SCG I, c. 59, God is said to know enuntiabilia through a 
simple understanding (there through his essence, here as if in the simple notion ‘human’). 
Nonetheless, as in In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Aquinas emphasizes that God knows the 
complex that we know in our propositional knowledge. In fact, he adds three points not 
found earlier: God knows all the enuntiabilia that we know in our propositions, and, in 
fact, knows all propositions that can possibly be made (because he knows all potencies, 
including our own). Later in the same article, in response to the second objection (which 
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runs along the same lines as the second objection in In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3),
136
 
Aquinas makes a reference to that which is signified by enuntiabilia, identifying it, as in 
the Sentences commentary, as ‘esse rei’ or the esse of a thing: 
[C]ompositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod 
esse rei, et sic Deus per suum esse, quod 
est eius essentia, est similitudo omnium 
eorum quae per enuntiabilia 
significantur.
137
 
 
The enuntiable composition signifies some 
esse of a thing, and in this way God, 
through his own esse, which is his essence, 
is a likeness of all those things that are 
signified through enuntiabilia. 
 
Aquinas’ general description of enuntiabilia in the Summa theologiae is one with which 
we are familiar. Enunciations are characteristic of a human mode of cognition. They are 
formed by the intellect’s act of composing and dividing, and are thus identified with the 
sort of composition formed by predication (putting together the predicate with the 
subject). Furthermore, Aquinas speaks of the “composition” of an enuntiabile, which is a 
sign of ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’, which enuntiabilia themselves are said to 
signify. 
There is certainly some development on Aquinas’ treatment of the question of 
God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia in the mature writings; Aquinas does not do things the 
same way. But one can see that there is an essential unity in the doctrine. 
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Concluding Remarks on the Intellect’s Apprehension of Esse Rei 
at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 
 
 From our examination of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, it is evident that in setting up 
the correlation between the second operation of the intellect and esse rei, Aquinas does 
not have in mind as the ultimate object of the second operation of the intellect esse 
considered in itself as a simple, the actus essendi, as for the standard interpretation, but 
rather esse or actus essendi as part of a complex, as predicated and known of things, 
belonging to them as its subject or supposit. Is this the only manner in which the intellect 
may apprehend a thing’s esse? It is true that the intellect cannot apprehend ‘the esse of a 
thing’ except by composing an affirmation (as some adherents of the standard 
interpretation may agree). But this composite apprehension is only possible if the human 
intellect already conceives the esse as an act or ‘form’ to be predicated of a subject or res: 
esse  + rei. The argument of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 presupposes ‘est’ or ‘est ens’ or 
‘habet esse’ or ‘est homo’ or ‘est album’ as ‘forms’ that may be combined in an 
enuntiation about a subject. From Aquinas’ correlation between the two operations of the 
intellect and a thing’s essence and esse, it does not follow that the intellect cannot 
conceive esse just as essence as a simple non-composite content. Quite the opposite: 
without the simple term, the enunciation is impossible. And if Aquinas means the 
judgment concerns esse as simple and non-composite, he fails to address the question of 
how God knows composite enuntiabilia (what is a simple enuntiabile?) Aquinas’ aim at 
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 is to contrast a proposional or complex apprehension of ‘the 
esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ in humans that in God is not really distinct from his 
apprehension of his esse, which is his essence. Nothing in this project rules out a simple 
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conception of esse. The text of Distinction 38 takes no position on the matter (nor, 
admittedly, does it make all of the distinctions necessary to address it). The question of a 
simple conception of esse is resolved by examining other texts in light of Aquinas’ 
semantic theory, which shows us that esse can, indeed, must be conceived in a simple 
conception. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 In this dissertation I present evidence for the following two thesis statements: 
First, Aquinas recognizes as part of his semantic theory a simple or non-composite 
conception of esse. Second, the traditional reading of Aquinas’ remarks in the 
commentaries on the Sentences and on Boethius’ De trinitate on the intellect’s 
apprehension of a thing’s esse as ruling out the possibility of a simple conception of esse 
cannot be made consistent with the text.  
Chapters II and III provide support for the first statement. In Chapter II, I show 
that Aquinas subscribes to a version of the standard semantic theory of the mid-thirteenth 
century Latin west according to which the signification of terms, nouns and verbs alike, is 
constituted primarily by their “signing relation” with a simple or non-composite 
conception of some res. For Aquinas, a term immediately signifies a concept or 
conception in the mind, but it ultimately signifies the res that is the object of that 
conception. Thus, the res significata (in the paradigm case an extra mental reality) is 
signified through the mediation of the intellect’s conception the term immediately 
signifies. Most of our terms signify a form or nature, such as humanity; but, the res 
significata of a term is semantically, not necessarily ontologicaly a form. For Aquinas, 
anything we are able to conceive, we are able to name, including privations. Regarding 
the conception signified by terms, we have seen that at different places throughout his 
works Aquinas characterizes it as simple or non-composite (incomplexa), whereas the 
conception signified by propositions is characterized as complex or composite 
(complexa). Also on more than one occasion Aquinas specifically links the kind of 
conception that nouns and verbs signify to the first operation of the intellect, and the kind 
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of conception that propositions signify, to the second operation of the intellect. 
Accordingly, the complexity of the conception signified by propositions is associated by 
Aquinas with predication, and hence with its being the subject of truth value. Aquinas 
refers to the conception signified by terms as simple or non-composite because it lacks 
the composition of a proposition. Thus, the conception signified by terms, insofar as it 
contains no predication, is not subject to truth or falsity per se.  
 
Under this semantic framework, the nouns ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as well as the verb 
‘est’, all of which have esse as their res significata, must signify a simple conception of 
esse. Accordingly, as Chapter III shows, these terms, for Aquinas, signify, not a 
‘judgment’ of esse, but a ‘concept’ of esse; that is to say, they signify a ‘simple 
conception’ of their res, which is esse. In order to ascertain the sort of conception these 
terms signify, I examine in Chapter III, the modes of signification that Aquinas assigns to 
these terms. As shown in Chapter II, following the practice of pre-modist logicians, 
Aquinas relates the notion of modi significandi with that of modi intelligendi. Given that 
the res significata of a term is signified through the mediation of the intellect’s 
conception, which conception term immediately signify, the mode or manner in which a 
term signifies its res signifcata is a reflection of the mode or manner in which the same 
res is conceived by the intellect. More precisely, the modes of signification of terms form 
part of the content of the conception signified by terms, the significatum. Hence, by 
examining the mode of signification that Aquinas assigns to the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and 
‘est’, we are able to determine the sort of conception these terms signify. 
In particular, what such an examination discloses is that Aquinas identifies the 
pair ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as an example of a concrete term and its abstract counterpart. 
218 
 
Furthermore, Aquinas parallels their signification with that of the pairs ‘albus’ - ‘albedo’ 
and ‘currens’ - ‘currere’. All of these pairs have in common that they signify the same 
res significata under different modes of signification: ‘ens’, ‘albus’, and ‘currens’ signify 
in the concrete mode (i.e., without precision) whereas ‘esse’, ‘albedo’, and ‘currere’ 
signify in the abstract mode (i.e., with precision). The parallel set up by Aquinas between 
these terms shows that, forhim, the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ signify the same sort of 
conception that the other terms signify. Otherwise, the parallel would be impossible. 
Thus, despite possible appearances to the contrary, the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ must 
signify a simple conception of their res, which is esse. 
The abstract term ‘esse’ appears the least to signify a judgment or complex 
conception. For, it signifies its res as ‘that by which’ and as simple; thus, it excludes in its 
signification all sorts of composition, from which it prescinds. By contrast, the term ‘ens’ 
appears the most to signify a judgment, for it signifies ‘quod est’ (‘what is’). Parmenides 
exploited the paradoxes that ensues if ens entails an existential judgment. But, explains 
Aquinas, the term ‘ens’ does not signify the composition signified when one says ‘aliquid 
est’ (‘something is’). Rather, the term ‘ens’, insofar as it signifies esse in the concrete 
mode, “consignifies” composition; for, it signifies ‘a thing having esse’; that is to say, it 
signifies ‘the subject of esse’. Furthermore, the kind of composition ‘ens’ consignifies is 
not the kind of composition the judgment ‘something is’ signifies, wherein a comparison 
is made between a thing and esse, based on which a truth value may be assigned. The 
term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, but unlike what is the case in the judgment ‘aliquid est’ 
(‘something is’), the ‘est’ in ‘quod est’ is not a predicate, but signifies the res significata 
of the term.  
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The case of the verb ‘est’ is parallel to that of ‘ens’. Taken in itself, that is, as a 
verb and not as short-hand for the proposition ‘aliquid est’ (‘something is’), ‘est’ 
consignifies composition, for verbs signify their action as inherent in a subject. However, 
since no an actual inherence is asserted, the conception signified has no truth value. Thus, 
like the noun ‘ens’, the verb ‘est’ consignifies composition insofar as it includes in its 
mode of signification the subject of esse. Nevertheless, neither the noun ‘ens’ nor the 
verb ‘est’ signify that some subject is or exists, that is to say, the fact that esse actually 
inheres in some subject. Hence, neither term signifies a judgment. 
Chapter IV provides evidence for the second thesis statement: the traditional 
reading of Aquinas’ remarks in the commentaries on the Sentences and on Boethius’ De 
trinitate on the intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s esse as ruling out the possibility of a 
simple conception of esse cannot be made consistent with the text. In this chapter, I offer 
an exegesis of the key text, In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, where Aquinas refers twice to the 
intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s esse in its second operation. My reading of the text is 
guided by the theoretical context of the discussion. The question Aquinas addresses here 
is a standard one for thirteenth-century theologians: can God with his simple 
understanding know enuntiabilia, which are complex, and if so, how? In reviewing the 
theory of enuntiabilia, we may see that in both logical and theological contexts, the term 
‘enuntiabilia’ is used to identify the immediate objects of the intellect’s act of 
composition and division. Enuntiabilia are the mental products of the second operation of 
the intellect, that which the intellect produces and properly understands when it composes 
and divides. Now, enuntiabilia signify something in reality, which at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 
1, a. 3 Aquinas identifies as ‘esse rei’ or ‘the esse of a thing’. It follows, then, that by 
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means of enuntiabilia, the intellect comprehends in its second operation ‘the esse of a 
thing’ or ‘esse rei’. Hence, as Aquinas observes in the text from the Sentences 
commentary, the human intellect comprehends ‘esse rei’ by composing an affirmation.  
The expression “esse rei” as signified by enuntiabilia stands, not for something 
simple, but for something composite. Evidence for this claim is found in Aquinas’ 
presentation of the inherence theory of predication. In that presentation, the intellect’s 
composition of subject and predicate involves the predication of esse, that is to say, the 
attribution to a subject of esse taken either in the sense of existence or in the sense of a 
particular mode of being (as in ‘being white’ or ‘esse album’). In fact, even in those cases 
where the verb ‘is’ is not explicitly contained in the predicate, as in the proposition 
‘Socrates runs’, esse is attributed to some subject; for every verb can be restated with ‘is’. 
It follows that in the composition of enuntiabilia, that is to say, in the composition 
signified by subject and predicate, the intellect conceives ‘the esse of a subject’, either in 
the sense of ‘the existence of a subject’, as in the enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is’, or in the 
sense of ‘the being-so-and-so of a subject’, as in the enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is human’ 
or ‘that Socrates is white’.  
Now, enuntiabilia are the primary bearers of truth value. Although that which the 
human intellect knows in its second operation by means of enuntiabilia constitutes one 
single object, such single object is by no means simple (unum simplex). For, how could 
something which is intrinsically composed, i.e., an enuntiabile, be ‘equated to’ something 
which lacks composition, the simple actus essendi? If Aquinas’ conception of truth as 
adaequatio intellectus et rei is to be legitimate, that which corresponds ex parte rei to the 
composition of enuntiabilia will be something equally complex or composed (unum 
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complexum), at least in the paradigm case. Thus, if “esse rei” is that which all 
enuntiabilia signify in reality, then the expression “esse rei” cannot stand for simple or 
non-composite esse by itself, that is, esse considered apart from any subject in reality, of 
which it is affirmed in a way that yields a truth value. We conclude, then, that the 
expression “esse rei,” when used by Aquinas to indicate that which enuntiabilia signify, 
stands paradigmatically for the composed unit in the nature of things that is a subject or 
supposit and its esse. In other words, that which the human intellect knows by means of 
enuntiabilia in its second operation is esse, not as simple, but as “inherent” in and 
predicated of a subject or supposit. 
Aquinas’ aim at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 is to identify a propositional 
apprehension of ‘esse rei’ or ‘the esse of a thing’ in humans that in God is not really 
distinct from his apprehension of his essence, which is esse. It is precisely in the context 
of explaining divine simple knowledge of enuntiabilia that Aquinas develops a 
distinctive theory of propositions and their objects, where all propositions are related to 
existential propositions as the primary instance, so that all propositions can be seen as in 
some way predicating esse (the act of being) of a thing, and hence as signifying ‘the esse 
of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’: esse + rei. Aquinas’ association of the intellect’s second 
operation with ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ is thus a consequence of his distinctive 
view of the object of propositions. By establishing ‘esse rei’ as that which the human 
intellect’s knows by means of enuntiabilia, Aquinas is able to explain how God knows 
enuntiabilia in a simple understanding. For, inasmuch as God’s esse, which is simple, is 
cause and exemplar of all composite esse in creatures, in knowing his own esse, God 
knows that which enuntiabilia signify, although not through composition or division, but 
222 
 
simply. Nothing in this project rules out a simple conception of esse. The Distinction 38 
of the Book I of the Sentences commentary takes no position on the matter (nor, 
admittedly, does it make the distinctions necessary to address it). The question of a 
simple conception of esse is resolved by examining other texts in light of Aquinas’ 
semantic theory, which shows us that esse can, indeed, must be conceived in a simple 
conception. If esse as a simple actus essendi is said to be what is known only in 
judgment, then Aquinas fails to account for the divine knowledge of composites. The 
standard reading in Aquinas scholarship on the apprehension of esse as act, and the only 
serious alternative reading, that propositional being is meant, appear unwarranted once 
one examines the distinctive semantic theory of terms and propositions that Aquinas 
employs to explain God’s knowledge. 
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